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ABSTRACT 
Emotion is commonly considered as a disruptive factor in legal judgment and this has 
impacted on educational approaches to law, legal judgment and ethics. The first overall aim 
of the thesis is to demonstrate why it is important to include knowledge about emotion in 
legal-ethical judgment and decision-making. This aim is achieved in Chapters two and three. 
Chapter two explains what emotions are, demonstrates how emotions involve judgment and 
evaluation, and how emotions are connected to moral and ethical judgment. It is 
acknowledged that emotion can be a disruptive factor in ethical judgment but it is argued that 
the ability to account for both the positive and negative influences of emotion leads to better 
ethical judgment. Chapter three demonstrates how emotion is involved in ‘thinking like a 
lawyer’. This chapter builds on Angela Olivia Burton’s model of ‘thinking like a lawyer’, 
focusing specifically on narrative intelligence and the personal intelligences (intrapersonal 
and interpersonal). These intelligences include emotion, making Burton’s a useful model 
from which to educate law students about how to make ethical judgments that recognise the 
role of emotion. In this chapter the knowledge about emotion from Chapter two is used to 
expand the understanding of how emotion is involved in ‘thinking like a lawyer’ and legal-
ethical judgment. It is argued that including the emotional aspects of legal-ethical judgment, 
will make legal ethics education more comprehensive and better equip law students for the 
reality of making ethical judgments in practice. 
The second overall aim of the thesis is to demonstrate how knowledge about emotion could 
be introduced into legal ethics education. This aim is achieved in Chapters four and five 
through the case study of the legal ethics curriculum at the Law Faculty, University of 
Technology Sydney. Chapter four explains the context for how legal ethics curricula have 
been implemented in Australian law schools and in particular UTS Law. The chapter argues 
that educating students about the role of emotion in legal-ethical judgment is best 
implemented via the pervasive and incremental approaches.  It is further argued that the 
ethics graduate attribute, course intended learning outcome and subject learning objectives 
developed at UTS Law, provide the means from which to include knowledge about emotion 
from the previous chapters. Chapter five supports the second overall aim of the thesis by 
demonstrating how knowledge about the role of emotion in legal-ethical judgment can be 
introduced, via Burton’s model of ‘thinking like a lawyer’, into the content of specific 
teaching and learning strategies. Two subjects have been chosen in order to provide an in 
depth application of the knowledge about emotion and legal-ethical judgment from previous 
chapters. It is argued that by using concrete examples of how emotion is involved in legal-
ethical judgment and how emotion can be integrated into teaching and learning strategies,  
this thesis will provide academics with a framework from which they can formulate their own 
teaching and learning strategies with a view to achieving learning outcomes for students such 
as: increased awareness and understanding of  their own emotional capabilities and the ability 
to critically reflect on and analyse the role of emotion in ethical judgment.  
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Thesis Topic and Problem 
This thesis addresses a common omission in legal education: teaching students about the role 
of emotion in legal-ethical judgment. This oversight has been acknowledged by Susan 
Bandes who has observed that ‘even the seemingly well-developed ethical discussion is 
impoverished by the failure to address emotional variables that are bound to affect ethical and 
legal choices.’1 As discussed below, there are academics who are now considering the role of 
emotion in legal ethics and legal ethics education. This thesis contributes to that scholarship 
by considering what is important about emotion in legal-ethical judgment and how emotion 
can be implemented into a pervasive legal ethics curriculum. The thesis seeks to demonstrate 
that emotion is an integral part of legal-ethical judgment and that learning about emotion in 
such judgment is important.  
An aspect of the problem that this thesis addresses was stated in the 1980’s by an American 
law student: 
Legal education imbues its victims with a sense of importance of intellect, rationalism, and 
logic to the exclusion of feeling and caring. When we become aware of emotional stirrings we 
immediately strike out to rid ourselves of the transgressor – the intruder in our intellectual 
realm. We are unable to utilise both cognitive and emotional skills. From the day one attends 
that first law school class the relationship between head and heart is severed.
2
 
This statement is indicative of the experience of students in many Australian law schools.
3
 
Legal education privileges rationalism and promotes disengagement from emotion because it 
is a ‘transgressor’, having no place in the intellectual realm of law. This disengagement 
comes about because contemporary legal doctrine and practice valorises the objective logic of 
law and as such, the predominant view of rationality is reason free from emotion. Thus, 
emotions are viewed suspiciously, as a factor not to be considered or weighed when making 
decisions because of their passivity, potential partiality and arbitrary nature.
4
  
Erin Ryan has reviewed the ‘traditional segregation of emotion and cognition in Western 
thought’ and contends that this has ‘created a legal culture that disparages open consideration 
                                                          
1
 Susan Bandes, ‘Repression and Denial in Criminal Lawyering’ (2006) 9 (2) Buffalo Law Review 339, 344. 
2
 James R Elkins, ‘The Pedagogy of Ethics’ (1985) 10 The Journal of the Legal Profession 37, 49. 
3
 See for example ANU Law School Reform Committee, ‘Breaking the Frozen Sea: The case for reforming 
legal education at the Australian National University’ (Law School Reform ANU Law Students Society, 2010). 
The Introduction in Chapter 3 recites comments from the students at ANU regarding a lack of emotional 
engagement in law school. 
4
 David Pizarro, ‘Nothing More Than Feelings? The Role of Emotion in Moral Judgment’ (2000) 30 (4) Journal 
for the Theory of Social Behaviour 355, 356-357. 
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of emotional input’.5 Further, she argues that lawyers ‘continue to practice as though 
acknowledging emotionality in legal discourse is a betrayal of the profession.’6 According to 
the student in the quote above, this attitude begins on the first day of law school and it is on 
this day that students are introduced to the practice of ‘thinking like a lawyer’. Teaching 
students to ‘think like a lawyer’ is a manifestation of the rationalist practices of law and 
represents the ways in which students are separated from subjectivities such as emotion. 
However, there are conceptions of ‘thinking like a lawyer’ which include emotion and this 
thesis aims to expand on them.  
Legal and ethical judgment, and legal education, are currently organised around discourses 
and practises that marginalise or negate the role of emotion in judgment.
7
 This is problematic 
because there are several disciplines, including philosophy, neuroscience and psychology, 
that establish the cognitive nature of emotion and that emotion is an essential component of 
ethical judgment. Additionally, there are legal academics, drawing on a variety of disciplines, 
who explore the relationship between legal judgment, legal education and emotion.
8
  For 
example, Karen Barton and Fiona Westwood claim that traditional legal education over-
emphasises the cognitive domain at the expense of the affective domain and this results in 
students lacking preparation for all of the dimensions of legal practice, including the 
development of ‘professional character’ and conscience.9 Nigel Duncan demonstrates how 
emotion, in particular empathy, is a significant factor in developing ethical behaviour and 
argues that ‘those of us who are interested in preparing students for ethical practice as 
lawyers should be willing to address it.’10 Paul Maharg makes the following observation in 
relation to curriculum design: 
Learning a disciplinary discourse is of course a disciplined activity. But the process of 
learning a discipline need not be separated from the development of our students as persons – 
indeed the two are closely allied.
11
 
                                                          
5
 Erin Ryan, ‘The Discourse Beneath: Emotional Epistemology in Legal Deliberation and Negotiation’ (2005) 
10 Harvard Negotiation Law Review 231, 237-238. 
6
 Ibid 239. 
7
 See Dennis Lloyd, The Idea of Law (Penguin, 1964) 100-101; Ysaiah Ross, Ethics in Law: Lawyers’ 
Responsibility and Accountability in Australia (Lexis Nexis Butterworths, 2005) 27; J Shklar, ‘Law and 
Ideology’ (1964) in MDA Freeman, Lloyd’s Introduction to Jurisprudence (Sweet and Maxwell Ltd, 7th ed, 
2001) 24. 
8
 See for example Paul Maharg and Caroline Maughan (eds), Affect and Legal Education: Emotion in Learning 
and Teaching the Law (Ashgate, 2011); Susan Bandes (ed), The Passions of Law, (New York University Press, 
1999); Terry A Maroney, ‘Law and Emotion: A Proposed Taxonomy of an Emerging Field’ (2006) Law and 
Human Behaviour 119. 
9
 Karen Barton and Fiona Westwood, ‘Developing Professional Character – Trust, Values and Learning’ in 
Maharg and Maughan, above n 8, 236. 
10
 Nigel Duncan, ‘Addressing Emotions in Preparing Ethical Lawyers’ in Maharg and Maughan, above n 8, 257. 
11
 Paul Maharg, ‘Space, Absence, Silence: The Intimate Dimensions of Legal Learning’ in Maharg and 
Maughan, above n 8, 284. 
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This thesis considers the disciplinary discourse and activity of legal ethics education, how a 
curriculum can be designed to include knowledge about emotion, and how such a curriculum 
can facilitate the development of students as persons. It is therefore important to make the 
following distinction between legal ethics and professional responsibility. Legal ethics is 
defined as the decisions lawyers make about the ethical aspects of their work lives, which are 
guided by objective considerations such as formal rules which embody norms and principles, 
and subjective considerations such as moral orientation, personal values and emotion. In this 
thesis the definition of professional responsibility by Christine Parker and Adrian Evans is 
adopted. Professional responsibility refers to ‘the law of lawyering, the published rules and 
regulations that apply to lawyers and the legal profession.’12 The rules and regulations 
embody professional norms and principles relating to conduct and duty. The distinction is 
made because professional responsibility is conceptually narrower than legal ethics.
13
 As 
defined above, legal ethics are not contingent on professional rules alone, but also require 
reference to the person’s subjectivity and the term ‘ethics’ also denotes the formally and 
informally adopted norms of the profession.
14
 Accordingly, legal-ethical judgments are 
determined by reference to a lawyer’s subjectivity including personal values and emotion, 
informal norms, and formal norms as adopted in the professional responsibility rules. 
It is acknowledged that legal ethics encompasses a broad range of factors and theories and 
that emotion comprises only a portion of the whole. However, given current attitudes towards 
emotion as a factor in legal-ethical judgment, the problem that this thesis addresses is the 
marginalisation of emotion in legal ethics education. It is acknowledged that emotion can be 
a disruptive factor in ethical judgment, but it is argued that the ability to account for both the 
positive and negative influences of emotion leads to better ethical judgment. This thesis 
demonstrates that thinking about emotion is consistent with exercising legal-ethical judgment 
and ‘thinking like a lawyer’. It is further argued, that introducing the role of emotion in legal-
ethical judgment will make legal ethics education more comprehensive and better equip law 
students for the reality of making ethical judgments in practice. 
1.2 Background and Scope 
Law and emotions scholarship is said to explore ‘the reciprocal relations between emotions 
and the law’ and it ‘reflects pluralism along several dimensions.’15 Kathryn Abrams and Hila 
Keren describe the legal academy’s reception of this scholarship as ‘ambivalent’ and state 
                                                          
12
 Christine Parker and Adrian Evans, Inside Lawyers Ethics (Cambridge University Press, 2007) 3. 
13
 See for example Sally Kift, 21
st
 Century Climate for Change: Curriculum Design for Quality Learning 
Engagement in Law’ (2008) 18 Legal Education Review 1, 26-27; Gonzalo Villalta Puig, ‘Legal Ethics in 
Australian Law Schools’ (2008) The Law Teacher 29, 34; Douglas N Frenkel, ‘On Trying to Teach Judgment’ 
(2001) 12 Legal Education Review 19, 19. 
14
 Donald Nicholson and Julian Webb, Professional Legal Ethics: Critical Interrogations (Oxford University 
Press, 1999) 5. 
15
 Kathryn Abrams and Hila Keren ‘Who’s Afraid of Law and Emotions?’ (2010) 94 Minnesota Law Review 
1997, footnote 1. 
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that this attitude is ‘at sharp odds with its pragmatic potential.’16 Despite this ambivalence 
there is increasing interest and acceptance of the role of emotion in legal ethics and the role 
of emotion in legal education more generally.
17
 For example, when the emotional 
components of ‘thinking like a lawyer’ are discussed, psychological emotional intelligence 
frameworks are commonly utilised by legal academics to demonstrate the value of emotion in 
personal judgment and interpersonal skills.
18
  
Abrams and Keren argue that law and emotion scholarship has three dimensions, namely 
‘illumination, investigation, and integration’, and that the most fully realised forms of law 
and emotion scholarship will reflect all three.
19
 The ‘investigation’ dimension is realised in 
this thesis by exploring the cognitive attributes of emotion and how emotion is implicated in 
legal-ethical judgment, drawing on cognitivist philosophy, cognitive psychology and 
cognitive neuroscience in Chapter 2 and legal scholarship on ‘thinking like a lawyer’ in 
Chapter 3. The ‘illumination’ dimension is realised in Chapter 4 by demonstrating how the 
inclusion of emotional knowledge in legal ethics education is consistent with the pervasive 
and incremental approaches to learning legal ethics and institutional and faculty statements of 
the ethics graduate attribute, and in Chapter 5 by developing practical examples of how to 
teach students about ethical judgment in ways that consider the role of emotion in such 
judgment. In relation to the ‘integration’ dimension the normative goal of this thesis is to 
modify legal ethics education by expanding the concept of ‘thinking like a lawyer’ and to 
provide concrete strategies that show how knowledge about emotion can be introduced into 
legal ethics education.
20
 
                                                          
16
 Ibid 2033. 
17
 See for example Maharg and Maughan above n 8; Laurel E Fletcher and Harvey M Weinstein, ‘When 
Students Lose Perspective: Clinical Supervision and the Management of Empathy’ (2002-2003) 9 Clinical Law 
Review 135; Kristen B Gerdy, ‘Clients, Empathy, and Compassion: Introducing First Year Law Students to the 
Heart of Lawyering’ (2008-2009) 87 Nebraska Law Review 1; B A Glesner, ‘Fear and Loathing in Law 
Schools’ (1990-1991) 23 Connecticut Law Review 627; Gerald F Hess, ‘Heads and Hearts: The Teaching and 
Learning Environment in Law School’ (2002) 52 Journal of Legal Education 75; Ann Juergens, ‘Practicing 
What We Teach: The Importance of Emotion and Community Connection in Law Work and Law Teaching’ 
(2004-2005) 11 Clinical Law Review 413; John E Montgomery, ‘Incorporating Emotional Intelligence Concepts 
into Legal Education: Strengthening the Professionalism of Law Students’ (2007-2008) 39 University of Toledo 
Law Review 323; Marjorie A Silver, ‘Love, Hate and Other Emotional Interference in the Lawyer/Client 
Relationship’ (1999-2000) 6 Clinical Law Review 259; Marjorie A Silver, ‘Therapeutic Jurisprudence / 
Preventative Law and Law Teaching: Emotional Intelligence and Legal Education’ (1999) 5 Psychology, Public 
Policy and Law 1173. 
18
 See Chapter 3, 3.4. 
19
 Abrams and Keren, above n 15, 2033-2034. 
20
 Ibid footnote 1. The dimensions of law and emotions scholarship are: (1) Illumination – ‘attributes of 
cognition: law and emotions scholarship values the affective dimensions of cognition as fully as the classically 
rational, rather than understanding them as "other" or as potentially problematic departures from rationality’; (2) 
Investigation – ‘cognate literatures: law and emotions scholarship may draw on economics, biological science, 
and more objectivist social sciences, but it also draws on literature, history, philosophy and other humanist 
disciplines’; (3) Integration – ‘normative goals: law and emotions scholarship engages law not simply, or even 
primarily, to correct the cognitive responses of legal subjects in favour of greater rationality; it aims to modify 
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Terry Maroney explains the genesis and academic development of law and emotion 
scholarship.
21
 Maroney divides this field of study into six interrelated but distinct 
approaches.
22
 Relevant to this thesis are the legal actor and emotion theory approaches. The 
legal actor approach typically ‘focuses on the humans that populate legal systems and 
explores how emotion influences and informs, or should influence and inform, those persons’ 
performance of the assigned legal function.’23 According to Maroney, the highest 
concentration of empirical work has been in relation to the legal actor approach with the 
focus of much of this research being primarily focused on jurors.
24
 Lawyers as legal actors 
have also been considered. For example, the emotions of criminal lawyers have been 
considered in the context of resentment / forgiveness,
25
 empathy,
26
 outrage,
27
 revulsion,
28
 and 
joy.
29
 These emotions are commonly appraised for the impact they have on other actors such 
as victims and defendants.  
Emotion is also considered in the context of the problems experienced by some lawyers such 
as drug and alcohol abuse, depression, anxiety, divorce, suicide, stress, burnout, unhappiness, 
impaired physical health, and lack of personal satisfaction.
30
 The elevated psychological 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
law more fully to acknowledge the role of specific emotions, or to use law to produce particular emotional 
effects.’ 
21
 Terry A Maroney, ‘Law and Emotion: A Proposed Taxonomy of an Emerging Field’ (2006) Law and Human 
Behaviour 119.  
22
 Ibid 125-132.The approaches are emotion-centred, emotional phenomenon, emotion theory, legal doctrine, 
theory of law, and legal actor.  
23
 Ibid 131-132.  
24
 Ibid 132.  
25
 David M Lerman, ‘Forgiveness in the Criminal Justice System: If It Belongs, Then Why Is It So Hard To 
Find?’ (1999-2000) 27 Fordham Urban Law Journal 1663; Derek A Denckla, ‘Forgiveness as a Problem-
Solving Tool in the Courts: A Brief Response to the Panel on Forgiveness in Criminal Law’ (1999-2000) 27 
Fordham Urban Law Journal 1613. 
26
 Charles J Ogletree, ‘Beyond Justifications: Seeking Motivations to Sustain Public Defenders’ (1992-1993) 
106 Harvard Law Review 1239. 
27
 Abbe Smith, ‘Too Much Heart and Not Enough Heat: The Short Life and Fractured Ego of Empathic, Heroic 
Public Defender’ (2003-2004) 37 Davis Law Review 1203. 
28
 Bandes, above n 1.  
29
 Abbe Smith and William Montross, ‘The Calling of Criminal Defense’ (1998-1999) 50 Mercer Law Review 
443. 
30
 Bandes, above n 1, 342; Patrick J Schiltz, ‘On Being a Happy, Healthy, and Ethical Member of an Unhappy, 
Unhealthy, and Unethical Profession’ (1999) 52 Vanderbilt Law Review 871; Marjorie A Silver, Sanford 
Portnoy and Jean K Peters, ‘Stress, Burnout, Vicarious Trauma, and Other Emotional Realities in the Lawyer / 
Client Relationship’ [2002-2004] Touro Law Review 847; Martin Seligman, Paul R Verkuil and Terry H Kang, 
‘Why Lawyers Are Unhappy’ (2005) 10 Deakin Law Review 49; Lawrence S Krieger, ‘The Inseparability of 
Professionalism and Personal Satisfaction: Perspectives on Values, Integrity and Happiness’ (2004-2005) 11 
Clinical Law Review 425; G Andrew H Benjamin, Elaine J Darling and Bruce Sales, ‘The Prevalence of 
Depression, Alcohol Abuse, and Cocaine Abuse Among United States Lawyers’ (1990) 13 International 
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distress of law students has also been examined. Some academics have expressed concern 
that law school environments, and approaches to education that privilege rationality over 
humanistic concerns, cause or contribute to student distress and depression.
31
 Research, 
conducted at the Australian National University found that, after the first year of law school, 
students showing an increase in rational thinking and lower levels of experiential thinking 
reported increased symptoms of psychological distress and depression.
32
 It is not within the 
scope of this thesis to examine lawyer or law student depression, anxiety, problematic 
behaviours, or the causes of these problems. Nor is it within the scope of this thesis to 
substantiate any claim that the inclusion of emotion in legal education will ameliorate the 
psychological problems experienced by some students. The focus of this thesis is on the 
implementation of emotional knowledge in legal ethics education by utilising one of the key 
models of rational thinking: ‘thinking like a lawyer’. It is argued that including knowledge 
about emotion in learning how to ‘think like a lawyer’ will enable students to make better 
judgments because they will be better equipped to understand the role of emotion in those 
judgments. It is argued that this will improve ethical judgment and analytical skills which 
will ultimately benefit students in legal practice. Therefore, this thesis is confined to 
considering the role of emotion in legal-ethical judgment and how students, as legal actors, 
can be educated about ethical judgment that includes emotion. Academics, as legal actors, are 
implicated in this process because they devise and deliver the means of educating students in 
the law, including its forms of reasoning and the methods by which legal judgments are to be 
reached.  
The emotion theory approach typically examines a particular theory of emotion and analyses 
whether, or to what degree, the current law reflects that theory, and whether the theory should 
be adopted.
33
 For example, in the field of emotion theory and criminal law, much of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Journal of Law and Psychiatry 233; Connie Beck, Bruce Sales and G Andrew H Benjamin, ‘Lawyer Distress: 
Alcohol-Related Problems and Other Psychological Concerns Among A Sample Of Practicing Lawyers’ (1995-
1996) 10 Journal of Law and Health 1; Lila Vrkleski and John Franklin, ‘Vicarious Trauma: The Impact on 
Solicitors Exposure to Traumatic Material’ (2008) 14 Traumatology 106; Beaton Consulting, ‘New Survey finds 
professionals have more depressive symptoms than general population’(Media Release, 13May 2007) 
http://www.beyondblue.org.au/index.aspx?link_id=105.898&oid=921 (12/11/09).   
31
 Molly Townes O’Brien, Stephen Tang and Kath Hall, ‘Changing Our Thinking: Empirical Research on Law 
Student Wellbeing, Thinking Styles and the Law Curriculum’ (2011) 21 (2) Legal Education Review 149; James 
Alfini and Joseph Van Vooren, ‘Is There a Solution to The Problem of Lawyer Stress? The Law School 
Perspective’ (1995-1996) 10 Journal of Law and Health 61; Phyllis Beck and David Burns, ‘Anxiety and 
Depression In Law Students: Cognitive Intervention’ (1979-1980) 30 Journal of Legal Education 270; G 
Andrew H Benjamin et al, ‘The Role of Legal Education in Producing Psychological Distress Among Law 
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research has focused on victims, jurors and defendants, exploring emotions such as disgust, 
shame, remorse and the desire for revenge.
34
 Whilst this thesis does not directly analyse 
whether a particular theory of emotion is reflected in particular laws, this approach is still 
relevant. This thesis falls within this approach because it utilises emotion theory to 
demonstrate how emotion influences ethical judgment and how this can be introduced into 
legal ethics education. It is argued that emotions are forms of evaluative judgment that 
encompass perceptions, beliefs, values and motivations. However it is impossible, given the 
vast array of theories, to include the perspectives of all the disciplines that deal with emotion 
and cognition. This thesis analyses and synthesises knowledge from cognitive neuroscience, 
cognitivist philosophy, and cognitive psychology. These disciplines have been chosen 
because they are compatible in some respects and because of the extensive research into the 
relationship between cognition and emotion establish the role of emotion in judgment.  
Neuroscience is a branch of biological science and relates to the study of the nervous system. 
Cognitive neuroscience includes the study of language, emotion and decision-making. 
Antonio Damasio is a neurologist and neuroscientist and is a leading researcher on emotion 
and decision-making.
35
 Damasio distinguishes between primary emotions which are 
instinctual, and secondary emotions which involve cognitive evaluations, are acquired 
through experience and can be modified by learning. These emotions are more social in that 
they require other people for their existence and they are a behavioural factor that can steer 
our interactions with the environment. Secondary emotions include moral emotions, such as 
contempt, anger and sympathy. Damasio’s research ‘has shown that emotion is integral to the 
process of reasoning and decision-making, for worse and for better’ and the findings ‘suggest 
that selective reduction of emotion is at least as prejudicial for rationality as excessive 
emotion.’36 
There has been resurgence in the philosophical theories of emotion in the latter half of the 
twentieth century and into the twenty-first, many of which build on the Aristotelian and Stoic 
understandings of emotion. These theories refute the reason / emotion dichotomy and restore 
the role of emotion in moral judgment. For example, philosophers who offer cognitive 
theories of emotion contend that emotions are an essential element of intelligence, not just a 
support for intelligence.
37
 In general, these philosophers consider emotion to be a form of 
judgment, composed of certain kinds of beliefs, values, and appraisals. The mental evaluative 
process involved in emotion produces thoughts. The thought of the object of the emotion, the 
belief about the object and the recognition of the object’s salience enable people to identify 
                                                          
34
 For examples see Bandes, above n 8. 
35
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2000) 41. 
37
 Martha Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions (Cambridge University Press, 2001) 
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with the emotional experience and the object of the emotion.
38
 These philosophers primarily 
focus on what they call higher cognitive emotions which include moral emotions. These 
emotions are the same as Damasio’s classification of secondary emotions. In relation to 
ethical judgment, the philosopher Martha Nussbaum contends that emotion shapes our 
assessment of right and wrong. Nussbaum argues that emotions are forms of judgment
39
 and 
the evaluations contained in them can be right or wrong, not just appropriate or 
inappropriate.
40
  
Cognitive psychology examines mental processes often related to problem-solving, decision-
making, memory and language.
41
 A specific example of a theory within this paradigm is 
appraisal theory. Essentially, appraisal theorists contend that ‘emotions are elicited by 
evaluations (appraisals) of events and situations.’42 Appraisal theory takes a functional 
approach to emotion. Appraisals lead to reactions and the function of those reactions is to 
deal with specific situation types having some significance for the individual.
43
 Appraisal 
theory resonates with Damasio’s, and cognitivist philosophy’s explanation of the evaluative 
function of emotion.  
All of these disciplines recognise the role of emotion in cognition, judgment and decision-
making. Additionally, they recognise that emotion is a form of knowledge because of its 
evaluative content. Because these disciplines see emotion as cognitive they also assist in 
expanding what is meant by ‘thinking like a lawyer’. ‘Thinking like a lawyer’ is premised on 
cognitive processes and if emotion is cognitive, then emotion is involved in ‘thinking like a 
lawyer’. Additionally, ‘thinking like a lawyer’ is a process in which judgments are made and 
because emotions are involved in judgment, emotion has a role to play in ‘thinking like a 
lawyer’. Some literature on ‘thinking like a lawyer’ considers emotion and this thesis 
examines this more closely. The original contribution this thesis makes is to build on and 
expand conceptions of ‘thinking like a lawyer’ that include emotion by giving a more detailed 
and practical account and linking this to legal-ethical judgment and education. Further, this 
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 Ibid 27-31. 
39
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40
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41
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University Press, 2003). 
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thesis applies this knowledge and provides practical examples which demonstrate how 
emotion can be integrated into classroom teaching and learning strategies. 
1.3 Aims 
There are two overall aims of this thesis. The first is to demonstrate why it is important to 
include knowledge about emotion in legal-ethical judgment and decision-making. This aim is 
achieved in Chapters 2 and 3. Chapter 2, ‘Emotion and Judgment’ explains what emotions 
are, demonstrates how emotions involve evaluative judgments, and how emotions are 
implicated in moral and ethical judgment. Chapter 3, ‘Thinking like a Lawyer: 
Professionalism, Ethics and Emotion’ demonstrates how emotion is involved in ‘thinking like 
a lawyer’. The analytical framework of ‘thinking like a lawyer’ is relevant to legal-ethical 
judgment and decision-making because this is another form of problem-solving undertaken 
by lawyers. This chapter builds on Angela Olivia Burton’s model of ‘thinking like a lawyer’, 
focusing specifically on narrative intelligence and the personal intelligences (intrapersonal 
and interpersonal).
44
 The knowledge about emotion from Chapter 2 is used to expand on the 
understanding of the involvement of emotion in legal-ethical judgment. It is argued that 
Burton’s is a useful model from which to educate law students about how to make ethical 
judgments that recognise the role of emotion, thereby improving the ability of students to 
‘think like a lawyer’. 
The second aim of the thesis is to demonstrate how knowledge about emotion could be 
introduced into legal ethics education. This aim is achieved in Chapters 4 and 5. These 
chapters involve a case study of the legal ethics curriculum at the Law Faculty, University of 
Technology Sydney. Chapter 4, ‘Case Study Part One: UTS Law Legal Ethics Curriculum 
Development’ explains the context for how legal ethics curricula have been implemented in 
Australian law schools and in particular UTS Law. It is argued that emotional knowledge in 
legal ethics education is best implemented via the pervasive and incremental approaches.  
The chapter demonstrates that the ethics graduate attribute, Threshold Learning Outcome 
(TLO), Course Intended Learning Outcome (CILO) and subject learning objectives 
developed at UTS Law provide the means from which to introduce knowledge about emotion 
from the previous chapters. Thus, it is argued that these factors provide the educational 
justification for including the role of emotion in legal-ethical judgment at an institutional and 
subject level. Chapter 5, ‘Case Study Part Two: Introducing Emotional Knowledge into Two 
Core Law Subjects at UTS Law’ demonstrates how knowledge about the role of emotion in 
legal-ethical judgment can be introduced, via Burton’s model of ‘thinking like a lawyer’, into 
specific teaching and learning strategies in an educationally justified way. This is achieved by 
developing the content of teaching and learning strategies for the subjects Ethics and 
Professional Conduct, and Evidence and Criminal Procedure. Two subjects out of the five 
core law subjects embedding the ethics graduate attribute have been chosen in order to 
provide a detailed application of the emotional knowledge from previous chapters. It is 
                                                          
44
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argued that by using concrete examples of how emotion is involved in legal-ethical judgment 
and how emotion can be integrated into teaching and learning strategies, this thesis will 
provide  academics  with a framework from which they can formulate their own teaching and 
learning strategies with a view to achieving learning outcomes for students such as: increased 
awareness and understanding of  their own emotional capabilities and the ability to critically 
reflect on and analyse the role of emotion in ethical judgment. It is further argued that by 
including emotion, students will gain a more comprehensive understanding of ‘thinking like a 
lawyer’ and that their ability to make ethical judgments will improve. 
1.4 Methodology  
In order to achieve the overall aims, the thesis is divided into two parts each comprising two 
chapters.  As described above, the first part of the thesis demonstrates why it is important to 
include knowledge about emotion in legal-ethical judgment and decision-making. The 
content of this part of the thesis will be elaborated on in the chapter summary below.  The 
second part of the thesis comprises a case study, the aim of which is to demonstrate how 
knowledge about emotion could be introduced into legal ethics education. The methodology 
employed in the second part of the thesis is outlined in this section.  
1.4.1 Case Study – Chapters 4 and 5 
The sociologist Randy Stoecker describes the qualitative case study, not as a method in the 
typical sense,
45
 but as a ‘design feature’ or ‘frame’ that determines the boundaries of 
information gathering.
46
 Stoecker defines a case study as ‘those research projects which 
attempt to explain holistically the dynamics of a certain historical period of a particular social 
unit.’47 According to Stoeker, this definition takes into account multi-methodological 
approaches and places emphasis on the theoretical and historical components of the study.
48
 
The choice of theory determines the explanation of phenomena and history places emphasis 
on the explanation of process and context.
49
 The qualitative case study has also been 
described as an approach ‘that facilitates exploration of a phenomenon within its context 
using a variety of data sources.’50 This thesis combines these approaches and has the 
following scope: 
 Consideration of the dynamics and phenomena involved in developing a legal ethics 
curriculum that includes the emotional aspects of legal-ethical judgment;  
                                                          
45
 For example, the investigation of individuals, organisations, communities or societies. 
46
 Randy Stoecker, ‘Evaluating and Rethinking the Case Study’ (1991) 39 (1) The Sociological Review 88, 98. 
47
 Ibid 97-98. 
48
 Ibid 98. 
49
 Ibid 93-94. 
50
 Pamela Baxter and Susan Jack, ‘Qualitative Case Study Methodology: Study Design and Implementation for 
Novice Researchers’ (2008) 13 (4) The Qualitative Report 544, 544. 
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 during the 2013 curriculum review; 
 within the social unit and context of the Faculty of Law, University of Technology 
Sydney (UTS); and  
 using data sources such as UTS Course Intended Learning Outcomes and curriculum 
development policy, law subject outlines, teaching materials, and faculty coursework 
policies. 
Therefore, this thesis places emphasis on the social unit of UTS Law and the historical 
process and context involved in developing the ethics graduate attribute and its 
implementation into core law subjects. The purpose of the case study is to demonstrate how 
knowledge about emotion and its relationship to ‘thinking like a lawyer’ and ethical judgment 
can be introduced into a pervasive legal ethics curriculum in an educationally justified way. 
The reason for choosing UTS Law Faculty will be elaborated on in the next section.  
An instrumental case study provides a general understanding of a phenomenon using a 
particular case.
51
 This type of case study has been chosen because the intent behind it is to 
gain insight and understanding.
52
 The phenomenon that the case study considers is the 
question of how to recognise and critique the emotional aspects of ‘thinking like a lawyer’ in 
legal ethics education. This cannot be considered without the context of law school 
pedagogies. Thus, the particular case analysed is the substance and form of the program of 
legal ethics education at UTS Law. In summary, Chapter 4 provides the educational 
justifications for introducing knowledge about emotion into the legal ethics curriculum at 
UTS Law. Chapter 5 demonstrates how knowledge about emotion can be introduced into the 
content of specific teaching and learning strategies. Both chapters support the second overall 
aim of this thesis because they demonstrate how knowledge about emotion could be 
introduced into legal ethics education at an institutional and a subject level. 
There are different approaches to the delivery of legal ethics education in Australian law 
schools. They include single foundational and vocational subjects, and the pervasive 
approach which embeds legal ethics in core legal subjects throughout the curriculum. From 
2014, UTS Law uses a combination of a first year foundational subject and pervasively 
embeds legal ethics throughout the core law curriculum via the ethics graduate attribute. This 
curriculum change provides the opportunity to demonstrate the justifiability of introducing 
knowledge about emotion into this form of curriculum.  
Literature in legal ethics education suggests that the preferred approach to teaching and 
learning ethics is the pervasive approach.
53
 It is preferred because, when legal ethics pervades 
                                                          
51
 Kenneth Harling, ‘An Overview of Case Study’ http://www.farmfoundation.org/news/articlefiles/284-
1_harling.pdf (09/07/2012). 
52
 Baxter and Jack, above n 50, 550. 
53
 See for example Deborah L Rhode, ‘Ethics by the Pervasive Method, (1992) 42 Journal of Legal Education 
31; Deborah L Rhode, Professional Responsibility: Ethics by the Pervasive Method (Aspen Publishers, 2
nd
 ed, 
1998); Steven Hartwell, ‘Promoting Moral Development Through Experiential Learning’ (1994-1995) 1 
Clinical Law Review 505; Russell G Pearce, ‘Teaching Ethics Seriously: Legal Ethics as the Most Important 
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the curriculum, opportunities to explore ethical issues and to practice making ethical 
judgments are frequent and arise in different contexts. The pervasive approach should ideally 
coincide with the incremental approach.  
The incremental approach allows time for students to recognise and reflect upon ethical 
issues and develop knowledge and skills gradually.  In Chapter 3 it will be demonstrated that 
emotion is involved in ‘thinking like a lawyer’ and that this analytical framework is 
employed in legal-ethical judgment. ‘Thinking like a lawyer’ is relevant to legal-ethical 
judgment because this is another form of problem solving encountered by lawyers. It is 
generally accepted that learning how to ‘think like a lawyer’ needs to take place pervasively 
and incrementally. Similarly, allowing students to develop emotional awareness and acumen 
requires time to recognise, reflect, and develop insights and to make connections to values 
and beliefs.
54
 In other words, if ethical judgment is best learned by a pervasive and 
incremental approach, then learning emotional judgment should also pervade the curriculum 
and be developed incrementally. 
The ‘judgment approach’ is less of an approach to teaching and more of an approach to 
ethical decision-making.
55
 This approach acknowledges that ethical questions arise in every 
subject and this provides opportunities to explore the ethical issues, rules and obligations, and 
the way judgments are made.
56
 It is in this way that it is an approach to teaching because the 
approach recognises that ethics and learning how to make ethical judgments should pervade 
the curriculum. As an approach to ethical decision-making the judgment approach 
encompasses a broad conception of legal ethics. It emphasises the process of decision-making 
and encourages students to learn that discretion is inevitable in practice, that reflective 
deliberation and justification for choices are key professional attributes, that legal ethics and 
morality are not mutually exclusive, and that lawyers need to develop their own sense of 
morality.
57
 In Chapter 2 it will be demonstrated that emotion is a form of judgment and that 
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Loyola University Chicago Law Journal 719; Barry Sullivan and Ellen S Podgor, ‘Respect, Responsibility and 
the Virtue of Introspection: An Essay on Professionalism in the Law School Environment’ (2001) 15 (1) Notre 
Dame Journal of Law, Ethics and Public Policy 117; Dennis Turner, ‘Infusing Ethical, Moral and Religious 
Values Into a Law School Curriculum: A Modest Proposal’ (1999) 24 (2) University of Dayton Law Review 
283. 
55
 Maxine Evers, Leanne Houston and Paul Redmond, ‘Good Practice Guide (Bachelor of Laws): Ethics and 
Professional Responsibility (Threshold Learning Outcome 2)’ 2011. Support for the original work was provided 
by the Australian Learning and Teaching Council Ltd, an initiative of the Australian Government Department of 
Education, Employment and Workplace Relations, 3. 
56
 Ibid. 
57
 Michael Robertson, ‘Renewing a Focus on ethics in Legal Education’ (2004), 3-4, 
http://anulaw.anu.edu.au/sites/all/files/users/u4081600/Conference_docs/mikerobertson.pdf (17/05/13). 
Chapter One: Introduction 
 
13 
 
emotion is connected to morals and ethics. Therefore, emotion is implicitly related to the 
judgment approach to ethical decision-making.  
1.4.1.2 Why UTS? 
Graduate attributes are developed by individual universities and are standards that describe 
the capabilities, skills, qualities and characteristics graduates will have attained at a particular 
university and in a particular degree. Following a curriculum review in 2007, the first round 
of graduate attributes was embedded into core subjects at UTS Law. In 2013, the law faculty 
at UTS undertook another curriculum review for the purpose of developing new graduate 
attributes and embedding them in core law subjects in a more co-ordinated way. This was 
instigated by university policy that required each faculty to develop Course Intended 
Learning Outcomes (CILOs) that conformed with the Australian Qualifications Framework 
(AQF). At UTS the CILOs are based on graduate attributes and the standards in each degree 
are determined by the AQF. The ethics attribute that was embedded in the 2007 curriculum 
review has been retained under the recent curriculum review, although the statement of the 
attribute has been reformulated to accord with the AQF standards. At UTS embedding the 
attributes, including the ethics attribute, is done both incrementally and pervasively 
throughout the degree. 
The UTS Law faculty is the context for the case study and was chosen for the following 
reasons. UTS Law has, prior to the 2013 curriculum review, attempted to develop a pervasive 
and incremental approach to legal ethics, by embedding the ethics graduate attribute in three 
core law subjects. However, it is questionable whether the pervasive and incremental 
approaches were fully realised in that attempt. The 2013 curriculum review provided an 
opportunity to analyse that problem and to consider the relevant educational factors and 
strategies that would improve the pervasive and incremental approaches and introduce the 
judgment approach to ethical decision-making.  Because the legal ethics curriculum at UTS 
combines different approaches, the case study provides conclusions from which 
generalisations can be made about the inclusion of emotion in ethical judgment and legal 
ethics education. As such, the insight and understanding gained from this case study can be 
transferred and adopted in other law school settings where the pervasive and incremental 
approaches to legal ethics are utilised.  
1.5 Chapter summary 
Chapter 2: Emotion and Judgment 
The overall purpose of this chapter is to articulate how emotions contain evaluative 
judgments and why it is important to account for the influence of emotion on judgment, 
including ethical judgment. It begins by distinguishing emotional terminology (i.e. affect, 
mood, feeling, emotion) for the purpose of clarifying that this thesis is dealing with the 
concept of emotion. The thesis deals with emotion because of the specific kinds of evaluation 
involved which link emotion to judgment. The explanation of what emotions are, the kinds of 
evaluation involved in emotion, and why people have emotional responses, are placed into 
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three broad interrelated categories for the purpose of the thesis: perception, cognition, and 
emotional dispositions. This chapter looks at the content of emotion generally so that the 
specific application of emotion in legal thinking in Chapter 3 makes more sense. Following 
from this, emotion as a factor in moral judgment is briefly considered and then the specific 
moral emotions of empathy, sympathy, anger and contempt are examined. Empathy and 
sympathy are emotions associated by some legal academics in the interpersonal aspect of 
‘thinking like a lawyer’ and are included in Chapter 3. Empathy, sympathy, anger and 
contempt arise in the materials used in Chapter 5 and are applied in the content of teaching 
and learning strategies in that chapter. It is for this reason that the evaluative content of these 
emotions are explained in Chapter 2. 
Chapter 3: Thinking like a Lawyer: Professionalism, Ethics and Emotion 
This chapter demonstrates how emotion is involved in legal judgment, specifically ‘thinking 
like a lawyer’. Legal-ethical judgment and decision-making involves the same analytic and 
problem-solving structures as ‘thinking like a lawyer’.  Some of the literature on ‘thinking 
like a lawyer’ considers emotion and this thesis builds on this scholarship by incorporating 
the knowledge about emotional from Chapter 2. This thesis adopts Burton’s model of 
‘thinking like a lawyer’ and argues that this model is an appropriate vehicle from which to 
educate law students about how to make judgments, including ethical judgments that 
recognise the role of emotion. This chapter further argues that including the emotional 
aspects of ‘thinking like a lawyer’ in legal ethics education will enable students to make 
better judgments because they will be more equipped to understand and account for the role 
of emotion in those judgments. Burton’s model is appropriate because it is the most explicit 
in identifying the capacities involved in ‘thinking like a lawyer’ where emotion is relevant, 
specifically narrative intelligence and the personal intelligences. The cognitive content of 
narrative intelligence is explained briefly followed by a detailed explanation of the emotional 
content of narrative intelligence. The personal intelligences involve intrapersonal and 
interpersonal intelligences and a detailed explanation of the role of emotion in these 
intelligences is given. This thesis contributes to a better understanding of the role of emotion 
in legal-ethical judgment because it expands on the function of emotion contained in Burton’s 
model. 
 
Chapter 4: Case Study Part One: UTS Law Legal Ethics Curriculum Development 
There are three overall aims of this chapter. Firstly, to explain the context of how legal ethics 
curricula have been implemented in Australian law schools and UTS in particular. This 
provides the context for the incremental and pervasive approach adopted by UTS Law. 
Second, it is argued that knowledge about emotion and judgment in legal ethics should be 
done pervasively and incrementally because learning about emotion is consistent with these 
approaches. Third, to demonstrate that the ethics graduate attribute, Course Intended 
Learning Outcome (CILO) and subject learning objectives developed at UTS Law, provide 
the means from which to incorporate knowledge about emotion from the previous chapters. 
This chapter initiates the case study by charting and analysing the development of the 
incremental and pervasive approach to legal ethics at UTS Law. The analysis of the 2007 
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curriculum review briefly critiques the attempt to embed the ethics attribute pervasively and 
incrementally in that period. The analysis of the 2013 curriculum review explains the 
development of the ethics graduate attribute, the corresponding CILO, the new subject 
learning objectives and the process of improving the pervasive and incremental approach to 
legal ethics at UTS. It is argued that these factors provide the educational justification for 
including the role of emotion in legal-ethical judgment at an institutional level and for 
implementing emotional knowledge into the legal ethics curriculum at UTS Law.  
Chapter 5: Case Study Part Two: Introducing Emotional Knowledge into Two Core 
Law Subjects at UTS Law  
This chapter demonstrates how knowledge about the role of emotion in legal-ethical 
judgment can be introduced, via Burton’s model of ‘thinking like a lawyer’, into specific 
teaching and learning strategies in an educationally justified way. This is achieved by 
developing the original content of teaching and learning strategies for two core law subjects: 
Ethics and Professional Conduct, Evidence and Criminal Procedure. The content of the 
teaching and learning strategies advanced in this chapter contribute to a better understanding 
about the different ways in which emotion is involved in legal ethics and how educators can 
incorporate knowledge from other disciplines. It is argued that by using concrete examples of 
how emotion is involved in legal-ethical judgment and how emotion can be integrated into 
teaching and learning strategies, this thesis will provide academics with a framework from 
which they can formulate their own teaching and learning strategies with a view to achieving 
learning outcomes for students such as: increased awareness and understanding of  their own 
emotional capabilities and the ability to critically reflect on and analyse the role of emotion in 
ethical judgment. It is further argued that by including emotion, students will gain a more 
comprehensive understanding of ‘thinking like a lawyer’ and that their ability to make ethical 
judgments will improve. 
There are five core subjects embedding ethics at UTS, however two have been chosen to 
provide an in depth application of the emotional knowledge from Chapters 2 and 3. The 
subject Ethics and Professional Conduct is an example of how emotion already features in the 
ethics curriculum at UTS Law. This subject began to include the role of emotion in legal-
ethical judgment in 2013. In this subject there are three topics where emotion is considered in 
detail. The first topic is ‘theoretical perspectives of values, morals and ethics’ and the 
emotional themes and knowledge that arise here are: how narratives disclose and convey 
values and emotion; the relationship between morality, personal values and emotion; 
interpersonal intelligence, perspective taking and empathy; and Burton’s model of ‘thinking 
like a lawyer’. The second topic is ‘professional and personal conduct’ and the emotional 
themes and knowledge that arise here are: analysis of narratives to disclose the role of 
emotion in legal and ethical judgment; intrapersonal intelligence; the defining features of 
anger and its justifiability; emotional dispositions and emotional beliefs; and emotional 
defence mechanisms and self-awareness. The third topic is ‘duty to the court – criminal law’ 
and the emotional themes and knowledge that arise here are: emotional motivations, 
compassion and sympathy; and emotion as a guide to ethical choice. This subject will not be 
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running from 2015. However, the emotion and judgment content has been adapted for the 
new foundational subject Ethics, Law and Justice which commenced in 2014.   
The subject Evidence and Criminal Procedure is an example of how emotion, as conceived in 
Chapters 2 and 3, could be implemented into a subject embedding the ethics graduate 
attribute. From 2014 this subject embeds the ethics attribute via a specific learning objective. 
However, ethics is not the substantive focus of the subject and as such the ethical content is 
not as comprehensive as it is in Ethics and Professional Conduct. It is for this reason that only 
one strategy in relation to the role of emotion in legal-ethical judgment has been formulated 
for this subject. The emotional themes and knowledge that arise here are: how emotion is 
used persuasively by lawyers to create narratives in order to influence juror decision-making; 
and an in depth analysis of the evaluative properties and moral justifiability of contempt. 
Chapter 6: Conclusion 
The thesis concludes by summarising the arguments and outcomes of each chapter and how 
they relate to the overall aims of the thesis. The teaching and learning strategies advanced in 
this thesis demonstrate that emotion does not belong to a realm outside of law and legal 
thinking. Emotion is involved in ‘thinking like a lawyer’ and it is only a transgressor in the 
intellectual realm when it is not properly accounted for in judgment. Importantly, this thesis 
recognises that students have subjectivities that will influence the way they learn law and 
perform as ethical practitioners. Instead of ignoring or repressing the subjectivity and 
emotional experiences of students, it is important that students bring them into the classroom 
and identify their relevance in legal practice. 
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2.0 EMOTION AND JUDGMENT 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter will primarily consider the evaluative judgments contained in emotion and this 
will be referred to as emotional judgment. It is argued that understanding emotional judgment 
leads to better self-awareness and the ability to educate ones-self about emotional capacities 
and responses. It is further argued that with this awareness decision-makers are better able to 
account for the positive and negative influences of emotion on judgment including ethical 
judgment. Theories about emotion are diverse but for the purpose of this thesis establishing 
emotions’ role in judgment is done by drawing on knowledge primarily from the disciplines 
of neuroscience and cognitivist philosophy. This chapter will draw on elements of 
psychology albeit in a necessarily limited way, in order to supplement those other disciplines. 
This chapter does not purport to be a comprehensive review of the literature. The disciplines 
and theorists selected represent the most current or dominant thinking; they are compatible in 
some respects and their extensive research into the relationship between cognition and 
emotion establish the role of emotion in judgment. In order to demonstrate the role of 
emotion in judgment, the way in which emotion is defined, its evaluative properties and the 
reasons why people have emotional responses will be examined. 
This thesis does not seek to provide an authoritative definition of emotion as this is an almost 
impossible task. In part, the problem of defining emotion relates to the variances between 
disciplines and ‘many aspects of emotion are described differently depending on the 
context.’1 Whilst acknowledging that feeling is a property of emotion, emotion is the central 
theme because the evaluations involved can be the subject of analysis leading to better self-
awareness. For the purpose of this thesis the following distinctions are made between the 
terms mood, affect and feeling. A mood is defined as sustaining a feeling or an emotion over 
a long period of time.
2
 Moods do not have to be directed toward a specific object and can 
include feelings of well-being or malaise, calm or tension.
3
 Affect is defined as an 
accumulation of different but related emotional concepts, both in the sense of personal 
experience or internal emotional state (feeling / emotion / mood) and as an emotional display 
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or external emotional state (emoting).
4
 This definition is consistent with definitions from 
psychology, where affect is used as a generic term to include several emotional concepts and 
distinguished from emotion. The primary distinction between emotion and affect in the 
psychological literature is that the defining feature of affect is the valence dimension: positive 
or negative, good or bad, pleasant or unpleasant.
5
 Emotions can be affective but it is generally 
recognised that there is no one defining characteristic that applies to all emotions.
6
 Feelings 
are defined as being sensory, in that they encompass bodily feelings and the perception of 
those feelings.
7
 The relationship between perception and feeling will be elaborated on in Part 
2.2 and the relationship between feeling and emotion in Part 2.3. 
In addition to emotional terminologies there are also different categories of emotion often 
referred to as basic emotion and higher cognitive emotion. The basic emotions identified by 
the anthropologist Paul Eckman in the 1960-s include happiness, sadness, anger, fear, 
surprise and disgust. These emotions are considered as innate and they are further typically 
characterized by their rapid onset and short duration.
8
 Higher cognitive emotions include 
love, guilt, shame, embarrassment, pride, envy and jealousy.
9
 One factor that differentiates 
higher cognitive emotions from basic emotions is, as the name suggests, that they are more 
cortical and more capable of being influenced by conscious thoughts, and this also makes 
them more culturally variable.
10
 The neurologist and neuroscientist Antonio Damasio 
classifies emotion into primary (or universal) emotion and secondary (or social) emotion.
11
 
Primary emotions involve innate emotional dispositions and have clear correlations to the 
basic emotions just described in that they are innate, pre-organised, physiological and 
psychological, and include happiness, sadness, fear, anger, surprise and disgust.
12
 Secondary 
emotions involve acquired emotional dispositions and likewise have a correlation to higher 
cognitive emotions in that they are social and involve cognitive evaluation. For the purpose 
of consistency and clarity Damasio’s terminology will be adopted throughout this thesis. 
The evaluative properties of emotion and the reasons why people have emotional responses 
are considered in this chapter in three broad and interrelated categories: perception, cognition 
and emotional dispositions. In philosophy these categories are often considered separately 
with theorists giving accounts of emotion that emphasise one over the other. In essence there 
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is debate over the essential properties of emotion and how it should be defined.
13
 However 
the neuroscientist Antonio Damasio’s conception of emotion traverses all three categories. 
For example, Damasio demonstrates that perception informs the cognitive evaluation 
involved in emotion and that people can perceive an object of emotion in a certain way 
because of emotional dispositions. This thesis does not give preference to any one account 
because as will be shown, there is no one definition of what constitutes an emotion that is 
appropriate and applicable across contexts. The three categories are used as umbrella terms 
from which to synthesise knowledge about the evaluative properties of emotion and how they 
inform judgment. Further it will be established that perception, cognition and emotional 
dispositions are relevant to moral judgment.  
The overall purpose of this chapter is to articulate how emotions contain evaluative 
judgments and why it is important to account for the influence of emotion on judgment, 
including ethical judgment. The aim of Part 2.2 is to demonstrate that the perception of the 
object of emotion has evaluative content and produces emotional responses. Perceptual 
theories primarily deal with primary emotion but as will be shown, perception is essential to 
the moral domain. In relation to cognition, the aim of Part 2.3 is to demonstrate that the 
thought of the object of emotion is evaluative and produces emotional responses. The belief 
and value attached to the object of the emotion can be influenced by how the object is 
perceived and by dispositional learning based on past emotional experience. Philosophers 
who offer cognitivist theories of emotion primarily deal with secondary emotion including 
moral emotions.  
Emotional dispositions are habits of thought and action based on past emotional experience 
that produce emotional responses. The aim of Part 2.4 is to demonstrate how emotional 
dispositions influence the perception of the object of the emotion and the formation and 
retention of the beliefs that underpin emotion. In this way emotional dispositions influence 
the judgments that are made about the object of the emotion and emotional responses. 
Acquired emotional dispositions are focused on in Part 2.4 because they are more capable of 
re-education and relate to secondary emotions like moral emotions. This is important because 
it shows that engaging in emotional education is an ongoing process and leads to more 
rational judgment. Because this thesis deals with legal-ethical judgment the aim of Part 2.5 is 
to demonstrate how emotions are specifically situated within moral and ethical judgment. 
Here emotion has perceptive and evaluative functions. The part considers how emotion is 
implicated in moral judgment by considering the evaluative content of empathy, sympathy, 
anger and contempt. Empathy and sympathy were chosen because they are relevant to 
building on the understanding of the role of emotion in ‘thinking like a lawyer’ in the 
following chapter and all of these emotions are applied in the content of teaching and 
learning strategies in Chapter 5. 
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2.2 Perception 
Perception can be defined as ‘a sensory means of gathering information about our 
environment’.14 Early theories about perception are closely related to the bodily changes that 
occur when an emotion is experienced. This part will briefly consider the inception of a non-
cognitive theory of emotion and then consider how this theory has been developed to 
encompass cognition and therefore judgment.  
The inception of non-cognitive theory of emotion, meaning non-conscious,
15
 is attributed to 
the nineteenth century psychologist and philosopher William James. James argued that by 
itself a judgment or evaluation (thought) could not produce an emotional state.
16
 According to 
James all emotions are feelings caused by physiological changes that arise through the 
unconscious perception of certain objects, and what distinguishes different emotions is that 
each involves the perception of unique bodily changes.
17
 This account of emotion is 
problematic because, for example, it only relates to the perception of the immediate 
environment and the subsequent emotional response.
18
 It does not account for emotional 
responses that arise through thinking and imagination and this is perhaps why the 
neuroscientist Antonio Damasio considers James’s theory as applicable only to primary 
emotions like fear or disgust.  
Damasio uses James’s theory as a platform from which to develop his definition of primary 
emotion.
19
 The kind of perception that James describes as emotion is distinguished as feeling 
by Damasio. According to Damasio, feeling is the perception of the changes to bodily 
sensations and thoughts when emotion is experienced.
20
 Primary emotion involves firstly 
perception / feeling then a cognitive evaluation. Secondary emotion involves firstly a 
cognitive evaluation then bodily changes that accompany the emotion. Damasio recognises 
that emotions can involve simple or complex evaluations and that the physiological changes 
to the body, including the brain, result in further mental activity.
21
 Damasio distinguishes 
between emotion and feeling but also acknowledges the relationship between them, 
considering feeling as an essential component of emotional experience. This is how 
perception is connected to emotion and judgment. That thoughts can trigger emotional 
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states
22
 is a critical difference between James and Damasio. Damasio recognises that primary 
emotions usually arise from the perception of the immediate environment, but that secondary 
emotions usually arise through the cognitive evaluation of the object of the emotion.  
The philosophers Jesse Prinz and Julien Deonna consider emotions as perceptions. Prinz has 
built on James’s conception of emotion as the perception of somatic states. Prinz argues that 
emotions have somatic and semantic properties that can be perceived, meaning that emotions 
also appraise concerns such as danger, threat or loss in the environment.
23
 Deonna 
acknowledges some important limitations in the theory of emotion as perception. For 
example in relation to the connection between feeling fear and appraising danger it is possible 
to be frightened of a mouse without believing it is dangerous; ‘emotions can be triggered by 
real as well as imagined circumstances, while perception cannot.’24 In recognising these 
limitations Deonna contends that not all emotions can be construed as perceptive because 
some, perhaps contempt and regret, are fully evaluative.
25
 However, as will be demonstrated 
below in relation to empathy and in Part 2.5 in relation to contempt, perception is a property 
of moral emotion. Deonna addresses these limitations in his conception of emotion as 
perception, however only one aspect will be elaborated on below as it demonstrates the 
relationship between perception, evaluation and emotional dispositions.  
Deonna considers perception as a way of tracking or gathering information about the world 
and observes that there are two dimensions to perception: factual and perspectival. The 
factual dimension is what James and Prinz consider in their concepts of perception of objects 
in the immediate environment. Perspective is how things look from the standpoint of the 
individual.
26
 Deonna argues that this perspectival dimension is also relevant to emotion and 
that the contrast between emotion and perception ceases to be important if emotion is 
considered as a perspectival perception.
27
 This means emotion evaluates what is significant in 
the environment according to the perspective of the person.
28
 Perspective is influenced by 
emotional dispositions and this in turn affects the evaluation of the object or environment. 
Deonna makes a distinction between emotional dispositions which represent long-standing 
evaluative tendencies and character traits or temperaments. Both influence perception but 
emotional dispositions are more likely to relate to specific situations and specific emotions 
which lead to certain emotional reactions.   
                                                          
22
 Damasio, above n 2, 6. 
23
 Jesse J Prinz, ‘Is Emotion a Form of Perception?’ (2006) 36 Supplement [vol. 32] Canadian Journal of 
Philosophy 137, 149. Like James’s theory Prinz’s conception more readily accommodates immediate, passive 
and short-term emotional responses see Goldie, above n 13, 934. 
24
 Deonna, above n 14, 31. 
25
 Ibid 32. 
26
 Ibid 32. 
27
 Ibid 34. 
28
 Ibid 39. 
Chapter Two: Emotion and Judgment 
 
22 
 
The influence of emotional dispositions on perception is important because it assists in 
overcoming one of the limitations of emotion as perception as outlined above. To return to 
the example of being afraid of a mouse without believing it to be dangerous; the person’s 
emotional disposition contains evaluative beliefs about mice so that whenever they see a 
mouse they automatically fear it even though this is not cognisant with their belief that mice 
are not dangerous. Deonna observes that emotion is subject to error and classifies this 
problem as a systematically defective emotional response or as a phobia.
29
 In this example 
the perceptual system connected to emotion systematically induces fear, which is the 
disposition, and according to Deonna this can be corrected so that dispositional emotional 
beliefs become cognisant with fact.
30
 This re-education is done by people engaging in an 
evaluation of their emotional responses and the beliefs that underpin them in order to change 
perception. This process of evaluation and re-education will be discussed further below in 
Part 2.4 on emotional dispositions and the educability of emotion.  
Perception also directly relates to secondary emotions and the moral domain. This has less to 
do with somatic states and more closely resembles Deonna’s perspectival dimension of 
perception.  The philosopher Arne Johan Vetlesen contends that emotions, in particular 
empathy and sympathy, are perceptive and provide access to the moral domain.
31
 Being 
moral according to Vetlesen involves how we relate to others and it is to perceive, judge and 
act with concern for the well-being and distress of others.
32
 Perception, according to 
Vetlesen, is a way of seeing the suffering of others and this perceptive capacity depends on 
the emotional capacity of empathy. Without empathy the perceptive capacity to see suffering 
would be impaired or non-existent.
33
 Accordingly, perception is to have the moral sensibility 
of recognising the suffering of others.  
Vetlesen then states that it is our attitudes toward ourselves, not other’s attitude towards us, 
that has to change if a change in moral conduct is to be effected. He gives the example of a 
racist person shifting from ‘being a racist’ to ‘having once been a racist’ and that this 
presupposes a shift in the nature of the attitude towards him or herself.
34
 This is similar to 
what Deonna observes about emotional dispositions, character traits or temperaments and the 
influence they have on perspective. In order to change these qualities and attitudes it is also 
necessary to change the values and beliefs that underpin them because this influences how the 
object is perceived. Racist attitudes are typically coupled with the emotions of hate and anger 
and engaging in the re-education of attitudes also implies the re-education of these emotions.  
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In this Part, perception and its relationship to emotion has been considered in an embodied 
sense and in an evaluative sense. For James the perception of bodily sensations is an emotion; 
for Damasio primary emotion involves the perception of feelings plus an evaluation; and for 
Prinz emotions have somatic and semantic appraisal properties which are perceptions. This 
kind of perceptual theory has been linked with gut reactions and intuition, and they appear to 
be limited to primary emotions. Deonna recognises the somatic and factual properties of 
perception but by introducing the idea of perspective his theory is a more plausible argument 
for emotions as perceptions. For Deonna emotion does not arise out of perception, it is a form 
of perception providing evaluative knowledge from the perspective of the person. Deonna’s 
conception of emotion as perception appears to be able to accommodate more cerebral 
emotions. Vetlesen deals with secondary emotions, specifically moral emotions. Perception is 
to have the moral sensibility of seeing suffering in others and the ability to have this 
perspective is influenced by character traits and temperament. This aspect of perception will 
be returned to in Part 2.5. 
2.3 Cognition 
Amongst the different philosophical perspectives, the development of cognitivist theories of 
emotion have contributed significantly to understanding the properties of emotion and they 
have been described as ‘currently the most widely favoured [theories] of emotion among 
philosophers’.35 At the heart of such theories is the notion that emotions are intellectual and 
following the Stoics, philosophers who offer cognitivist theories of emotion generally 
identify emotion with judgment or appraisal, meaning affirmations or denials of propositions 
or appearances.
36
 According to these philosophers the mental evaluative process involved in 
emotion produces thoughts, and these thoughts contain propositions and propositional 
attitudes.
37
 That is, the thought of the object, the belief about the object and the recognition of 
the object’s salience enables a person to identify with the emotional experience and the object 
of the emotion.
38
 Emotional beliefs if true justify the emotion, if false invalidate the emotion, 
and thus they can assist or impede judgment.
39
 It is clear that these philosophers diverge from 
the Stoic account of emotion in that emotions are not simply irrational beliefs that affect 
decision-making negatively. Whether an emotion is deemed appropriate or inappropriate 
depends on whether a person ‘gets the appraisals right, using a defensible theory of value.’40 
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Accordingly, these philosophers refute the view that emotion is antithetical to reason and 
seek to establish emotion’s role in rationality.  
Another consistency between theories that are cognitivist and Stoic philosophy is that 
cognition is essential to the identity of emotions and feeling does not distinguish particular 
emotions. There are two primary reasons for the distinction between feeling and cognition: 
feelings are not intentional in that they are not directed toward an object and there is no 
propositional thought that accompanies them. Intentionality and propositional thought are 
concepts central to theories that are based on cognition and this will be elaborated on below. 
The consequence of this view is that feeling has no role in identifying the emotion or in the 
appraisal of the situation or experience. In this paradigm what distinguishes one emotion 
from another is the cognitive evaluation of the object or situation. Consequently, philosophers 
who are cognitivists have refuted William James’s position that emotions can be 
distinguished through our perception and awareness of physiological changes only.
41
 
However, these philosophers are primarily concerned with secondary emotions whereas 
James’s theory relates to primary emotions. In the following discussion, intentionality and 
propositional thought will be considered. Further, the criticisms of cognitivist theory that 
have arisen because it does not give adequate attention to feeling or primary emotion will be 
addressed. 
In general, philosophers who are cognitivists contend that emotions are intentional because 
they are directed toward an object (a person, thing or event). Those intentional states of mind 
include thought, and the content of the thought is represented as a proposition.
42
 Further, they 
maintain that in order to have an emotion, a person must have an attitude directed at a 
proposition. If, for example, Y’s car has been stolen by X, X is the object and Y’s thought 
that X stole the car is the proposition. Y is angry at X because Y believes X stole the car, Y’s 
belief is the propositional attitude which is also a thought. Anger is connected to the 
propositional attitude and if the belief is true then the anger is justified. The propositional 
attitude has evaluative content because Y has to choose between accepting or rejecting the 
belief that X stole the car.  
However there is disagreement amongst philosophers about the defining features of cognition 
and the evaluative properties of emotion. Martha Nussbaum contends that emotions are 
cognitive
43
 because: 
1. They have an object.  
2. The object is an intentional object – emotion embodies a way of seeing, the 
intentional object figures in the emotion as it is seen or interpreted by the person 
whose emotion it is. 
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3. Emotions do not simply embody ways of seeing an object, but beliefs about the 
object. ‘Again, these beliefs are essential to the identity of the emotion: the feeling of 
agitation all by itself will not reveal to me whether what I am feeling is fear or grief or 
pity. Only an inspection of the thoughts discriminates.’ 
4. ‘Finally, we notice something marked in the intentional perceptions and the belief 
characteristic of emotions: they are concerned with value, they see their object as 
invested with value or importance… The value perceived in the object appears to be a 
particular sort. It appears to make reference to the person’s own flourishing. The 
object of the emotion is seen as important for some role it plays in the person’s own 
life.’44 
Point 2 relates to perception and although Nussbaum refers to an embodied way of seeing, 
she is not referring to the sensory capacity of perception. The perception of the object is 
intentional in that the thought of the object results in the emotion, and the way the object is 
thought of depends on the person’s interpretation of it. Deonna’s theory of perspectival 
perception is very similar because according to him emotion tracks how things are in the 
world and those evaluations depend on the person’s perspective. Following from intentional 
perception, emotions are further characterised by beliefs about the object. These beliefs or 
propositional attitudes are essential to the identity of the emotion with the distinction being 
clearly drawn in point 3 that feelings alone cannot delineate particular emotions. Point 4 
relates to the recognition of the object’s salience denoting its value or importance.  According 
to Nussbaum, emotional judgments are a subclass of value judgments
45
 and not all beliefs are 
emotional. Emotional beliefs are those that define the emotion and if true, justify it.
46
 Thus, 
according to Nussbaum, the defining elements of an emotion are evaluative judgments based 
on intentionality, belief and value as related to the object of the emotion. 
Jerome Neu holds a similar view to Nussbaum in relation to the lack of intentionality in 
feeling. Neu contends that sensations or bodily feelings ‘may mark the difference between 
emotions and non-emotions, but generally they are not what marks the experience as the 
distinctive emotion it is.’47 Like Nussbaum, Neu denies that feelings have any utility in 
understanding the identity of the emotion because they lack intentionality. That is, we can 
only discern or interpret whether our bodily feelings relate to an emotion by thinking and 
evaluating information about the object or situation creating those feelings. According to 
Neu, emotions are defined by certain kinds of thought. For example Neu makes the following 
distinction between envy and jealousy. Jealousy is typically about what one possesses and 
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fears to lose, whereas envy is about something that a person desires to possess.
48
 These 
emotions are not just about fear and desire they are also distinguished by the object of the 
emotion and the thought of the object. Neu states that jealousy is directed toward a valued 
object (usually another person); a desiring as well as a desired object.
49
 The fear, which 
involves the thought that a rival may possess the object, produces jealousy. Envy is directed 
toward an object, a person, who possesses a particular thing or quality that is desirable.
50
 The 
thought of the value attached to the thing or quality and the lack of possession of the thing or 
quality, produces envy. This example also demonstrates that primary emotions are involved 
in secondary emotions and that there is additional thought in relation to how the object is 
perceived and valued. Importantly neither Nussbaum nor Neu discount the fact that people 
experience feelings and that they are related to emotion. Indeed, Nussbaum clearly states that 
‘all human experiences are embodied, and thus realised in some kind of material process.’51 
The point these philosophers are making is that people know the emotion they are 
experiencing and why they are experiencing it because they think about it. Both Nussbaum 
and Neu equate emotional cognition with a mental evaluative process. 
Robert Solomon argues that basing cognition on the properties of belief and thought is too 
narrow to encompass the gamut of emotional experiences. Solomon recognises that beliefs 
and emotions are related but contends that beliefs are too dispositional to capture the essence 
of emotion.
52
 Solomon observes that ‘thoughts are too episodic for emotions, which often 
turn out to be enduring processes’ and that not all emotions are cerebral as implied by 
thought.
53
 Solomon defines emotional cognition as a complex of evaluative judgments 
through which people are engaged in the world. In this way judgment can capture an array of 
emotional qualities. For example, if cognition is judgment widely construed then emotion can 
be perceptive and can apply to the immediate situation. Emotional judgments can also be 
made without perceiving an object and encompass thought and belief.
54
 Solomon argues that 
defining emotion as judgment provides flexibility in the analysis of different kinds of 
emotion and the different kinds of cognition involved.
55
 This includes feeling which is part of 
the complex of judgments that constitute emotion. In responding to the criticism
56
 of 
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cognitivist philosophy for omitting or giving inadequate attention to the role of feeling in 
emotion Solomon argues, that feelings are ‘judgments of the body – felt bodily engagements 
with the world.’57 
According to Solomon, cognition means judgment and judgment can be both non-
propositional and pre-reflective. Therefore feeling can be a form of judgment. Recognising 
that emotional judgment can be non-propositional means that feeling is an internal 
communication and the ‘judgments of the body’ provide evaluative knowledge. Solomon is 
not specific about the content of this evaluative knowledge; however this characterisation 
seems to be close to the interrelationship of emotion and feeling recognised by Damasio. That 
is, the ‘felt bodily engagements’ described by Solomon are analogous to Damasio’s 
conception of feeling as the perception or awareness of the changes in our body state as well 
as our thoughts. Damasio recognises that dispositional learning influences the evaluations 
involved in emotion, likewise Solomon recognises that our ‘knowing responses’ may have 
more to do with habit and practice.
58
 Damasio analogises that emotion and feeling are twins, 
so that ‘emotions play out in the theatre of the body’ and ‘feelings play out in the theatre of 
the mind.’59 Solomon states that feelings are ‘not distinct from cognition… and they are not 
mere “read-outs” of processes going on in the body’.60 Damasio states that ‘feelings are not a 
mere decoration added onto the emotions’ because our thoughts can trigger emotional states 
and engender feelings, so that ‘bodily emotions become the kind of thoughts we call 
feelings.’61 This could be construed as meaning that bodily feelings require interpretation, 
interpretation requires thought, and thought involves evaluation. If this is so then feelings are 
evaluative and inform the cognitive evaluations involved in emotion through perception and 
awareness. The extent to which they do so would likely depend on the kind of emotion 
experienced. 
It has been observed by the philosopher John Deigh that philosophers who are cognitivists 
have trouble in accounting for primary or ‘primitive emotions’ as he calls them, because they 
focus on emotions as intentional states and thoughts represented as propositions.
62
 Deigh 
states that primitive emotions such as fear and anger are instinctive in the sense that they are 
an inherited trait, and that their development depends on environmental conditions and 
meeting basic biological needs.
63
 Thus, if the thought content in every intentional state is a 
proposition, a belief or judgment, primary emotions cannot be accounted for because of their 
instinctual character.
64
 According to Deigh another problem with propositional thought 
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applying to all emotions is that it presupposes linguistic capacities and it is apparent that 
primary emotion is common to both humans and animals, and is experienced in human 
infancy.
65
 Belief and judgment are predicated on linguistic capacity and this is how they 
represent cognitively. Deigh contends that philosophers who advance cognitivist theories of 
emotion ‘must find a way to explain some of those thoughts as non-propositional so as to 
avoid making the possession of linguistic capacities a condition of being liable to 
emotions.’66 
Deigh’s point about propositional thought presupposing linguistic capacities is an argument 
levelled at Stoic philosophy because Stoics denied emotion to children and non-human 
animals. Martha Nussbaum agrees that the Stoic account of emotion requires modification 
because it is ‘overly focused on linguistically formulable propositional content’ and this leads 
Nussbaum to explain an aspect of her neo-Stoic view.
67
 Stoics saw judgment as an assent to 
an appearance and that assent was always a voluntary or deliberate act, they also had a 
demanding doctrine of self-monitoring.
68
 Nussbaum responds to Deigh’s criticism by arguing 
that these aspects of Stoic philosophy do not have to be accepted in order to accept their 
general view on judgment, because assent can also be involuntary. Nussbaum explains that 
such things as ‘habit, attachment, and the sheer weight of events may frequently extract 
assent from us.’69 Nussbaum is attempting to account for instinctual emotional properties. 
However habits and attachments are formed whereas instincts are innate. Further, even if it is 
accepted that assent can be involuntary, linguistic capacity is still a problem because in order 
to form habits and attachments, beliefs and judgments are made and retained for which 
linguistic capacity is required.
70
 
Defining emotion as cognition alone is problematic as it does not fully account for embodied 
emotional experiences and the more instinctual emotions. However cognitivist theories of 
emotion provide valuable insights into the content of secondary emotions. The idea that these 
emotions are evaluative and are defined by belief, thought or judgment provides a framework 
from which to analyse the evaluations contained in emotions. As has been demonstrated 
above the belief, thought and judgment involved in emotion can be influenced by how the 
object is perceived. The way in which the object is perceived can be influenced by belief, 
thought and judgment. How the latter arises is related to emotional dispositions. 
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2.4 Emotional Dispositions 
Emotional dispositions are habits of thought and action based on past emotional experience 
that produce emotional responses. In Part 2.2, a connection was made between perception and 
emotional dispositions. Emotional dispositions influence the perspective taken about the 
object of emotion and they affect the way in which the object is perceived. Apart from 
perception, emotional dispositions influence how objects are valued and they influence the 
formation and retention of beliefs that underpin emotion. In this way, emotional dispositions 
influence the judgments that are made about the object and the consequent emotional 
response. This part explains the content of acquired emotional dispositions, how they cause 
certain emotional responses and how they can be re-educated. Acquired emotional 
dispositions, as opposed to innate dispositions,
71
 are focused on because they relate to 
secondary emotion, and therefore moral emotion, and because they are more capable of being 
re-educated. Engaging in emotional education is an ongoing process and this is important 
because it can lead to judgment that is more rational. 
Over an individual’s life-time they will have an array of emotional experiences and through 
this accumulate knowledge, and become disposed to habits of thought and behaviour that 
produce certain emotional responses. In relation to the content of acquired emotional 
dispositions, Damasio states that when the mind evaluates the object of emotion it is 
informed by dispositional learning about the object of the emotion and past emotional 
experience.
72
 Dispositional representations are related to recallable images and are acquired 
through experience, thus they constitute a memory.
73
 Dispositional representations ‘embody 
knowledge pertaining to how certain situations usually have been paired with certain 
emotional responses, in your individual experience.’74  
Similarly David Arkush, drawing on research from social psychology, describes knowledge 
structures as ‘the building blocks of cognition’; they are schemas which enable people to 
perceive, classify, interpret, communicate and reason.
75
 There are two major ways in which 
emotion influences knowledge structures. Firstly, emotion influences the schemas that are 
applied to interpret events and when an emotion is activated, the schema associated with that 
emotion identifies and recalls (mood) congruent material from memory.
76
 Secondly, emotion 
‘moderates the formation and reformation of knowledge structures’.77 Arkush states, that if a 
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negative schema is formed through emotional association it is not readily undone by 
rationality; rather it is more effectively counteracted by altering the perceived emotional 
association.
78
 According to Damasio and Arkush, emotional dispositions are acquired through 
experience and are constituted by memories and schematic knowledge structures that pair 
past emotional experiences to the current object of the emotion, thus influencing the 
evaluation of and the response toward the object of the emotion. 
The philosopher Amelie Rorty theoretically examines the formation and causes of 
individuals’ emotional dispositions. Individual dispositions can be characterized as the stable 
characteristics, including emotion, within people that produce behaviour.
79
 What a person 
selects or omits from their consideration of the emotion’s object is determined by their traits 
which in turn determine the beliefs and desires that are salient and important to them. This 
affects judgment because people are habituated toward thinking and acting on emotion in 
certain ways. Emotions can conflict with judgment or distort perception. Rorty asserts that 
people conserve emotions that are not rational to the immediate object of the emotion, 
because they conserve inappropriate or anomalous beliefs towards the intentional component 
of the emotion.
80
 Accordingly, if a person changes their belief in relation to the object their 
reaction to it will go from being irrational to being rational. Like Aristotle, Rorty states that 
‘how people succeed in changing emotions that they judge inappropriate or irrational closely 
follows the more general explanation of how people change their habits.’81  
Envy will be used to illustrate the content and influence of acquired emotional dispositions. A 
person is envious of a colleague who has just been given a promotion because that colleague 
is more qualified to do the job. Envy is directed toward the person (the object) who received 
the promotion and is based on the desire of possessing what the person does not possess (the 
propositional attitude). The schema involves two evaluations, that what the rival has is good 
and it is bad that they have it and you don’t.82 In this example the envious person has been 
denied promotions previously and has accumulated feelings of resentment as a result. The 
emotional disposition toward envy and the associated feeling of resentment was acquired 
through past experience and stored in autobiographical memory so that a negative emotional 
schema was formed. This means that the person will view the current situation through their 
negative emotional schema and will almost always feel resentment to some degree at 
another’s success in similar situations. The feelings of envy and resentment may be based on 
beliefs that favouritism is involved or that the person is undervalued. In this example these 
beliefs are irrational; the other person was selected because they were more qualified.  
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Emotional self-awareness would allow a person to examine their emotional beliefs in light of 
their own qualifications and whether their colleague was in fact more qualified to do the job. 
In this way they are engaging in emotional education because they are analysing their beliefs, 
and recognising that their beliefs are not cognisant with fact. They are also making a further 
evaluation that the feeling of envy is unpleasant or being envious is an unpleasant state and 
because of that they want to change. Despite being overly simplified this example shows that 
the examination of emotional dispositions and reorienting emotional beliefs is not an easy 
process. Acknowledging that emotional schemas have been formed, and that this leads to 
emotional reactions in and of itself is difficult particularly when people are in turmoil. 
Additionally the insinuation in the example that the person may lack emotional self-
awareness, is a value judgment because it pre-supposes that the envious person is in pain and 
because of that should want to change.  
The philosopher Peter Goldie acknowledges that emotions can be misleading when people 
are in turmoil and where people are ignorant of emotion. Goldie argues that if people don’t 
have the right ‘prudential and moral’ emotional dispositions then emotions can distort 
perception and reason and in this way emotions ‘skew the epistemic landscape’.83 Goldie’s 
theory of the educability of emotion draws on Aristotle’s explanation of character and 
weakness of will. Goldie also sees the educability of emotion as a matter of habituating 
emotional capabilities with practical reason as a lifelong lesson.
84
 Goldie also describes the 
educability of emotion as 
a matter of coming to understand your emotional capabilities, and the power of the emotional 
desires which are expressions of those capabilities. Once you do have this understanding, you 
are in a better position further to educate your capabilities over time, and in a better position 
to exercise authority on an occasion over your emotional desires.
85
 
Goldie suggests that people begin with uncultured, genetically endowed psychological 
capabilities for emotion and, through education of the emotions in a culturally informed 
world, the capabilities for emotion will develop and change.
86
 Further, people should not 
avoid responsibility for their emotions, although some are passive and cannot be controlled, 
because that is to be ignorant of the possibility of educating emotions so that emotional 
responses are consonant with deliberated rational choice.
87
 This is significant for legal ethics 
education because it indicates that opportunities should be provided in that context for 
students to better understand their emotional capabilities and the impact of emotion on ethical 
judgment.  
Acquired emotional dispositions influence the way that the object of the emotion is perceived 
and valued. They also influence the formation and retention of beliefs that underpin an 
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emotion. This means that emotional dispositions can influence what is evaluated and how it is 
evaluated in the emotional experience. The ability to trace and recognise the cause of an 
emotional disposition is an element of emotional self-awareness. The ability to examine the 
validity of the beliefs underpinning emotion forms the basis of educating emotional 
capabilities and this leads to more rational judgment. Engaging in emotional education leads 
to the ability to control emotion, experience emotion appropriately and to form habits of 
thought that enable people to see what is and is not relevant to their judgments and why. 
2.5 Emotion in moral judgment 
Definitions of morality, ethics and the properties of moral and ethical judgment are debated 
topics amongst philosophers
88
 and it is not within the scope of this thesis to engage in those 
debates. For the purpose of this thesis the following definitions are adopted. Morals are 
related to a person’s character, and their values and beliefs as to what is right or wrong. 
Moral judgment reconciles action to moral principles and beliefs.
89
 Ethics denotes proper 
behaviour in the social system in which morals are applied. Ethical judgment reconciles 
normative standards and moral judgment. Thus there is a relationship between moral and 
ethical judgment. As with other forms of judgment, emotion is involved in moral judgment 
and can be ‘subject to critical reflection and moral evaluation.’90 As in the previous 
discussion of emotion, moral emotions can have perceptive, motivational and evaluative 
functions. As discussed in Part 2.2, Vetlesen considers the perceptive functions of empathy 
and sympathy as providing access to the moral domain. According to Vetlesen, the exercise 
of moral judgment is made possible by the ability to have certain emotions and the passing of 
a moral judgment requires a balance between the emotional and cognitive faculties.
91
  
Similarly the philosophers Justin D’Arms and Daniel Jacobson argue that the most important 
connection between ethics and emotion ‘arises from the quasi-judgmental, quasi-perceptual 
character of emotional experience.’92  
Many philosophers contend that a part of moral education is the education of the emotions.
93
 
It is for this reason that it is important to understand the functions and evaluative properties of 
emotion in this context. This will be done by considering the specific moral emotions of 
empathy, sympathy, anger and contempt. These emotions have been chosen because they 
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arise in the content of teaching and learning strategies presented in Chapter 5.
94
 Moral 
emotions are a category of secondary emotions and the cognitive evaluations outlined in Part 
2.3 are the same but there are additional defining features of these emotions which will be 
discussed here.  
While there is no one definition of moral emotion, it can be understood in the following 
ways.
95
 According to the psychologists Pfister and Bohm, emotions are moral because of the 
contexts in which they arise.
96
 Emotions can reflect pre-existing concerns such as beliefs and 
principles.
97
 Emotions are responses ‘to moral violations’ or ‘motivate moral behaviour’.98 
Emotions have been said to influence ‘the link between moral standards and moral 
behaviour.’99 Empathy is experienced toward the distress or joy of another, and thus empathy 
denotes concern for the welfare of others.
100
  
2.5.1 Empathy and Sympathy 
The terms empathy and sympathy are often used synonymously.
101
 They are seen as other-
suffering emotions,
102
 commonly defined as being about concern for others and involving 
perspective about the other’s situation. For example empathy has been defined as having both 
cognitive and affective aspects. The cognitive aspect of empathy is the ability to understand 
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the point of view of another person and this is its perspective-taking role.
103
 The affective 
aspect of empathy, which can be the result of perspective-taking, is ‘the vicarious emotional 
response that occurs when exposed to the emotions of another.’104 However, being defined by 
perspectives and vicarious emotional responses is ambiguous and could equally be used to 
describe other emotions, including sympathy. 
The psychologist Lauren Wispe makes a clear distinction between empathy and sympathy. 
The difference between them primarily involves the way the object of the emotion is 
perceived and this is related to the evaluative judgment made about the object. According to 
Wispe: 
Sympathy refers to the heightened awareness of another’s plight as something to be 
alleviated. Empathy refers to the attempt of one self-aware self to understand the subjective 
experiences of another self. Sympathy is a way of relating. Empathy is a way of knowing.
105
 
Sympathy is about increased sensitivity to another’s emotions and it relates to negative 
emotions because it involves the urge to mitigate the suffering of the other person.
106
 If this 
definition is accepted then there are two evaluative beliefs that underpin sympathy. There is 
the belief that another person is suffering and the belief that the suffering can be alleviated. 
Sympathy is a response of compassion or concern and does not involve reproducing the 
emotion perceived in the other; it is a specific emotional state.
107
 The emotional state of 
sympathy involves feelings of sorrow and concern and being motivated by these feelings to 
help.
108
 Empathy can motivate people to help but not necessarily and this is why sympathy is 
seen as the more moral of the two emotions.
109
  
Empathy requires self-awareness, imaginal and mimetic capacities, in order to comprehend 
non-judgmentally the positive or negative experiences of another person.
110
 The object of 
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empathy is to understand the other person
111
 thus empathy is not a discrete emotion but is an 
emotional process
112
 and can be manifest in any emotion.
113
 Because of this, the beliefs that 
are attached to empathy can vary. According to Deonna there are two interacting conditions 
which are necessary and sufficient for empathy: awareness of another person’s emotion and 
feeling ‘in tune’ with the other person.114 Awareness involves being conscious of the kind of 
circumstances the other is in and the way in which the other psychologically relates to those 
circumstances.
115
 Feeling ‘in tune’ means experiencing a ‘token emotion of the same type as 
experienced by the person empathised with’.116 Although stated differently, Deonna and 
Wispe’s definitions both involve evaluations about the object, the environment and the 
object’s emotional experience. 
In the above definitions the properties of sympathy include a response of compassion or 
concern and empathy includes the non-judgmental comprehension of another’s experience. 
The assumption is that people can direct sympathy and compassion to anyone and they are 
always benevolent. However, even the defenders of compassion acknowledge that people are 
more likely to sympathise with people who are like them.
117
 Further, Lauren Berlant observes 
that compassion 
implies a social relation between spectators and sufferers, with the emphasis on the 
spectator’s experience of feeling compassion and its subsequent relation to material 
practice.
118
 
Berlant goes on to critique this view of compassion with regard to socio-political rhetoric. 
This view provokes consideration of how the object of the emotion is perceived and the 
motivations behind compassion, sympathy and empathy. Nussbaum defines compassion in 
part as ‘occasioned by the awareness of another person’s undeserved misfortune.’119 
Similarly, empathy involves a judgment that the other is worthy of concern. According to 
Nussbaum, if a person is at fault for their suffering then blame and reproach are the likely 
reactions. However the philosopher Diana Cates disagrees with Nussbaum. Cates observes 
that it is possible to make a moral judgment and have compassion for a person who is 
responsible for their misfortune, further the question of whether the person brought suffering 
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on themselves is never straightforward.
120
 Additionally ‘the spectator’s’ experience is 
orientated around the privilege of not being in the same situation as the sufferer and 
‘compassion is figured in terms of unequal relations of power.’121 Berlant alludes to this 
imbalance, it redirects focus to the motivations of the ‘spectator’ and requires 
acknowledgment that sympathy, empathy and compassion can be used strategically, 
rhetorically or insincerely.  
2.5.2 Anger 
Anger and contempt are seen as other-condemning emotions that judge the propriety of the 
actions of other people.
122
 Anger as a basic emotion is a ‘response to goal blockage and 
frustration’ however it is also a moral emotion.123 Anger is sometimes thought to be an 
immoral emotion that requires suppression or control because it can produce anti-social 
behaviour, but anger can also motivate people to stand against perceived injustices and to 
demand retaliatory or compensatory action and as such is not always a negative emotion.
124
 
Consideration needs to be given to whether the emotional response of feeling anger and any 
resulting actions are justified and proportionate.
125
 
Aristotle recognised anger as a moral emotion defining it as  
an impulse, accompanied by pain, to a conspicuous revenge for a conspicuous slight directed 
without justification towards what concerns oneself or towards what concerns one's friends… 
It must be felt because the other has done or intended to do something to him or one of his 
friends. It must always be attended by a certain pleasure-that which arises from the 
expectation of revenge.
126
 
For Aristotle, anger is a social emotion caused by a belief that an unjustified offence has been 
directed toward the individual or their friends. Anger is apparently linked to honour because 
the expectation of revenge means that the individual believes they can rectify the unjustified 
wrong and restore their standing or well-being.
127
 In a similar vein the philosopher Gabriele 
Taylor contends that there are three defining features of anger. Firstly anger is not just 
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directed toward the object ‘it attracts our desire to hit back’ and so there must be a capacity 
for accountability;  secondly anger is connected to human agency and responsibility and can 
be the result of intentional, stupid, clumsy or inconsiderate actions; and thirdly the loss of 
well-being is seen as undeserved and unfair.
128
 Taylor argues that for anger to be justified it 
must also satisfy further conditions: 
a) The object of the anger must exist; 
b) The wrong suffered must actually be wrong and this involves: 
c) A well-founded notion of what is due to the individual or others, otherwise the wrong 
cannot be regarded as undeserved or unfair; 
d) A belief that the agent held responsible is capable of recognising dues either because 
the agent belongs to a class expected to conform to certain standards or because in the 
particular situation it is proper to make certain demands of them; and 
e) Anger toward X is justified if it is X and no-one else who brought about the harm.129 
In order to illustrate the features and conditions of anger consider the example from Part 2.3 
where Y is angry because X stole Y’s car. A moral (and a legal) standard been breached in 
the form of taking another’s property without their consent; this trespass is the injustice. X is 
the object and as a human agent has the capacity for accountability and responsibility and X’s 
actions have affected the well-being of Y. On the basis that (a) the object X exists, the wrong 
is justifiable (b) if: 
(c) Y has a well-founded notion of what is due, which could be the expectation that 
personal property should not be interfered with and that any interference, here a 
trespass, is unjust and wrong; 
(d) X is part of a class expected to conform to the standards of the criminal law, of which 
stealing is a breach; and  
(e) X, not anyone else, actually stole the car. 
Conditions (c)-(e) involve evaluations. In (c) the evaluation involves a consideration of moral 
standards of right and wrong, in (d) the evaluation involves an assessment of whether the 
agent should comply with the standards, and in (e) the evaluation involves examining the 
belief that X stole the car and no-one else. This example considers the justifications for anger 
as an emotional response but what has not been considered are Y’s ensuing thoughts of 
revenge, retaliation or compensation. If Aristotle’s definition of anger is correct then Y will 
derive a certain pleasure from the thought of bringing X to justice and this may motivate Y to 
act against the injustice. 
The philosophers Justin D’Arms and Daniel Jacobson accuse Taylor of falling into a 
‘moralistic fallacy’ which is ‘to infer from the claim that it would be wrong or vicious to feel 
an emotion, that it is therefore unfitting.’130 However, their argument is premised on an 
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improper interpretation
131
  and a lack of contextualisation. D’Arms and Jacobson contend that 
Taylor:  
expresses sympathy for the thought that anger might be systematically wrong to feel, on the grounds 
that ‘it is wrong to be so concerned with what is due to one’… 
Unfortunately, Taylor takes this moral objection to feeling anger as a demonstration that ‘anger… 
should be classed among those emotions which one is never justified in feeling’.
132
 
 
This is an unfair criticism given that the whole of Taylor’s essay demonstrates the necessary 
conditions for angers’ justifiability. Taylor acknowledges that justifying anger is ‘a 
complicated process’ and even if all the above conditions are satisfied it does not imply that a 
person ‘ought to feel angry.’133 Taylor then goes on to demonstrate situations where a lack of 
anger is evidence of a failing in perception or belief and it is reasonable to say that a person 
‘ought to’ have felt anger.134 The emotions of envy and jealousy are contrasted because it is 
difficult to say a person ‘ought to’ feel jealous or envious when these emotions are evidence 
of a character weakness.
135
 Even if the premises of Taylor’s arguments are not accepted, she 
cannot be accused of considering anger as an emotion that is never justified. Taking the quote 
in its entirety, Taylor is simply raising the possibility that this moral objection to anger is 
arguable but, as in the case of jealousy, ‘amounts to a justification of the moral system 
adopted, and so is beyond the scope of this paper.’136 Therefore Taylor has not committed a 
moralistic fallacy but has simply acknowledged that different moral systems impact on the 
justifiability of emotions. 
2.5.3 Contempt 
Contempt is related to anger and moral disgust.
137
 Some theorists argue that contempt is a 
blend of these emotions; whilst others argue that they are distinguishable from contempt.
138
  
Contempt involves a judgment about a moral or character defect in another person. As such, 
contempt involves ‘looking down on someone and feeling morally superior’ and is ‘elicited 
                                                          
131
 The quote D’Arms and Jacobson use is from one sentence but they have not included the entirety of the 
sentence which provides context. They have also re-ordered the words to support their argument and in doing so 
misrepresent Taylor’s meaning. For the full quote see Taylor, above n 93, 401-402. 
132
 D’Arms and Jacobson, above n 82, 79. 
133
 Taylor, above n 93, 397. 
134
 Ibid 397-400. 
135
 Ibid 401. 
136
 Ibid 402. 
137
 As a basic emotion disgust relates to revulsion of contaminates in the environment and as a moral emotion it 
contains a judgment about the degrading behaviour of another person.  
138
 For empirical research on the differentials of these emotions and a review of the psychological literature see 
Cendri A Hutcherson and James J Gross, ‘The Moral Emotions: A Social-Functionalist Account of Anger, 
Disgust and Contempt’ (2011) 100 (4) Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 719. 
Chapter Two: Emotion and Judgment 
 
39 
 
by the perception that another person does not measure up’. 139 This can result in the object of 
contempt being treated with less respect and consideration or with derision or disregard.
140
 
Like anger, contempt is not always a negative emotion. The philosopher Michelle Mason 
argues that in some situations contempt is understandable and morally justifiable. Mason 
prefers to refer to contempt as an attitude, because of its quality as a form of regard, which 
also involves an affective stance toward the other.
141
 Having contempt involves perceiving 
and regarding the object as a person who ranks low in their worth because they fall short ‘of 
some legitimate interpersonal ideal’ and the affective quality is feeling pained in the presence 
of the object thus making the object a source of aversion.
142
 According to Mason the 
conditions necessary for contempt’s proper focus and moral justifiability are: 
1. It is directed at a person or persons (objects) as a response to violations of an 
interpersonal ideal. The object does not have to commit a personal offense against the 
person; the offense can be based on a belief about a class of people. 
2. The violation stems from a morally evaluable character trait.  
3. The object can appropriately be held responsible for the expression of the character 
trait. 
4. There is a legitimate expectation or demand that the object can approximate the 
interpersonal ideal. 
5. The attitude toward the object emanates from an agent who does not possess a similar 
fault otherwise they are also contemptible. 
6. The agent is responsive to evidence that the object has repented or changed for the 
better thus being open to forgiveness or some other change in attitude. To be blind to 
that evidence would be a morally objectionable attitude. 
Conditions 1-4
143
 relate to the conditions necessary for the proper evaluative presentation of 
the object of contempt. Conditions 5 and 6
144
 relate to the moral justifiability of contempt. To 
demonstrate the evaluation of the object of contempt and its moral justifiability, consider the 
example of law students X and Y who are friends at university. X pays other people to do her 
assignments knowing that it is wrong and consistently achieves high grades. Y is diligent and 
submits her own work and also achieves high grades. Y’s ideal is that cheating is wrong and 
that students should earn their grades. Y learns that X is not submitting her own work, thus it 
becomes interpersonal and X has violated the ideal (1). The morally evaluable character trait 
that the violation stems from is a propensity to cheat (2) and X can be held responsible 
because X knows that this is wrong (3). There is a legitimate expectation that X can 
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approximate the ideal because X could and should submit her own work according to the 
norms and rules of academia (4). Y always does her own work and thus does not possess a 
similar fault (5). There is no evidence that X has changed and thus Y’s attitude of contempt 
toward X is morally unobjectionable (6). Y is pained by thought of her friend cheating and 
feels a sense of aversion toward X, thus Y’s perception of and attitude toward X has changed.  
All of the above conditions and justifications contain evaluations. The agent evaluates the 
object in relation to their actions, character traits and responsibility. In doing so the agent is 
also evaluating their standards, how the object does not meet them, and their beliefs toward 
the object and situation. This is what differentiates contempt from feelings of resentment. If 
X was getting good grades but not putting in as much work as Y, Y may feel resentment but 
this would not be a feeling that judges the character of X and would not necessarily lead to 
feelings and actions of aversion. Contempt is characterised by a judgment about the character 
of the object and represents a change in attitude toward the object. This is known as 
globalised contempt because it judges the person’s character as a whole.  
Kate Abramson contends that globalised attitudes are problematic because they preclude 
‘appreciation of someone’s redeeming qualities’ and such attitudes are morally 
inappropriate.
145
 Connected to this objection is another regarding aversion, withdrawal or 
avoidance. Abramson argues these expressions of contempt communicate disinterest in the 
object defending themselves and an unwillingness to be held accountable for the feeling of 
contempt.
146
 Accordingly these attitudes are morally objectionable.
147
 However the role of 
forgiveness in point 6 above is not fully appreciated. On the basis that contempt is justifiable 
the ability to forgive implies an openness to see the redeeming qualities of the other. These 
redeeming qualities include, but are not limited to, evidence of change, repentance or in the 
least an apology. Additionally if the problem is communicated, the person is accountable for 
feeling contempt and is providing the opportunity for the other to defend their self.  
In summary empathy, sympathy, anger and contempt all involve how the object of the 
emotions are perceived, which in turn influences the evaluation of the object. Empathy and 
sympathy are evaluative in the sense that they involve awareness of the object’s situation and 
the emotion the object is experiencing. These emotions can also motivate people to alleviate 
the suffering of the object. Anger involves the perception of a wrong which is evaluated as 
being unfair or unjust and the wrongdoer is responsible and accountable. Anger can motivate 
people to seek revenge or compensation. Contempt involves the perception that the object has 
violated an interpersonal ideal and the object is evaluated as having a morally evaluable 
character trait. Further, contempt involves evaluations about moral and personal standards, 
expectations and responsibility. Therefore all of these emotions contain judgments about the 
object of the emotion. These emotions are implicated in moral judgment because of the 
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context in which they arise and the kinds of evaluation that underpin them and they are 
implicated in ethical judgment because it reconciles moral judgment with action. 
2.6 Conclusion 
The overall purpose of this chapter was to demonstrate that emotions involve evaluative 
judgments. In order to do this the evaluative properties of emotion and why people have 
emotional responses were considered under the categories of perception, cognition, emotional 
dispositions and moral emotion. This chapter illustrated the difficulty in defining emotion and 
that there is no one definition of what constitutes an emotion that is appropriate for all 
emotions, as they are highly subjective and context-dependent. 
Perception includes both somatic and cognitive components both of which have evaluative 
properties. The way in which the object of emotion is perceived is influenced by perspective 
and perspective is influenced by emotional dispositions, traits and temperament. Non-
cognitive theories define emotion through the perception of somatic states and are more 
useful in understanding primary emotion. Emotion as perception provides evaluative 
knowledge pertaining to the object and this theory can more readily accommodate secondary 
emotions. In terms of moral emotion, perception includes the ability to see the plight of 
others and this depends on the emotional capacity of empathy which involves evaluations 
about the object’s situation and emotional response.  
The way in which an object is cognitively evaluated can be influenced by perception and 
emotional dispositions. According to cognitivist theories, emotions are defined by beliefs, 
thoughts or judgments directed toward the object, all of which are evaluations. 
Notwithstanding the shortcomings of these theories, these conceptions provide a framework 
from which to analyse the content of emotion and shows how they are capable of re-
education. The way in which the object is perceived can be influenced by the beliefs 
underpinning emotions that have been acquired through experience and this relates to 
emotional dispositions. 
Emotional dispositions are habits of thought and action that can influence how the object is 
perceived and evaluated. Through experience and learning, people form beliefs and attitudes 
and these influence how people perceive the object of an emotion and how they create or 
respond to emotional situations. This affects judgment because people are habituated toward 
thinking and acting on emotion in certain ways. The discussion of the educability of emotion 
revealed that emotional dispositions can be modified through learning by changing the belief 
underpinning the emotion and the habit of thought and action associated with it. It was 
concluded that the ability to examine emotional responses and to develop emotional 
capabilities would lead to more rational judgment. 
The evaluative content of moral emotions was demonstrated in the discussion of empathy, 
sympathy, anger and contempt. These emotions were characterised as moral because of the 
role they play in moral thinking and behaviour and because of the object of the emotion. 
Moral emotions have perceptive, motivational and evaluative functions in moral judgment. 
These emotions are also connected to ethical judgment because it reconciles normative 
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standards, moral judgment and action. Empathy and sympathy involve concern for others 
whereas anger and contempt are other-condemning emotions. Empathy and sympathy are 
perceptive because they involve recognising that another person is in distress. These 
emotions can also reveal moral values connected to concern for others. The evaluations 
contained within these emotions involve judgments about knowing what it would be like if I 
were the other person (empathy) or knowing what it would be like to be that other person 
(sympathy).
148
 Hence empathy and sympathy both involve understanding and evaluating the 
experience of another. Anger involves the perception of a wrong which is evaluated as being 
unfair or unjust and that the wrongdoer is responsible and accountable. Contempt involves 
the perception that the object has violated an interpersonal ideal and the object is evaluated as 
having a morally evaluable character trait. Further, contempt involves evaluations about 
moral and personal standards, expectations and responsibility. 
Emotions involve evaluative judgments and are implicated in moral and ethical judgments. 
The significance to this thesis is that emotion is also implicated in legal-ethical judgment. 
Emotions can impede and facilitate judgment and it is therefore necessary to account for the 
positive and negative influence of emotion. The ability to account for these influences 
requires an understanding and examination of the evaluative judgments that emotions 
contain. The purpose of demonstrating that emotions are forms of judgment is to complement 
and expand on the emotional themes that will arise in the following chapter and to do this in a 
way that makes the literature and knowledge about emotion accessible and relevant to legal 
academics. The selection of disciplines in this chapter was based on their compatibility to 
each other and also their compatibility to the cognitive frameworks employed in law. A major 
hypothesis of this thesis is that awareness of emotion and introducing knowledge about 
emotion into learning how to ‘think like a lawyer’ will improve analytical skills, ethical 
judgment and better equip law students for the reality of making ethical judgments in legal 
practice.  
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3.0 THINKING LIKE A LAWYER: 
PROFESSIONALISM, ETHICS AND 
EMOTION 
3.1 Introduction 
The legal theorist Peter Goodrich argues subjective considerations such as emotion are not 
valued and recognised in the legal domain because they belong to ‘a realm outside of law’.1 
Further, Goodrich observes: 
Legal training teaches the subject to separate the personal and the legal, demanding the 
repression of emotion and the privileging of the objectivity of rules over the subjectivities of 
the truth – Aristotle’s wisdom without desire.2 
Legal training promotes objectivity because the validity of legal judgment is premised on the 
perception of unbiased and consistent application of the law. If emotion is repressed then 
legal judgment appears to be objective. Legal training achieves the appearance of objectivity, 
in part, through legalism, where abstract logical reasoning applied to rules is privileged over 
contextual, social or personal factors. The emphasis on objectivity, logic and legalism fosters 
the rational attributes of law students by attempting to separate them from their moral and 
subjective experiences.
3
  
Legalism manifests in teaching students to ‘think like a lawyer’.4 Teaching students to ‘think 
like a lawyer’ has been described as the obligation of educators to ‘exorcise’ students’ 
subjectivity.
5
 Learning how to ‘think like a lawyer’ has been described as a process which 
‘steals one’s soul’.6 There is evidence that some Australian law students are concerned and 
dissatisfied with these aspects of legal training. Student members of the Australian National 
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University Law School Reform Committee published a report in 2010
7
 in which students 
provided insights into their experience of legal education. A student observed  
We discovered that the ‘law’ was a series of rules, handed down by old men on the bench to 
lawyers who ‘neutrally’ applied it. Law school was a process of learning and memorising 
what ‘is’ not dreaming of what could be, not arguing for what it should be. Our lived 
experiences were irrelevant to our learning.8  
Others felt ‘disillusioned by a lack of intellectual and emotional engagement’ and wanted 
legal education to ‘make space for people with different experiences, talents and forms of 
intelligence.’9 Another stated ‘as we learn how to ‘think like lawyers’, let’s also cultivate our 
capacity to think like human beings’.10 Others wanted the curriculum to include ‘deep ethical 
inquiry’.11 In relation to the personal skills required in lawyering, students noted the absence 
of opportunities to develop these and ‘found there was little attention given to the 
development of empathy, personal morality and values.’12 This sample of students identifies 
the omission of legal education to encourage subjective and humanistic concerns. They 
appear to believe that this omission affects the quality of their education and their ability to 
develop professionally, personally and morally. In order to address this problem the legal 
academic James Gray suggests that the process of legal education and legal academics’ 
attitude to legal education requires new ways of thinking.
13
 It is for this reason that this 
chapter seeks to demonstrate that emotion can be implemented in legal ethics education by 
utilising the existing analytical framework of ‘thinking like a lawyer’.  
‘Thinking like a lawyer’ represents the way in which students are instructed in the rationalist 
practices of law. The rationalist practices of law require lawyers to detach from emotion in 
order to perform their role and this practice is instituted in law school. According to Kristen 
B Gerdy the focus of legal educators on logic and critical thinking to the exclusion of 
emotional and humanistic concerns gives the message that dealing with emotions and 
personality is inconsistent with legal thinking.
14
  This is problematic for Gerdy because if 
‘thinking like a lawyer’ does not involve a human context, then legal analysis is being taught 
in a vacuum where there is little discussion as to how the law impacts on the lives and 
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emotions of the people being discussed.
15
 The human context also includes students and their 
values and emotions. It has been suggested that requiring students to ‘think like a lawyer’ is a 
denial of their previous experience which can lead to alienation from their emotions, values 
and ideals.
16
 In this chapter it will be argued that emotional detachment does not mean the 
repression or denial of emotion. Appropriate emotional detachment means the ability to 
account for and moderate emotion and this ability requires emotional self-awareness.  
The analytical framework of ‘thinking like a lawyer’ is relevant to legal-ethical judgment and 
decision-making because this is another form of problem-solving undertaken by lawyers. 
There are some academics that analyse what it means to ‘think like a lawyer’ and include the 
role of emotion. This scholarship is useful because it addresses issues that arise from a 
conception of professionalism which ignores or represses emotion and expands the concept of 
‘thinking like a lawyer’ to include emotion. When the emotion of lawyers and law students is 
discussed, psychological emotional intelligence frameworks are commonly utilised to 
demonstrate the value of emotion in legal practice. The incorporation of emotional 
intelligence into the law curriculum is seen as an opportunity to strengthen the 
professionalism of lawyers through the development of intrapersonal and interpersonal 
skills.
17
 The ability to ‘think like a lawyer’ and to practice law ethically is related to 
professionalism. This chapter will argue that emotional, moral and humanistic concerns are 
not inconsistent with professionalism or legal and ethical judgment.
18
 This is achieved by 
showing how emotion is situated within legal analytic and problem-solving structures utilised 
in exercising such judgment. Angela Olivia Burton has articulated a model which explicitly 
identifies the capacities involved in ‘thinking like a lawyer’ where emotion is relevant: 
narrative intelligence and the personal intelligences. As such, Burton’s model is an effective 
vehicle for the incorporation of emotional knowledge as discussed in Chapter 2. The relevant 
emotional concepts from Chapter 2 applied in this chapter are the evaluation of emotional 
judgments, beliefs and values; emotional dispositions and the educability of emotion; 
emotional self-awareness; and empathy and sympathy because these emotions are relevant to 
the capacity of interpersonal intelligence. This knowledge will be incorporated into Burton’s 
model to expand the understanding of how emotion is involved in ‘thinking like a lawyer’ 
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and legal-ethical judgment. It is argued that including the emotional aspects of legal-ethical 
judgment will make legal ethics education more comprehensive and better equip law students 
for the reality of making ethical judgments in practice. 
This chapter focuses on how law students are taught to make legal decisions that require 
ethical judgment. The first overall aim of this chapter is to demonstrate firstly, how emotion 
is involved in legal judgment. This aim is achieved in Part 3.2 where models of ‘thinking like 
a lawyer’ and the cognitive processes and analytical frameworks employed in these models 
are discussed. Part 3.2 then introduces Burton’s model as it is the most explicit in identifying 
the capacities involved in ‘thinking like a lawyer’ where emotion is relevant.  
The second and third overall aims of this chapter are to demonstrate that Burton’s model of 
‘thinking like a lawyer’ is a useful model from which to educate law students about how to 
make judgments (including ethical judgments, that recognise the role of emotion); and to use 
the knowledge about emotion in Chapter 2 to expand the understanding of how emotion is 
involved in ‘thinking like a lawyer’. These aims are achieved in Parts 3.3 and 3.4. Part 3.3.1 
briefly explains the cognitive content of narrative intelligence. This is followed by a detailed 
explanation of the emotional content of narrative intelligence in Part 3.3.2. In this Part the 
case of Legal Practitioners Board v Morel
19
 is used to illustrate the emotional content of 
narrative intelligence and to demonstrate how emotional narratives can be the subject of 
analysis. This case is used in the UTS subject Ethics and Professional Conduct in relation to 
personal and professional conduct and will be returned to in Chapter 5. Part 3.4 begins by 
explaining that the personal intelligences involve intrapersonal and interpersonal intelligences 
as significant factors in emotional intelligence. Part 3.4.1 gives a detailed explanation of 
emotional self-awareness and detachment as these are important concepts in intrapersonal 
intelligence. Part 3.4.2 considers empathy and the balance between engagement and 
detachment as these are important concepts in interpersonal intelligence. Legal Practitioners 
Board v Morel is returned to in this Part to illustrate how too much emotional engagement 
can cause boundary violations. 
3.2 Thinking and feeling like a lawyer 
Definitions of ‘thinking like a lawyer’ are contested; however, the concept can be broadly 
understood to mean the ability to undertake legal problem-solving. The traditional approach 
to legal problem-solving is mostly focused on skills such as written and oral communication 
and analytical skills such as analogical, deductive and inductive reasoning. Academics are 
now starting to focus on and expand the range of cognitive processes that underpin ‘thinking 
like a lawyer’. For example Larry O Natt Gantt contends that there are numerous general 
definitions of ‘thinking like a lawyer’ but these definitions ‘do not go beyond the tasks of 
lawyers to consider what underlying cognitive processes are involved when lawyers 
undertake these tasks.’20 According to Gantt, legal problem-solving involves three broad 
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cognitive processes: analytical frameworks,
21
 cognitive processes (the steps to legal problem-
solving)
22
 and logical reasoning.
23
 Gantt’s article illuminates these processes and offers a 
useful framework for educators who seek to be more explicit about them. However what is 
lacking in that framework is the exposition of other capacities and forms of judgment 
involved in legal thinking such as narrative and emotion.  
Alexander Scherr agrees that cognitive processes, such as those identified by Gantt, are 
important but advances the role of emotion and narrative in practical judgment. He argues 
that lawyering involves both legal and non-legal realities but ‘little work has gone into what 
those non-legal realities might be.’24 Similarly, Angela Olivia Burton contends that there has 
been a disproportionate focus on some lawyer intelligences like rule-based inductive, 
deductive and categorical reasoning processes.
25
 To counteract this tendency Burton focuses 
on ‘multiple lawyering intelligences’ and this pedagogical construct is ‘designed to expand 
the terms of reference for what it means to ‘think like a lawyer’’ and thereby foster good 
judgment in students.
26
  
Burton proposes the following lawyering intelligences model, summarised below, which is 
said to be ‘a set of distinct yet interconnected intellectual capacities that animate every kind 
of legal work’27 and as such includes legal-ethical judgment decision-making. Narrative 
intelligence in point 4 and the personal intelligences in point 5 are built on in this chapter 
because they are intellectual capacities where emotion is explicitly involved.  
1. Linguistic Intelligence – General characteristics of this form of intelligence include 
‘sensitivity to the spoken and written word’ and ‘the ability to use language 
pragmatically’.28  
2. Categorising Intelligence – ‘Categorisation occurs when we order or classify 
concepts, people, things or events on the basis of significant generalisations or on 
patterns of difference and similarity.’ Cognitive psychologists see this and 
stereotyping as an essential way to process information and assign meaning.
29
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3. Logical-Mathematical Intelligence – Here legal educators typically emphasise 
inductive, deductive, and analogical reasoning.
30
 
4. Narrative Intelligence – This cognitive process involves ‘structuring facts in the 
context of stories rather than in the context of legal rules, in an attempt to discover or 
demonstrate the meaning of the situation.’ Narrative reasoning permits consideration 
of contextual factors like moral, political and social considerations. Because of this, 
narrative reasoning embraces facets of human reaction and judgment such as emotion 
and empathy, issues of right and wrong.
31
 
5. The Personal Intelligences – Intrapersonal and Interpersonal. These intelligences 
shape our understanding of ourselves and others and relate to sensitivity to issues of 
personality, motivation, belief, values and emotion.
32
 
6. Strategic Intelligence – Lawyers use this when they imagine and generate alternative 
plans and choose the most effective course of action.
33
 
All six of the above intelligences are intellectual capacities and all are necessary for the 
ability to undertake legal problem-solving, reasoning and judgment.  In relation to the 
capacity of narrative intelligence Burton points out that narrative reasoning goes beyond 
legalistic problem-solving which primarily focuses on legal text, legal authority and 
analogical reasoning associated with facts. Therefore, lawyers use narrative reasoning to 
contextualise problems beyond legal rules, to gain an understanding of the perspective of 
their clients and others, and to construct stories that convey facts persuasively. Narrative 
reasoning also permits consideration of contextual factors like moral, political and social 
considerations, emotion and issues of right and wrong. These contextual factors are relevant 
in legal ethics making this model applicable to educating students about how to exercise 
legal-ethical judgment in order to solve problems.  
Narratives cognitively represent as stories and Burton also argues that to be effective 
narrators, lawyers need to be familiar with the general elements of a good narrative, which 
are the focus on a central character, the protagonist faced with a dilemma, the dilemma 
developing into crisis, the crisis building to a climax, the climax, the crisis solved.
34
 
Narratives that involve these general elements will necessarily embrace human reaction and 
judgment including emotion.
35
 Through another analogy with fictional narratives Suzanne 
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Keen suggests that identification with the characters in a story promotes perspective taking 
and empathy.
36
 Identification and empathy will be returned to in Part 3.4.2. 
The personal intelligences identified by Burton in point 5 are capacities that arise in 
psychological emotional intelligence literature. These intelligences shape our understanding 
of ourselves (intrapersonal) and others (interpersonal). Integral to intrapersonal intelligence is 
the capacity for emotional self-awareness and awareness of the role of emotion in judgment.
37
 
Burton contends that ‘emotional sensitivity’ is essential to developing intrapersonal 
intelligence but that  ‘it is how a person uses self-knowledge for personal and professional 
problem-solving that the full measure of an intrapersonal intelligence is actualised.’38 
Resolving ethical issues is a form of professional problem-solving which requires an 
understanding of personal values, morality and emotion. Interpersonal intelligence denotes 
the capacity to understand another person’s desires and motivations and to use that 
knowledge to effectively deal with other people.
39
 Interpersonal intelligence also requires 
emotional self-awareness to prevent boundary violations which could lead to unethical 
conduct.  
Intrapersonal intelligence includes the stories we tell ourselves about ourselves, while 
interpersonal intelligence includes the stories we tell ourselves about other people. This is 
how narrative intelligence and the personal intelligences are connected. As Burton has 
identified, these stories evoke emotion and require that emotion is accounted for in judgment. 
Therefore, in order to fully develop the capacities of narrative intelligence and the personal 
intelligences, the ability to recognise the influence of emotion within these capacities, to 
develop greater emotional self-awareness and to understand of the role of emotion in 
judgment is required. Each of these capacities is discussed in more detail below. 
3.3 Narrative Intelligence 
In cognitive neuroscience, empirical studies have identified the neurological basis for a 
narrative understanding of self.
40
 In cognitive psychology, the researchers Rettinger and 
Hastie contend that when making morally salient decisions, people undertake narrative 
processing to identify, comprehend and integrate material into a complex mental 
representation.
41
 According to the philosopher Martha Nussbaum, narratives contain and 
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express emotion and are essential in the process of practical reflection.
42
 In Chapter 2, 
narrative examples of emotion were used to demonstrate the structure and content of anger, 
envy and contempt. Thus narratives evoke emotional activity and they can also reveal the 
structure of an emotion meaning that narrative intelligence is utilised in the appraisal of 
emotion. Emotion can also instigate narrative judgment. The perceptive capacity to see the 
suffering of another is said to precede ‘the analytical, reflective and deliberative components 
of moral judgment.’43 The aim of this part is to explain both the cognitive and emotional 
content in narrative intelligence. This content is not mutually exclusive as both factors are 
necessary for narrative intelligence. A brief account of the cognitive content will be given 
followed by a more detailed account of the emotional content. The account of the emotional 
content of narrative intelligence will focus on the analytical and reflective aspects of 
narratives to demonstrate how emotions within those narratives can be analysed. 
3.3.1 Cognitive content 
Alexander Scherr observes that in law, narrative ‘has a dense pedigree... narrative centres 
lawyering.’44  Like Burton, Scherr states that narrative provides ‘a cognitive frame for data’ 
and ‘a tissue of language through which decision-makers discern the certainty necessary for 
action.
45
 Similarly Graham and McJohn state that stories are ‘almost an ideal data structure 
for human cognition’ particularly in relation to learning and memory.46 Graham and McJohn 
describe the cognitive value of narrative in the following way: 
Focusing on the cognitive aspects of stories illuminates the cognitive tasks of law, such as 
reasoning, remembering, learning, persuading, and communicating. Relying on cognitive 
science concepts, we suggest that narrative plays a fundamental role in legal reasoning, in 
such areas as memory, moral decision-making, reasoning by analogy, explanation, and even 
the organisation of the vast amount of information that lawyers contend with.
47
  
Graham and McJohn state that moral and legal reasoning involves the capacity for narrative 
intelligence and this suggests that this capacity is relevant to legal-ethical judgment. Further, 
the psychologists Rettinger and Hastie argue when moral factors and emotion are involved in 
a decision this leads to ‘elaborated narrative processing as subjects try to create stories about 
each outcome and evaluate the stories.’48 The cognitive content of narrative intelligence 
provides a way of organising, interpreting, evaluating, elaborating, remembering, learning 
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and communicating information. Narrative reasoning provides coherence and is essential in 
the process of judgment leading to legal and ethical decisions. 
3.3.2 Emotional content 
Although Graham and McJohn, Burton, and Scherr recognise the role of emotion in narrative 
intelligence none of them elaborates on it. Graham and McJohn observe that narratives 
convey emotive content effectively. They argue that cognitive science supports the contention 
that the emotive aspects of narratives make them easier to remember and also makes them 
more persuasive.
49
 For Burton, narratives embrace facets of human reaction and judgment 
such as emotion and empathy.
50
 For Scherr, narratives contain and express emotion and 
motivate the decision-maker toward choice and commitment to action.
51
 Scherr briefly 
considers cognitive philosophy, in particular Martha Nussbaum, to demonstrate that beliefs 
and emotions are related and are open to assessment and criticism.
52
  He concludes that 
awareness and appraisal of emotion forms a natural activity of practical judgment because it 
recognises that emotion influences choices.
53
 As was demonstrated in Chapter 2, the ability to 
account for the positive and negative influences of emotion in judgment requires an 
understanding of the evaluative judgments that emotions contain. The evaluative judgments 
contained in emotion and how this is related to the capacity of narrative intelligence will be 
dealt with here.  
According to Nussbaum narratives can reveal the meaning of an emotion.
54
 The capacity of 
narrative intelligence involves the ability to recognise and evaluate emotional preferences, 
perspectives, beliefs, values and dispositions because these factors can influence judgment. 
Accordingly a component of narrative intelligence is the way we examine, evaluate and make 
sense of emotional experiences. For example, Robert Solomon contends that complex 
emotions such as love ‘involve process and story’ and that the stories we tell are ‘important to 
the nature of love itself.’55 Different stories dictate different meanings of love and if ‘love is a 
narrative, many of the wrong stories are told.’56 In order to illustrate the emotional content of 
narrative intelligence and how the emotional content can be analysed, the case of Legal 
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Practitioners Board v Morel
57
 will be used as an example. This case involves personal 
relationships between a lawyer and some of her clients which led to poor ethical judgment 
and the solicitor being struck-off for professional misconduct. This particular disciplinary 
case elicits a narrative of love and discloses how ethical judgment can be influenced by 
emotion. 
Morel was a criminal lawyer in South Australia who was struck off the Roll of Practitioners 
for deceptive and dishonest conduct. In 1989 she began a professional and personal 
relationship with a prisoner named McFarlane, they were married in 1990 and she ceased 
being his lawyer. They divorced in 1996 whilst McFarlane was still imprisoned. In 1997 she 
began a professional and personal relationship with another prisoner Paul Page. Morel lied to 
prison authorities stating that she urgently needed to speak with Page on legal matters; 
whereas in fact she wished to talk on personal matters. The prison authorities began 
monitoring Page’s conversations with Morel during which he admitted assaulting another 
prisoner. Morel was banned from visiting Page because the prison authority considered that 
she was using the privilege of legal visits to further her personal relationship with him. 
Despite this, Morel continued to act for Page in a professional capacity.  
This is an example of personal and professional boundary violations and the analysis here is 
not concerned with the breach of disciplinary rules. What will be illustrated is how love 
within this narrative can be analysed for the purpose of demonstrating the influence of that 
emotion on the ethical judgment of this practitioner. In other words, emotion influences 
judgments that are of an ethical nature and in order to understand those influences, the 
evaluative properties of the emotion must be examined. There is limited information about 
the personal emotional narrative of Morel. However the psychologist’s report provides some 
insight into the narrative of love and a salient aspect is extracted here.  
She described in the past either not trusting people or trusting them too much. Ms Morel told 
me she is aware that she is a person who has a large capacity of empathy for others, a 
tendency to absorb other’s feelings and that this is what she has to be more careful about.  
Ms Morel told me she now realises she got into trouble with these boundary issues as she did 
not know herself well enough to have a definite set of protective values.
58
  
The report discloses that Morel had a relationship with another prisoner who resided with her 
whilst he served a sentence in home detention. This took place after she was removed from 
the roll.  
Love is implied in the above narrative because of the intimate relationships Morel engaged 
in. Nussbaum states that love is an emotion, but it is also a relationship and cannot be 
understood unless it is examined ‘as part of the complex fabric of a story that extends over 
time.’59 Understanding this ‘complex fabric’ exposes the habits and dispositions towards 
engaging in certain kinds of relationships and thinking about love in certain ways. The case 
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provides an incomplete narrative of love; there is no way of knowing the full historical and 
psychological features of that narrative and therefore the emotional habits and dispositions of 
Morel. As such, the following analysis does not purport to represent Morel’s actual 
motivations, thinking and feelings. The application of emotion theory to the legal narrative 
provides a reading of the case that is speculative, but which illustrates the kinds of analysis 
that emotional narratives can be the subject of and which are suggestive of dispositions to 
think and act in certain ways.  
There could be unacknowledged reasons for love in relation to Morel’s relationships with 
prisoners. Solomon contends that unacknowledged reasons can be amongst the worst reasons 
for love.
60
 For example, people can enter into patterns and Solomon observes that there are 
several reasons for doing this. One reason is ‘the safety of such a relationship, the fact that it 
has built in limits of time and commitment.’61 This is arguable; Morel did marry McFarlane 
suggesting commitment to that relationship, but Morel knew that she could not conduct both 
professional and personal relationships at the same time, thus placing limits on the ability to 
commit and the longevity of future relationships. The tendency to choose partners in prison 
whilst also providing legal representation, suggests a certain safety in the knowledge that the 
men are dependent both professionally and personally. Morel eventually acknowledged this 
stating  
I understand I am responsible for both creating such dependencies and the damaging effect 
this need has had on my life and the life of the other person involved.
62
  
Another unacknowledged reason for love is that the loved one satisfies ‘more neurotic needs 
– the need to be punished or martyred, the desire to take care of a truly pathetic human being, 
the need to play God with someone.’63 This provides a way of understanding Morel’s ‘large 
capacity’ for empathy and absorbing the feelings of others, and her own dependency in such 
relationships. The psychiatric review reported that Morel ‘tended to act in the role of a 
"rescuer" in relation to three prisoners’64 indicating a misguided sense of empathy, sympathy 
or compassion which led to unethical behaviour. In the discussion of moral emotion in 
Chapter 2, empathy and sympathy were defined as relating to another’s experience. Although 
Morel identifies having too much empathy as an issue, based on the definitions in Chapter 2, 
it is also possible that she was experiencing sympathy. Empathy is an emotional process and 
can manifest in any emotion, whilst sympathy is a discrete emotional state that is 
characterised by the desire to alleviate the suffering of another. Empathy and sympathy are 
not about absorbing the feelings of others and this highlights the need to develop appropriate 
emotional boundaries and detachment. This point will be returned to in Part 3.4.2. 
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Characteristic of sympathy, and in some circumstances empathy, is a belief that the suffering 
of the other can be alleviated; however acting in the role of rescuer suggests the possibility of 
Morel’s emotional needs surpassing the needs of the men she was involved with. Applying 
Nussbaum’s explanation of the evaluative properties of emotion from Chapter 265 
demonstrates this point in theory. According to Nussbaum, the defining elements of an 
emotion are evaluative judgments based on intentionality, belief and value as related to the 
object of the emotion. The objects of sympathy and love are the prisoners with whom Morel 
had relationships. The objects are intentional; Morel simultaneously perceives them as 
helpless (sympathy) and desirable (love). Underpinning sympathy is the belief that the men 
are suffering and their suffering can be alleviated. The suffering possibly pertains to their 
confinement and lack of intimacy.  
Love is based on beliefs about the qualities of the object and the qualities of romantic 
relationships. On the evidence above, the relationships could be characterised by beliefs 
about care of vulnerable people and dependency. However, in relation to the possibility of 
Morel’s emotional needs, the most important aspect is the value attached to the intentional 
perception and belief characteristics. The value perceived in the prisoners and the relationship 
means that they were important for the role they played in the practitioner’s life. This value 
relates to the perception and thought of the object: the perception of the prisoners as helpless 
and thoughts based on beliefs of dependency. In terms of helplessness the value is the thought 
that she is the one that can alleviate the suffering by being the rescuer. Thus in this account, 
the value of those relationships could be to the practitioner’s ego, because dependency gives 
her power and this also relates to the object’s desirability. The dependency seemingly allows 
Morel to trust the person she is having a relationship with, a significant issue stated in the 
first quote above, also making him more desirable.  
It appears that the ‘wrong story’ about love is being told and that subconsciously empathy or 
sympathy is being used strategically because Morel’s motives may not have been entirely 
benevolent.
66
 In Morel the potential unexamined reasons for love and misguided sympathy 
had a negative impact on Morel’s professional judgment leading to unethical behaviour. 
Emotional self-awareness in this example means the ability to evaluate the emotional 
narrative in order to better understand how emotion influences ethical judgment and choice. 
In the quotes above there is some evidence of Morel evaluating her own emotional narrative, 
but overall it could be concluded that she lacked emotional self-awareness and as a result 
both her personal and professional judgment was impaired. This example shows that the 
capacity for narrative intelligence also requires a capacity for emotional self-awareness and 
with these capacities, people are more likely to approach and make judgments in a more 
rational and ethical manner. Morel also indicates how a lack of emotional self-awareness 
impacts on the capacities of intrapersonal and interpersonal intelligence. Emotional self-
awareness in the context of these capacities is discussed in detail below.  
                                                          
65
 See Chapter 2, 25. 
66
 See Chapter 2, 35-36. 
Chapter Three: Thinking Like a Lawyer: Professionalism, Ethics and Emotion 
55 
 
3.4 The Personal Intelligences 
The personal intelligences shape our understanding of ourselves (intrapersonal) and others 
(interpersonal). These intelligences involve being aware of our own and other people’s 
emotion, personality, motivations, beliefs and values. Intrapersonal intelligence is important 
for lawyering because emotional self-awareness contributes to personal and professional 
problem-solving. Interpersonal intelligence is the capacity to understand the desires and 
motivations of others and this is important for lawyering because contributes to effectively 
communicating and working with them. The delineation between intrapersonal and 
interpersonal intelligence is a feature of the psychological emotional intelligence framework. 
Paul J Cain states that there is more than one way to define emotional intelligence and that 
defining it ‘is a slippery task’.67 Cain describes the following indicia: 
 The ability to sense, understand and effectively apply the power and acumen of 
emotions as a source of human energy, information, connection, and influence. 
 Self-control, zeal and persistence, and the ability to motivate oneself. 
 Being able to rein in emotional impulse; to read another’s innermost feelings; to 
handle relationships smoothly. 
68
 
Marjorie A Silver provides the following definition: 
Emotional intelligence includes knowledge and appreciation of one’s own emotional life and 
sensitivity to and acceptance of the emotional lives of others. It is an attitude that 
acknowledges the legitimacy of emotions and their relevance to our actions, interactions and 
decisions. Its actualisation requires the intra- and interpersonal skills necessary to live a joyful 
and connected life, rich in personal relationships.
69
 
The major themes that emerge from Cain’s indicia and Silver’s definition are emotional self-
awareness, the ability to have appropriate emotional responses and detachment, and the 
capacity for empathic concern. The aim of this Part is to provide a more detailed account of 
the influence of emotion in intrapersonal and interpersonal intelligence and how these 
connect to legal-ethical judgment. This Part will begin by considering intrapersonal 
intelligence and the related concepts of emotional self-awareness and detachment. The Part 
will conclude by considering interpersonal intelligence, empathy and the need for balance 
between emotional engagement and detachment. Emotional self-awareness, empathy and 
detachment are examined for the purpose of demonstrating that they are essential to effective 
lawyer judgment and therefore learning how to ‘think like a lawyer’ in a more comprehensive 
way.  
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3.4.1 Intrapersonal Intelligence 
Burton defines intrapersonal intelligence as ‘the ability to distinguish and respond to our own 
feelings, needs, desires and motivations, to build accurate mental models of ourselves, and to 
use these mental models to guide us in making important decisions about our lives.’70 
Intrapersonal intelligence requires emotional self-awareness. According to the philosopher 
Michael Lacewing, emotional self-awareness involves feeling the emotion, being aware of 
the feeling, feeling a ‘second order’ emotional response to the initial feeling (e.g. tension, 
anxiety or calm) and being open to these emotions.
71
 This is similar to Damasio’s conception 
of feeling as the perception of changes to thoughts and bodily sensations when an emotion is 
experienced.
72
 However, the discussion of emotional dispositions and the educability of 
emotion in Chapter 2 revealed that emotional self-awareness is not only the 
acknowledgement of feeling a certain way. Perception of feelings is important but emotional 
self-awareness is also about acknowledging traits, habits of thought and action, examining the 
beliefs that underpin emotion, and educating emotional capabilities. Silver states that 
emotional self-awareness is important because a person ‘cannot know whether a decision is 
rational or otherwise appropriate unless one looks within to examine the irrational forces 
bearing on that decision.’73 However, as Goodrich and others have observed, legal education 
promotes the repression or denial of emotion meaning that if the emotion is an irrational 
force, it is not examined. There are several issues that arise from the repression and denial of 
emotion in the legal domain: self-representation, inappropriate emotional responses and 
inappropriate emotional detachment. These issues are discussed in turn below, in order to 
demonstrate how emotional self-awareness can lead to better ethical judgment.  
Emotional self-awareness is distinguished from ‘self-representation’ which involves 
‘reducing emotions to facts about ourselves.’74 Treating emotion as a fact in deliberation is a 
way to acknowledge emotion without allowing the feeling or experience of the emotion to be 
a genuine part of deliberation. Consider the following contrast between a ‘technocratic 
lawyer’75 and a ‘genuine ethical deliberator’:76 
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While the technocratic attorney uses certain sentimental capacities instrumentally to set the 
parameters for his strategic legal analysis, the attorney who engages in authentic ethical 
deliberation allows his sentimental responses to guide his practice independently of his 
client’s goals. The technocratic lawyer deploys his sentimental capabilities strategically; the 
genuine ethical deliberator experiences and reflects upon his sentiments non-tactically.
77
 
The sentiments being referred to are derived from Adam Smith’s philosophy where 
sentiments are associated with ethical virtues and emotion.
78
 Sentiments include feeling joy 
for a person’s good fortune or anger directed at a person hurting another; the sentiments 
involve complexes of emotion, cognition and judgment.
79
 This is not to say that all 
sentiments are appropriate because a part of ethical virtue is the ability to discern and have 
appropriate sentimental responses and to judge the appropriateness of other people’s 
sentiments.
80
 Genuine ethical deliberators bring their moral conscience to bear on the legal 
problem and their role as a lawyer.
81
 Genuine ethical deliberators demonstrate emotional self-
awareness because sentimental responses and the corresponding emotions are felt and guide 
legal practice and deliberation toward an ethical outcome. This is done independently of the 
client’s goals and theoretically, this leads to better ethical judgment because the lawyer is 
relying initially on moral sentiments as to right and wrong which set parameters around the 
legal analysis. Conversely, technocratic lawyers initially set parameters around their 
sentimental responses so that the legal problem can be resolved in accordance with the 
client’s goals and so that ethical issues are strategically accounted for. Technocratic lawyers 
treat emotion and sentimentality as a fact to be strategically accounted for in legal problem-
solving, and emotion is not a genuine part of how the legal problem is dealt with ethically.  
Lacewing argues that emotional self-awareness is essential to good ethical deliberation 
because emotions are evaluative responses.
82
 Inappropriate emotional responses are vetted by 
emotional self-awareness and appropriate emotional responses guide people toward value and 
morally salient reasons for action.
83
 When emotional responses signify difficulties within the 
person, denying the significance (lack of openness) and experience of an emotion (feeling), 
can lead to defence mechanisms which manifest as inappropriate detachment.
84
 Defence 
mechanisms are mental processes that ‘are used to defend the subject against a painful reality 
by perverting his or her experience of that reality’ and are ‘activated by painful or 
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unacceptable emotions and desires and seek to prevent them from reaching consciousness.’85 
As in Chapter 2, these defence mechanisms can be triggered by emotional dispositions or 
psychological schemas which encompass learned emotional reactions and behaviour.
86
  
Suppressing emotion is a form of defence mechanism and can be appropriate where a task is 
emotionally difficult, like a doctor performing an autopsy, or a lawyer interviewing a sexual 
assault complainant.
87
 The defence mechanism is activated because of the emotions being 
experienced and it prevents painful emotions from reaching consciousness through mental 
processes that seek to reduce anxiety.
88
 It does not eliminate anxiety and the feeling of 
anxiety if detected alerts the person to a difficulty within themselves. A person who is 
emotionally self-aware is able to allow the feeling of anxiety, gain insight into the source of 
the anxiety and evaluate their emotions.
89
 Emotional self-awareness of this kind is important 
because it provides information about the inner difficulty that could not be accessed without 
feeling and understanding the source of the emotion.
90
 In other words, a person who is 
emotionally self-aware will inquire into what the defence mechanism is concealing and why, 
and be able to moderate the emotion appropriately. 
Conversely, where emotion is the product of a defence mechanism, it is considered an 
inappropriate evaluative response.
91
 Defence mechanisms here also reveal difficulties within 
the person but are used to project or rationalise feelings.
92
 An example of projection is a 
homophobic person, who is unaccepting of their own homosexual feelings, projecting 
negative feelings onto homosexual people and responding ‘to homosexuals as though they are 
a threat.’93 As discussed in Chapter 2, the perception or perspective taken about homosexuals 
will change if the homophobic person changes their attitude toward themselves.
94
 This 
requires emotional self-awareness in order to acknowledge and re-educate the beliefs and 
values that underpin the attitude and the accompanying emotions such as hate and anger.  An 
example of rationalisation is ‘someone not given a promotion, simply because he was not the 
best person for the job, may feel resentful of his boss, but comes to believe his boss resents or 
hates him.’95 The example of envy and resentment in Chapter 2 and the discussion of 
emotional schemas and dispositions considered that an emotionally self-aware person would 
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examine the beliefs underpinning their emotions and recognise those beliefs were not 
cognisant with fact.
96
 Emotionally self-aware people also recognise the need to educate their 
emotional capabilities so that their emotional responses are appropriately directed toward the 
object of the emotion.
97
 In these examples a lack of emotional self-awareness can lead to poor 
judgment because attention is not focused on examining the validity of the emotion that has 
been produced by the defence mechanism.  
The ability to detach appropriately requires the emotional openness of emotional self-
awareness.
98
  According to Lacewing, appropriate detachment means that the emotion felt 
does not overwhelm the subject, but is moderated sufficiently to be questioned and 
understood, while still being engaged, for the emotion continues to be felt.
99
  Detachment is 
not setting aside or ignoring emotion, it is the ability to experience and moderate it. A form of 
detachment related to self-representation is intellectualisation. According to Lacewing 
intellectualisation means: 
Avoiding the affective force of one’s emotions and one’s second order responses to them is a 
tactic of intellectualization. 
Intellectualization defends against anxiety partly by working with denial, isolation, or 
repression to simply not feel the emotion that arouses anxiety, and partly by using various 
means of avoiding the emotion’s implications and personal significance.
100
 
The kind of detachment that comes with intellectualisation has two aspects, firstly not 
allowing the feeling, and secondly avoiding the significance of having the emotion. A good 
example of this kind of intellectualisation in relation to lawyers is found in research 
conducted by the legal academic Abbe Smith. Smith interviewed several Australian criminal 
lawyers primarily around the question of ‘how can you represent people you know to be 
guilty?’101 One lawyer stated that their sense of professionalism enabled them ‘to put aside 
personal feelings’.102 Professionalism according to another lawyer was about ‘being 
analytical, logical, and objective – regardless of how it personally affects you.’103 Another 
lawyer when discussing a child sexual assault case that they were anxious to win stated: ‘My 
own personal feelings about the outcome ought to influence the case much less than any other 
factor. I have been successful in establishing a way of operating where I suspend belief and 
judgment.’104  
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Apparently these lawyers believe emotion affects legal judgment negatively and that they 
wouldn’t be able to do their jobs effectively if they acknowledged their emotion. They are 
intellectualising because they appear to be avoiding the affective force of their emotions. 
Whilst they acknowledge experiencing emotions, they seem unwilling to feel them and 
account for them indicating a potential lack of emotional self-awareness. This suggests that 
these lawyers are engaging in self-representation because emotion is being treated as a fact to 
be excluded from deliberation. The inference from this example is that detachment means 
repressing, denying and isolating emotion thereby ignoring the personal significance of the 
emotion. An implication of treating emotion as a fact and avoiding the significance of 
emotion, is denying the significance of personal values and morality. It could be concluded 
that intellectualisation for these lawyers appears to be a form of defence mechanism, 
protecting them from having to rationalise their emotions, personal values and morality with 
the more unsavoury aspects of their jobs. However as Daniel L Shapiro observes, in relation 
to the reluctance of lawyers to acknowledge emotionality in legal practice, ‘[j]ust because we 
exclude something does not mean that it no longer affects us.’105  Apart from the impact of 
this on the psyche of lawyers, unacknowledged and unappreciated emotion can impact on 
ethical judgment, as illustrated by Morel. In such circumstances, it is less likely that 
appropriate emotional detachment is being exercised, or that genuine ethical deliberation is 
being engaged in that would set wider ethical parameters around the legal analysis of the 
problem. 
In this Part it has been argued that self-awareness means becoming more aware of emotions, 
feeling them, learning how to examine and account for them, and learning how to react to 
them effectively. A lack of emotional self-awareness manifests in self-representation, 
intellectualisation, inappropriate emotional responses and inappropriate emotional 
detachment. These issues can lead to poor judgment, unethical conduct and dissociation from 
personal values and morality. Therefore emotional self-awareness is an essential component 
of the intellectual capacity of intrapersonal intelligence, ‘thinking like a lawyer’ and ethical 
judgment. 
3.4.2 Interpersonal Intelligence 
Interpersonal intelligence denotes the capacity to understand another person’s desires and 
motivations and to use that knowledge to effectively deal with other people.
106
 The ability to 
understand the other requires a capacity for empathy.
107
 Empathy is not a discrete emotion; it 
is an emotional process which can manifest in any emotion.
108
 The legal academics Fletcher 
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and Weinstein contend that empathic communication is a critical dimension of lawyering and 
that without empathy, valuable affective and cognitive information in the client’s case may be 
lost. 
109
 Fletcher and Weinstein state that empathy can be understood to mean feeling the 
emotion of another, and understanding the experience or situation of another, both affectively 
and cognitively.
110
 This definition is consistent with the definitions in Chapter 2. However 
‘feeling the emotion of another’ is overstated in comparison to Deonna’s conception of 
feeling ‘in tune’ which only requires feeling a ‘token emotion’ of a similar kind as 
experienced by the other.
111
 On either definition, empathy involves understanding and 
evaluating the emotion and experience of the other through an affective connection. As with 
intrapersonal intelligence, there needs to be a balance between having a sufficient degree of 
empathy (engagement) and a sufficient degree of detachment (objectivity).
112
 When there is 
too much objectivity, empathy can be inhibited leading to a lack of understanding of the 
other. When there is too much engagement boundary violations can occur which can lead to 
unethical conduct. These issues are considered below. 
According to Wispe, empathy requires self-awareness and the ability to understand the 
subjective experiences of the other.
113
  A genuine capacity for empathy is distinguished from 
being a detached observer. This is when empathy is based on observation and labelling a 
person’s feelings from which the lawyer is removed.114 In this situation there is an 
insufficient degree of engagement. Observation is distinguished from perception. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, Vetlesen argues that the ability to recognise a situation as morally 
salient requires the ability to empathise and it is this interpersonal capacity that is the entry 
point into the domain of the moral.
115
  Taking the detached observer stance lacks 
identification and inhibits empathy. A lack of identification can lead to labelling feelings, 
meaning that the observer may be aware of the circumstances of the other but by not 
engaging with the other’s emotions, does not understand the significance of their motivations, 
values and goals. This is problematic because a lack of understanding means important 
information is discounted, thereby constraining the observer’s capacity to deal effectively 
with the other. There can be different levels of identification, even barriers to empathy, 
because people have many differences including cultural, gender and socio-economic 
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differences. It may not be possible to genuinely empathise because of these differences and in 
such cases self-awareness ensures that empathy is not used insincerely or strategically.
116
  
The balance between engagement and detachment is necessary in order to prevent problems 
such as counter-transference. Counter-transference is a Freudian concept and means 
‘unharnessed emotions – emotional responses gone awry... counter-transference may 
manifest itself in a variety of ways, as positive (love) or negative (hate).’117 In the current 
context it means the misplaced emotions of a lawyer on a client
118
 and occurs when there is 
an insufficient degree of detachment. The case of Morel can be characterised as an example 
of counter-transference, where too much empathic engagement manifested as love and led to 
boundary violations. For boundary violations to be avoided, or dealt with if they arise, 
requires self-awareness, the ability to recognise emotional responses, habits and dispositions, 
and the ability to analyse how emotion can affect the lawyer/client relationship.
119
 
Practitioners, in situations like those in Morel, are more able to avoid boundary violations by 
acknowledging the reasons for experiencing certain emotions and engaging in the re-
education of their emotional capabilities. This is why it is important to emphasise the 
emotional aspects of legal practice with students, and to provide them with opportunities 
where they can consider their own emotional capabilities with respect to ethical judgment. 
Emotional self-awareness assists in striking the balance between empathic engagement and 
detached objectivity.
120
 The intellectual capacity of interpersonal intelligence is more fully 
realised when emotional self-awareness is recognised as an essential component of that 
capacity. Legal education should therefore encourage and develop the capacity of empathy in 
students but also encourage students to develop appropriate detachment in order to avoid the 
consequences of a lack of identification, distant observation and counter-transference. Using 
cases such as Morel in teaching and learning strategies encourages students to consider 
appropriate emotional detachment. Kristin B Gerdy examined strategies from medicine that 
gave students experience with clients, empathy and compassion, and has suggested that 
teaching and learning empathy in law is similar.
121
 The strategies include using the 
humanities, reflection techniques, and experiential learning. These techniques engage the 
capacities of narrative and personal intelligence and can reveal the need for a balance 
between empathy and detachment. Further explanation and application of some of these 
techniques are given in Chapter 5.  
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3.5 Conclusion 
Resolving ethical issues is form of problem-solving which requires lawyers to exercise 
judgment. It is in this way that ‘thinking like a lawyer’ is utilised in exercising legal-ethical 
judgment and decision-making. This chapter has argued that emotion is involved in ‘thinking 
like a lawyer’ and that Burton’s model is an appropriate vehicle for recognising how emotion 
is implicated in or influences legal judgment. The knowledge of emotion from Chapter 2 has 
been integrated to expand the understanding of emotion in the capacities of narrative and 
personal intelligence. The analytical framework of ‘thinking like a lawyer’ is not antithetical 
to the analytical frameworks related to emotion. Indeed Burton’s model demonstrates that 
traditional analytical skills can be learned together with the analytical skills involved in the 
emotional aspects of ethical judgment. Fletcher and Weinstein contend that personal and 
professional growth influence lawyers’ emotional reactions to and engagement with legal 
practice and that ‘while frequently overlooked as a dimension of legal problem-solving, the 
progression of a law student into a legal professional entails attention to these two factors.’122 
The inclusion of emotion in ‘thinking like a lawyer’ reinstates the subjectivity of students and 
enables them to come to their own understanding of what ‘being a lawyer’ means. ‘Being’ in 
conjunction with ‘thinking’ encompasses a broader range of intellectual capacities, subjective 
and contextual realities.
123
 This allows students to gain a more comprehensive understanding 
of what is involved in the cognitive processes of ‘thinking like a lawyer’ and better equip 
them to account for emotion and other humanistic concerns in exercising ethical judgment. 
Narrative intelligence is an intellectual capacity that is required for legal and ethical 
judgment. Narratives evoke emotional activity and they can also reveal the structure of an 
emotion meaning that narrative intelligence is utilised in the appraisal of emotion. The 
emotional content of narrative intelligence involves the evaluation emotional preferences, 
perspectives, beliefs, values and dispositions. Emotionally self-aware people subject their 
emotional narratives to analysis to examine and evaluate their experiences. The legal 
narrative of Morel, and the emotional narrative within, was used to demonstrate how emotion 
can be analysed. Morel is an example of how a lack of emotional self-awareness impaired the 
practitioner’s personal and professional judgment. Using elements from Solomon’s narrative 
theory of love exemplified how a lack of emotional self-awareness led to boundary violations 
and unethical behaviour. Using Nussbaum’s theory on the evaluative properties of emotion 
demonstrated how Morel’s need to be a rescuer and the prioritisation of this need led to the 
‘wrong story’ of love being told and exposed unacknowledged habits and dispositions to 
think and act on love in certain ways.  
Emotion is also involved in the personal intelligences. These intellectual capacities are also 
integral to legal and ethical judgment. Intrapersonal intelligence requires emotional self-
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awareness which involves becoming more aware of emotions, learning how to examine and 
account for them and learning how to react to them effectively. This is essential for 
developing appropriate emotional responses, exercising appropriate emotional detachment 
and leads to better ethical judgment, problem-solving and maintaining emotional well-being. 
This chapter demonstrated that when logical-mathematical and strategic intelligences are 
given precedence in legal education then the style of lawyering that is promoted is 
technocratic and legalistic. If ethical problems are equated with legal problems, students will 
naturally see their own emotions and the emotions of others as facts and will intellectualise 
their emotional experiences. This is problematic because it can lead to poor ethical judgment 
and discordance between personal values and professional roles. If legal educators, the 
profession and the public, want more genuine ethical deliberators then more focus on the 
personal intelligences should be incorporated into legal education generally and into legal 
ethics education specifically. This will involve educating students about the importance of 
emotional self-awareness and providing opportunities for them to develop and apply it in 
legal contexts. 
Interpersonal intelligence requires empathy and this is important for identification with 
others. When a detached observer stance is taken there is too much objectivity resulting in 
empathy being inhibited and lack of understanding of the other.  However, there needs to be a 
balance between empathic engagement and a sufficient level of objective detachment 
otherwise boundary violations may occur. Boundary violations include counter-transference 
and this can be avoided by developing emotional self-awareness and engaging in the 
education of the emotions. Equipping students with this knowledge and these skills is 
essential and should not be thought of as an ancillary skill to be acquired through experience 
in legal practice. Legal educators can develop teaching and learning strategies that develop 
the capacity of empathy and appropriate emotional detachment in students. This includes, but 
is not limited to, using the humanities, reflection techniques and experiential learning. All 
three strategies employ different forms of narrative, engage students in narrative intelligence 
and they support the development of intrapersonal and interpersonal capacities and skills. 
How emotion, narrative intelligence, intrapersonal and interpersonal intelligence can be 
implemented into a legal ethics curriculum is the subject of the case study in the following 
chapters. 
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4.0 CASE STUDY PART ONE: UTS 
LAW LEGAL ETHICS CURRICULUM 
DEVELOPMENT 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the first part of the case study by explaining the development of the 
legal ethics curriculum at UTS Law in 2013. In order to do this background is given on how 
ethics curricula have been implemented in Australian law schools and therefore the context in 
which UTS Law developed its legal ethics curriculum. There are different approaches to how 
legal ethics education is delivered in Australian law schools. They include single 
foundational and vocational subjects, and the pervasive approach which embeds legal ethics 
in core legal subjects throughout the curriculum. The pervasive approach coincides with the 
incremental approach. The incremental approach allows time for students to recognise and 
reflect upon ethical issues and develop knowledge and skills incrementally. The ‘judgment 
approach’ to legal-ethical decision-making acknowledges that ethical questions arise in every 
subject and that this provides opportunities to explore the ethical issues, rules and obligations, 
and the structural conditions that contribute to the ethical issues and the way judgments are 
made.
1
 Chapter 2 showed that emotions contain evaluative judgments and are implicated in 
moral and ethical judgment. Emotions can have perceptive, motivational and evaluative 
functions in moral judgment and they are also connected to ethical judgment because it 
reconciles normative standards, moral judgment and action. Chapter 3 showed how the 
analytical framework of ‘thinking like a lawyer’ is relevant to legal-ethical judgment and 
decision-making because this is another form of problem-solving undertaken by lawyers. 
Therefore, emotion and the way in which it is involved in ‘thinking like a lawyer’ is relevant 
to the ‘judgment approach’ to legal-ethical decision-making. Ideally, learning about ethical 
judgment, as with learning how to ‘think like a lawyer’, would be built on from subject to 
subject allowing for the incremental development of student knowledge and skill. 
Approaching the teaching of ethical judgment in this way would also be beneficial to the 
development of emotional self-awareness in students as this requires time to recognise, 
reflect on and evaluate emotional experiences and dispositions.
2
 
The purpose of the case study in this chapter is to demonstrate how knowledge about emotion 
and its relationship to ‘thinking like a lawyer and ethical judgment can be introduced into a 
pervasive legal ethics curriculum in an educationally justified way. As outlined in Chapter 1, 
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this is a qualitative case study that seeks to explain the ‘dynamics of a certain historical 
period of a particular social unit’3 and places emphasis on the explanation of process and 
context.
4
 The qualitative case study has also been described as an approach ‘that facilitates 
exploration of a phenomenon within its context using a variety of data sources.’5 Instrumental 
case studies are qualitative. An instrumental case study provides a general understanding of a 
phenomenon using a particular case.
6
 This type of case study has been chosen because the 
intent behind it is to gain insight and understanding.
7
 The phenomenon that the case study 
considers is the question of how to recognise and critique the emotional aspects of ‘thinking 
like a lawyer’ in legal ethics education. This cannot be considered without the context of law 
school pedagogies. Thus, the particular case analysed is the substance and form of the 
program of legal ethics education at UTS Law.  
This thesis combines these approaches and has the following scope: 
 Consideration of the dynamics and phenomena involved in developing a legal ethics 
curriculum that includes the emotional aspects of legal-ethical judgment;  
 during the 2013 curriculum review; 
 within the social unit and context of the Faculty of Law, University of Technology 
Sydney (UTS);  
 using data sources such as UTS Course Intended Learning Outcomes and curriculum 
development policy, law subject outlines, teaching materials, assessment items, and 
faculty coursework policies. 
The UTS Law faculty is the context for the case study and was chosen for the following 
reasons. UTS Law has, prior to the 2013 curriculum review, attempted to develop a pervasive 
and incremental approach to legal ethics by embedding the ethics graduate attribute in three 
substantive law subjects. However, it is arguable whether the pervasive, judgment and 
incremental approaches were fully realised in that attempt. The 2013 curriculum review 
provides an opportunity to analyse that problem and to consider the relevant educational 
factors and strategies that will improve the pervasive and incremental approaches, including 
the role of emotion in legal-ethical judgment.  As will be illustrated below the legal ethics 
curriculum at UTS combines different approaches and the case study provides conclusions 
from which generalisations can be made about legal ethics education and the inclusion of 
emotion in ethical judgment. As such, the knowledge gained from this case study can be 
transferred and adopted in other law school settings. 
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After the 2013 curriculum review, UTS Law employs a combination of a foundational ethics 
subject in year one and the pervasive and incremental approaches throughout the Bachelor of 
Laws (LLB) and Juris Doctor (JD) degrees. The ethics curriculum at UTS Law utilises the 
incremental and pervasive approaches by embedding the ethics graduate attribute into core 
law subjects. Currently at UTS Law there are six graduate attributes.
8
 The ‘ethics and 
professional responsibility’ attribute and its corresponding Course Intended Learning 
Outcome (CILO) is the focus of this chapter. The development of graduate attributes and 
CILOs is explained in Part 4.3. This Part demonstrates how emotion, although not explicitly 
stated, is captured in the statements of the ethics graduate attribute and the corresponding 
CILO. The graduate attributes and CILOs are integrated into the Bachelor of Laws and Juris 
Doctor degrees via subject learning objectives. Subject learning objectives provide the means 
from which to introduce knowledge about emotion within the subjects embedding the ethics 
attribute. I was a participant in the faculty workshop that developed the ethics attribute and 
the ethics attribute sub-committee.
9
 This sub-committee devised the subject learning 
objectives implementing the ethics attribute and CILO into core law subjects. 
There are three overall aims of this chapter. The first is to explain the context of how legal 
ethics curricula have been implemented in Australian law schools and UTS in particular. 
Second, to demonstrate that knowledge about emotion in legal ethics education is best 
introduced via the pervasive and incremental approaches. These aims are achieved in Part 4.2 
where the current approaches to teaching ethics and professional conduct in Australian law 
schools is explained. This provides the context for the incremental and pervasive approach 
adopted by UTS Law. It is argued that the introduction of the emotional aspects of ‘thinking 
like a lawyer’ and legal-ethical judgment should be done pervasively and incrementally. The 
third aim is to demonstrate that the ethics graduate attribute, CILO and subject learning 
objectives developed at UTS Law, provide the means from which to introduce knowledge 
about emotion (as discussed in previous chapters). This aim is achieved in Part 4.3 which 
charts and analyses the development of the incremental and pervasive approach to legal 
ethics at UTS Law. The analysis of the 2007 curriculum review briefly critiques the attempt 
to embed the ethics attribute pervasively and incrementally in that period. The analysis of the 
2013 curriculum review explains the development of the ethics graduate attribute, the 
corresponding CILO, the new subject learning objectives and the process of improving the 
pervasive and incremental approach to legal ethics at UTS. All of these factors enable the role 
of emotion in legal-ethical judgment to be included in the legal ethics curriculum at UTS in 
an educationally justified way. 
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4.2 Current approaches to teaching ethics and professional conduct in 
Australian Law curricula 
The aim of this part is to explain the current approaches to teaching ethics and professional 
responsibility in Australian law curricula. The part considers single foundational and 
vocational subjects, pervasive and incremental approaches and thereby providing the context 
in which UTS Law has developed its legal ethics curriculum. The part concludes by 
explaining why it is important to introduce knowledge about the role of emotion in legal-
ethical judgment incrementally and pervasively. 
4.2.1    Single Foundational and Vocational subjects 
In 2008 the Australian Council of Law Deans (CALD) produced a catalogue of teaching legal 
ethics and professional responsibility in Australian law schools for the purpose of ongoing 
analysis of the educational approaches in this area.
10
 This strategy accords with CALD’s goal 
to ‘develop effective means to inculcate in Australian law students the values of 
professionalism, ethics and service.’11 The catalogue discloses a range of subjects offered by 
Australian law schools. Ethics teaching in Australian law schools can be divided into 
academic (undergraduate legal studies) and vocational (legal practice course) phases.  
Typically during the academic phase, universities offer foundation subjects in the first or 
second year of study. For example, according to the CALD catalogue, at the Australian 
National University students undertake the subject ‘Lawyers, Justice and Ethics’ in first year 
and at Macquarie University students undertake the subject ‘Law, Lawyers and Society’ in 
second year. In the vocational phase the majority of universities teach subjects in 
‘Professional Conduct’, ‘Ethics and Professional Conduct’ or ‘Legal Ethics and Trust 
Accounting’. Subjects such as these typically focus on professional responsibility rules. 
These universities may provide other learning opportunities or exposure to legal ethics. 
However the important point is, that whilst students undertaking such units of study are 
exposed to legal ethics or professional conduct, a single subject on its own, does not provide 
opportunities for pervasive and incremental learning about ethics and the development of 
judgment, skills and knowledge throughout the curriculum. 
Apart from embedding graduate attributes in core legal subjects, UTS Law also had a 
separate vocational subject ‘Ethics and Professional Conduct’ as part of the Practical Legal 
Training (PLT) program
12
 at the end of the curriculum. As a capstone subject it was here that 
ethics had its primary focus. It was decided under the 2013 curriculum review, and in 
accordance with the Priestly 11,
13
 that students should have a focused and earlier exposure to 
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ethics and that this should be re-enforced throughout the degree. As such, with the 
implementation of the curriculum review at UTS in 2014, Ethics and Professional Conduct 
was disbanded and the professional responsibility aspect of it will now be taught in the PLT 
subject Legal Skills. The ethics aspect of the subject will be taught through a new first year 
foundational subject called ‘Ethics, Law and Justice’, which commenced in semester one 
2014. That subject is a core subject and will cover the philosophical, social, professional and 
personal substance of ethics. The ethics program at UTS now comprises a first year 
foundational ethics subject, embeds ethics pervasively across select core law subjects and, for 
students enrolled in PLT, a vocational subject will cover professional responsibility and trust 
accounting. 
4.2.2 Pervasive, Judgment and Incremental approaches 
Literature in legal ethics education suggests that the preferred approach to teaching and 
learning ethics is a pervasive and incremental approach.
14
 The pervasive approach means that 
legal ethics is embedded throughout the law curriculum. The incremental approach means 
that knowledge and skills are developed in stages with increasing complexity. These 
approaches are preferred by many legal educators because students can practice exercising 
ethical judgment at different points during the curriculum, consider different ethical problems 
and perspectives, enhance skills and ethical analysis, gain awareness of structural and 
regulatory issues, and reflect on their values and how those influence ethical judgment.
15
 This 
is intended to give students the opportunity to develop their capacity for ethical judgment and 
problem-solving.  
Amongst the advocates of the pervasive approach to legal ethics there is divergence about 
how curricula should be designed to maximise student exposure and increase knowledge. 
Granfield and Koenig argue that legal ethics courses should impart three overriding skills:  
(1) An ability to recognise ethical considerations generated in various legal practice 
scenarios; (2) an ability to analyse such scenarios within a conceptual framework of 
ethical, jurisprudential, as well as legal, considerations; and (3) a capacity for and 
willingness to engage in reflective judgment.
16
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These skills are compatible with the framework of ‘thinking like a lawyer’ in Chapter 3. In 
that chapter legal-ethical judgment and the ability to undertake ethical analysis were 
connected to ‘thinking like a lawyer’. The analytical framework of ‘thinking like a lawyer’ is 
relevant to legal-ethical judgment and decision-making because this is another form of 
problem-solving undertaken by lawyers. Burton identifies six intellectual capacities
17
 that are 
necessary for the aptitude to undertake legal problem-solving, reasoning and judgment. 
Narrative intelligence and the personal intelligences are two of those capacities. Both 
narrative and the personal intelligence require the ability to perceive and analyse, and the 
capacity to engage in reflective judgment. This includes the emotional content of these 
intelligences. Incremental learning is implicit in the three overriding skills above, because 
acquiring and developing those skills, like learning how to ‘think like a lawyer’, is an 
ongoing process. Granfield and Koenig conclude that imparting these skills is best done by 
integrating ethics into the whole curriculum pervasively, because that approach enables a 
contextual perspective. But rather than embedding ethical components into substantive law 
subjects, these academics suggest that there should be ‘several specialised courses that 
address ethics across a range of professional practice areas.’18  
In evaluating
19
 the pervasive approach to legal ethics at the University of California, Los 
Angeles (UCLA), Menkel-Meadow and Sander found firstly, that the pervasive method 
should not be solely relied on, as students encountering ethics in up to six subjects would 
only cover a fraction of the material covered in a professional responsibility subject.
20
 In 
addition to embedding legal ethics in substantive law subjects, having a professional 
responsibility subject at the end of the curriculum provides students with the time to learn and 
understand the unifying concepts and structure of professional responsibility laws, 
regulations and rules. Secondly they found that the more faculty members who participate in 
pervasive teaching using participatory and experiential techniques, then the more effective 
the method would be.
21
 According to Menkel-Meadow and Sander, the more exposure 
students have to ethics, the more likely they are to draw connections to other subjects and 
other ethical topics.
22
  
Granfield and Koenig favour specialised subjects throughout a degree that address ethics 
across a range of professional practice areas. Menkel-Meadow and Sander favour the 
embedding of legal ethics in substantive law subjects across the degree with a capstone 
subject in professional responsibility. This model was used at UTS Law prior to 2014. 
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Cramton and Koniac differ from these approaches as theirs involves a first year foundational 
subject that is ‘supplemented with a well-designed and deliberate effort to-teach ethics 
through the pervasive method’.23 In the 2013 curriculum review, UTS Law adopted a 
combination of the Cramton and Koniac, and Menkel-Meadow and Sander models. UTS Law 
now has a foundational ethics subject, embeds ethics pervasively into core law subjects and 
has a vocational subject where professional responsibility and trust accounting will be taught. 
This change was made in accordance with the Priestly 11 requirements, the Teaching and 
Learning Outcomes,
24
 and the integration of the new ethics graduate attribute.
25
   
4.2.2.1 Australian pervasive approaches 
In the last decade Australian law faculties have embarked on projects to increase the ethical 
and professional acumen of students.  For example, many Australian universities and law 
faculties, including UTS, formulated graduate attributes
26
 amongst them ethics and 
professionalism, with the aim of giving students the opportunity to develop these attributes 
throughout their degrees. Christensen and Kift, define graduate attributes as 
the qualities, capabilities and understandings of a graduate which a university community 
agrees students should develop during their time at the institution, both for their future 
professions and to make a contribution as ordinary citizens.
27
  
Graduate attributes include technical skills and knowledge and encompass broader skills such 
as communication, teamwork and self-management. Christensen and Kift observe that the 
majority of research indicates ‘the most effective way of developing skills within a graduate 
attribute is to embed those skills within the curriculum’ because this allows students to 
develop skills and acquire knowledge incrementally.
28
 However, the success of this approach 
depends largely on the proper co-ordination and deployment of substantive material and skills 
components throughout the degree.
29
 Part 4.3 analyses the co-ordination of the pervasive and 
incremental approach to embedding the ethics attribute at UTS Law.  
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 See Evers, Houston and Redmond, above n 1. 
25
 See Appendix One, Table 1 for a full list of the attributes prior to 2013 and Table 2 for a full list of the new 
attributes developed in the 2013 curriculum review. 
26
 For example Queensland University of Technology, Griffith University, University of Western Australia, 
Australian Catholic University, University of South Australia, University of Melbourne, University of Adelaide, 
University of Tasmania, Bond University, University of New South Wales, Newcastle University, University of 
Western Sydney, Australian National University.  
27
 Sharon Christensen and Sally Kift, ‘Graduate Attributes and Legal Skills: Integration of Disintegration?’ 
(2000) 11 Legal Education Review 207, 207. 
28
 Ibid 220. 
29
 Sally Kift, ‘21st Century Climate for Change: Curriculum Design for Quality Learning Engagement in Law’ 
(2008) 18 Legal Education Review 1, 16. 
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Griffith Law School has adopted vertical subjects into their law curriculum.  A vertical 
subject is a separate subject, with separate learning objectives, content and assessment. The 
subject is pervasive because it is hosted by multiple substantive subjects
30
 and learning is 
incremental because the learning objectives ‘increase in complexity from one host subject to 
the next.’31 Areas of substantive law and practice are identified within the host subject where 
ethics is implicated and ethics learning objectives, teaching and assessment are aligned to the 
learning objectives of the host subject.
32
  
Embedding graduate attributes is a partially vertical approach. Under the 2007 curriculum 
review at UTS Law, embedding graduate attributes within core subjects was the task of the 
individual subject co-ordinator, which involved writing a learning objective, deciding what 
content within the subject was relevant to the attribute, and deciding whether the graduate 
attribute would be assessed. In comparison, a vertical subject appears to be a more formalised 
and pedagogically considered approach. Whilst UTS is not implementing a vertical subject, 
there is considerable benefit from recognising an approach that develops learning objectives 
and assessment in a coordinated and incremental way and then applying this to the 
embedding of graduate attributes. If the implementation of graduate attributes into subjects is 
co-ordinated properly, then this model should achieve the same pervasive and incremental 
results as a vertical subject. The attempt to formally co-ordinate the embedding of the ethics 
attribute in the 2013 curriculum review is discussed in Part 4.3.2 below.  
4.2.3 Emotion, Judgment, Pervasive and Incremental learning 
The pervasive approach to teaching and the judgment approach to legal-ethical decision 
making, recognise that legal ethics should be embedded as broadly as possible across the 
curriculum.
33
 This allows students to increase awareness as to when ethical judgment is 
required and to develop their capacity for exercising ethical judgment. The judgment 
approach also allows for the consideration of the role of emotion in legal-ethical judgment. 
For example, the ‘ethics-as-judgment approach’ recognises that ethical judgment is a process 
involving deliberation about ‘personal, moral, and political problems’ which requires the 
ability to synthesise the intellectual and emotional components of a problem.
34
 The ability to 
account for the positive and negative influences of emotion on judgment, including ethical 
judgment, requires an understanding of the evaluative judgments that emotions contain. 
Recognising and understanding those evaluative judgments requires a capacity for emotional 
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 Michael Robertson, ‘Challenges in the Design of Legal Ethics Learning Systems: An Educational 
Perspective’ (2005) 8 Legal Ethics 222. 
31
 Ibid 237. 
32
 Ibid 238. The vertical subject is also acknowledged in the Good Practice Guide as a viable alternative to 
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self-awareness.  Allowing students to acquire better emotional self-awareness and to practice 
making judgments that may involve emotion requires time to recognise, reflect, develop 
insights, and to make connections to personal values and beliefs. Therefore, the introduction 
of knowledge pertaining to role of emotion in legal-ethical judgment should ideally be taught 
across the curriculum and the complexity of such knowledge should increase from subject to 
subject. 
The pervasive, incremental and judgment approaches complement teaching and learning 
strategies in relation to introducing knowledge about emotion. As stated above ‘thinking like 
a lawyer’ is connected to ethical judgment as this is another form of problem-solving 
encountered by lawyers. ‘Thinking like a lawyer’ involves the capacities of narrative 
intelligence and the personal intelligences and emotion is involved in both of those 
intelligences. Thus the role of emotion in legal-ethical judgment is implicated in learning how 
to ‘think like a lawyer’. This means that if Burton’s model of ‘thinking like a lawyer’ is 
applied in legal ethics education the emotional content of narrative intelligence and personal 
intelligences can be introduced pervasively into the subjects that embed the ethics attribute. 
As above, the complexity of the emotional content in those intellectual capacities should 
increase incrementally along with the substantive legal ethics material in each subject. This 
theme is reiterated in the following Parts. 
4.3 Case Study: UTS Law Ethics Curriculum 
This part begins by charting the development of the pervasive and incremental approach to 
legal ethics at UTS Law. The analysis of the 2007 curriculum review in Part 4.3.1 explains 
the history of embedding the ethics attribute at UTS Law, and emphasises the process and 
context leading up to the 2013 curriculum review which is the main focus of the case study. 
Part 4.3.2 explains the contextual factors and the process of developing and implementing the 
ethics attribute under the 2013 curriculum review. This Part demonstrates that including 
knowledge about emotion within legal ethics education at UTS is consistent with student 
learning outcomes at institutional and faculty levels. In Part 4.3.3 the new subject learning 
objectives that embed the ethics graduate attribute are stated, in order to demonstrate how the 
subject learning objectives promote incremental learning of the emotional aspects of legal 
ethics, and how knowledge about emotion is either explicitly or implicitly included within the 
content of the learning objectives.   
4.3.1 The 2007 Curriculum Review  
In 2007, UTS Law undertook a curriculum review, one aim of which was to formulate and 
implemented graduate attributes into the curriculum. Ten graduate attributes were 
implemented covering the intellectual, professional and personal domains.
35
 The ethics 
attribute was stated as the ‘capacity to value and promote honesty, accountability and ethical 
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standards.’ This formulation of the attribute is narrower than the current statement36 and is 
not explicit about the skills and knowledge components of legal ethics. There were three core 
subjects in the LLB and JD that targeted the ethics attribute: Perspectives on Law, Torts and 
Corporate Law. In addition students undertaking Practical Legal Training (PLT) in the 
vocational phase undertook the subject Ethics and Professional Conduct.  
Table 1 - 2007-2013 LLB/JD Progression – Ethics Attribute 
Year of Study Semester Core Subject 
One One Perspectives on Law 
One Two Torts 
Two or Three One or Two Corporate Law 
Four PLT Ethics & Professional Conduct 
 
As illustrated in Table 1, this curriculum was not completely pervasive because an entire year 
did not have ethics coverage in core subjects.
37
 Further, the idea behind the pervasive 
approach is to allow incremental learning and development, but this depends largely on the 
systematic co-ordination and deployment of substantive ethics material and skills components 
throughout the degree. When the first round of graduate attributes was embedded in core law 
subjects in 2007, individual subject co-ordinators were given the task of matching the 
attribute with subject learning objectives and implementing teaching and learning strategies. 
Whilst this gave co-ordinators autonomy in respect of the content of ethics within their 
subjects, it meant that the implementation of the attribute was not co-ordinated. Although 
aspects of what Kift describes as ‘whole-of-program mapping’ were attempted, it was not 
fully realised.
38
 Because subject co-ordinators were not supported and directed through the 
process, they focused on how the attribute was situated within their subject, as opposed to 
collaborating on how the attribute and corresponding learning objective sat within the 
program of ethics education as a whole.
39
 The result of the unco-ordinated and unsupported 
implementation meant that incremental learning was not adequately considered. 
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 See Table 2 below. 
37
 Under the 2013 curriculum review Perspectives on Law is now redundant and is being replaced with the 
subject Foundations of Law which will not target the ethics attribute. The PLT subject Ethics and Professional 
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This process was more like what Kamvounias and Thompson describe as a ‘top-down 
approach’ leading to ‘mapping exercises where learning goals are matched with attribute 
categories’ as opposed to developing learning objectives that embed the attribute.40 The result 
of the ‘top-down’ approach meant that ethics topics tended to be construed narrowly and this 
might be expected given the way in which the attribute was stated, the lack of teaching and 
learning support, and the attempt to fit more content into core law subjects without losing 
substantive material. This also meant that broader ethical factors, like personal values, 
morality and emotion were overlooked.   
4.3.2 The 2013 Curriculum Review 
In 2013, UTS Law finalised the curriculum review which began in 2012 and the new 
curriculum was implemented in 2014. The process involved reformulating the graduate 
attributes to accord with the Threshold Learning Outcomes (TLOs) recommended by the 
Council of Australian Law Deans in 2012.
41
 Additionally, UTS required faculties to 
formulate Course Intended Learning Outcomes (CILOs) for degrees that reflected and 
complied with the Australian Qualification Framework (AQF) levels.
42
 UTS Law appointed 
an academic to co-ordinate the Graduate Attributes Project. A faculty wide consultation and 
workshop reformulated the graduate attributes and sub-committees were formed to translate 
the attributes into subject learning objectives. The rationale behind dedicating a group of 
academics to formulate learning objectives was to ensure the pervasive and incremental 
implementation of the graduate attributes into core law subjects.
43
 Subject outlines linked 
learning objectives to the relevant graduate attribute, so that students are aware of and can 
demonstrate the attainment of the attributes at the end of their degree. 
Graduate attributes are distinguished from Course Intended Learning Outcomes (CILOs) and 
Threshold Learning Outcomes (TLOs), but all are factors that influence the formulation of 
subject learning objectives, assessment tasks and assessment criteria. UTS adopted the 
following hierarchy and relationship between graduate attributes, CILOs, TLOs and 
individual subjects within degrees:
44
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
40
 Patty Kamvounias and Darrall Thompson, ‘Assessing Graduate Attributes in the Business Law Curriculum’ 
(2008) 1 (1) Journal of the Australian Law Teachers Association 181, 181. 
41
 TLOs are defined in Part 4.3.2.2. 
42
 CILOs are defined in Part 4.2.2.3. 
43
 Kift, above n 29, 18. 
44
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Graduate Attributes  
 
 
Course Intended Learning Outcomes (Graduate attributes combined with TLOs) 
 
 
Subject Learning Objectives 
 
 
Assessment Tasks 
 
    Assessment Criteria 
 
In this Part, the broader context of developing graduate attributes and CILOs is described 
because specific subject learning objectives are derived from these. It is demonstrated that the 
statements of the ethics graduate attribute, TLO and CILO require judgment and include the 
intellectual capacities of narrative and the personal intelligences in ‘thinking like a lawyer’ 
and therefore the emotional content of those capacities. This Part begins by defining graduate 
attributes, TLOs, CILOs and then ends with an explanation of how the ethics attribute will be 
embedded into the LLB and JD at UTS. Part 4.3.3 states the subject learning objectives that 
embed the ethics attribute via the CILO. This Part focuses on how the learning objectives 
promote incremental learning and how emotion is included within the content of the 
objectives.  
4.3.2.1 Graduate Attributes 2013 
Prior to the 2013 curriculum review there were ten graduate attributes. This has been changed 
and there are now six graduate attributes. The attributes were reformulated to accord with the 
six TLOs and the differences between the LLB and JD in the Australian Qualifications 
Framework (AQF) levels.
45
 The new attributes were merged with TLOs to formulate the 
CILOs discussed below. The differences between the outcome levels for the LLB and JD in 
Table 2 below pertain to the standards required under CILOs and reflect the different AQF 
levels. The content of the attributes remain largely the same although some have been merged 
under umbrella terms. This was done for two primary reasons. Firstly, merging some of the 
attributes simplified the process of drafting the CILOs and ensured that all the essential 
curriculum benchmarks were included in a coherent format. Secondly, the merge was 
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intended to make the task of drafting subject learning objectives, assessment tasks and 
assessment criteria more manageable.  
Table 2 - Ethics Graduate Attribute 2013 curriculum review 
Course Ethics Attribute 
LLB - AQF 
level 7 
Ethics & professional responsibility - A capacity to value and promote honesty, 
integrity, accountability, public service and ethical standards including an 
understanding of approaches to ethical decision-making, the rules of professional 
responsibility and, an ability to reflect upon and respond to ethical challenges in 
practice. 
JD - AQF 
level 9 
Ethics & professional responsibility - An advanced and integrated capacity to value 
and promote honesty, integrity, accountability, public service and ethical standards 
including an understanding of approaches to ethical decision-making, the rules of 
professional responsibility, an ability to reflect upon and respond to ethical challenges 
in practice, and a developing ability to engage in the profession of law and to exercise 
professional judgment. 
 
Although the attributes in Table 2 are not specific about the role of emotion in legal-ethical 
judgment, they capture this in the way they are framed. For example, in requiring ‘an ability 
to reflect upon and respond to ethical challenges’, the capacity of narrative intelligence may 
be engaged because constructing a story can contextualise the problem, assists in making 
sense of the ethical challenge and in understanding the perspectives of the people and factors 
involved. Such factors could include the personal feelings of the lawyer or accounting for the 
feelings of others. This also indicates that reflecting upon and engaging with ethical 
challenges involves intrapersonal and interpersonal intelligence because students may need to 
reflect and assess their own emotions, personal values and attitudes when faced with ethical 
challenges.
46
 Students may also have to consider these factors in relation to others and the 
impact that their responses to ethical challenges can have on others. An ‘understanding of 
approaches to ethical decision-making’ requires consideration of the roles and responsibilities 
of lawyers and their obligations to society, and developing values about justice.
47
 It also 
requires the ability to understand one’s own approach to ethical decision-making and the 
subjective and objective factors that influence ethical judgment. The ‘capacity to value and 
promote honesty…’ implies the relevance of intrapersonal intelligence because this requires 
awareness of personal values, such as honesty, and developing a sense of integrity.
48
 
Emotions are concerned with value because they can denote what is important about a 
person, thing or event, and emotions can reflect pre-existing concerns such as moral beliefs 
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and principles. Arguably, the statements of the graduate attribute involve a broad conception 
of legal-ethical judgment and are capable of capturing the involvement of emotion in such 
judgment. 
4.3.2.2 Threshold Learning Outcomes (TLOs) 
Threshold Learning Outcomes (TLOs) are a benchmark standard intended to apply to all 
Australian law faculties. Support for developing the TLOs was given by the Australian 
Learning and Teaching Council Ltd and TLOs pertaining to law were commissioned by the 
Law Associate Deans Network and endorsed by the Council of Australian Law Deans in 
March 2012.
49
 Six TLOs
50
 were developed having regard to national and international 
statements on the competencies, skills and knowledge that law graduates should have. TLO 2 
relates to Ethics and Professional Responsibility and is stated as: 
Graduates of the Bachelor of Laws
51
 will demonstrate: 
(a) An understanding of approaches to ethical decision-making 
(b) An ability to recognise and reflect upon, and a developing ability to respond to, 
ethical issues likely to arise in professional contexts 
(c) An ability to recognise and reflect upon the professional responsibilities of lawyers in 
promoting justice and in service to the community 
(d) A developing ability to exercise professional judgment. 
Like the statements of the graduate attribute above, the TLO captures the inclusion of the role 
of emotion in legal-ethical judgment because of the way it is articulated. The statements of 
the competencies, skill and knowledge in (a)-(c) above are the same as in the graduate 
attribute and as such, the same argument that they capture the role of emotion in legal-ethical 
judgment is also applicable to the TLO. The JD graduate attribute in Table 2 above and point 
(d) in the TLO require the ability to exercise professional judgment. A Good Practice Guide 
was developed as a resource to assist legal educators to facilitate student learning and the 
development of skills as set out in TLO 2.
52
 The Guide states that students should be 
encouraged ‘to learn that lawyers need constantly to make judgment calls that often involve 
personal choices’ and that the role of personal values need to be emphasised.53 This statement 
recognises that ethical knowledge and the ability to engage in ethical judgment involves self-
awareness. This can also involve emotional self-awareness, including how emotion is 
involved in personal choices and personal values and how these factors can play a role in 
legal-ethical judgment. Importantly for this thesis, there is recognition that ‘the best way to 
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 http://www.cald.asn.au/media/uploads/JD%20TLOs%20(March%202012)%20Andrew%20Kenyon1.pdf. 
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teach legal ethics is to incorporate moral judgment’.54 As demonstrated in Chapter 2, emotion 
can have perceptive, motivational and evaluative functions in moral judgment. Therefore, in 
order for the teaching of legal-ethical judgment to be comprehensive it should include moral 
judgment and the factors, such as emotion, that moral judgment encompasses.   
4.3.2.3 Course Intended Learning Outcomes (CILOs) 
Course Intended Learning Outcomes (CILOs) are a statement of what students will be able to 
do as a result of successfully completing the course requirements of their degree.
55
 At UTS, 
CILOs are based on a combination of graduate attributes
56
 and TLOs. The CILOs reflect the 
level (e.g. Bachelors or Masters) of the disciplinary context.
57
 Currently the Australian 
Qualifications Framework (AQF) determines learning outcome descriptors for different 
qualification types. For example a bachelor’s degree is at AQF level 7 and a master’s degree 
is at level 9.
58
 The levels are contrasted in several indicia including knowledge, skills and 
application.
59
 Table 3 states the CILO for ethics and professional responsibility and illustrates 
the combination of the graduate attribute and the TLO at AQF level 7. 
 
Table 3 - Ethics Level 7 and 9 Course Intended Learning Outcome 
 CILO AQF Level 7 (LLB) 
Ethics & 
Professional 
Responsibility 
A capacity to value and promote honesty, integrity, accountability, 
public service and ethical standards including: 
An understanding of approaches to ethical decision-making and 
professional responsibility; and 
An ability to recognise, reflect upon and respond to ethical issues 
likely to arise in professional contexts in ways that evidence 
professional judgment, promote justice and serve the community. 
 
                                                          
54
 Ibid 4. 
55
 UTS: Terminology used in the Graduate Attribute Project – Institute for Interactive Media and Learning, 
http://www.iml.uts.edu.au/curriculum/definitions.html  
56
 See Appendix One Table 2 and 3 for a full list of the new graduate attributes. 
57
 UTS: Terminology used in the Graduate Attribute Project – Institute for Interactive Media and Learning, 
http://www.iml.uts.edu.au/curriculum/definitions.html 
58
 The differences between outcome levels 7 and 9 can be broadly summarised in the following way: Level 7 
knowledge is broad and coherent, level 9 knowledge is advanced and integrated including recent developments; 
level 7 skills are well developed and level 9 skills are expert, specialised; the indicia for level 7 application of 
knowledge are autonomy, well developed judgment, responsibility and self-direction within the broad 
parameters in a work context or as a learner, level 9 indicia are autonomy, expert judgment, adaptability, 
responsibility and self-direction as a practitioner or learner. 
59
 See Appendix One Table 4 for all LLB and JD CILOs. 
Chapter Four: Case Study Part One: UTS Law Legal Ethics Curriculum Development 
80 
 
This CILO encompasses what has been described as the ‘whole student’ model because it 
engages the cognitive (intellectual), affective (values) and skill domains of legal ethics.
60
 The 
affective domain includes ‘emotions, values, attitudes, habits and beliefs’.61 Emotion can also 
be involved in the cognitive domain of legal ethics. For example, Chapter 2 established that 
some emotions are cognitive because they contain evaluative judgments, thereby tacitly 
engaging the intellectual domain of legal ethics. Emotion is also involved in ‘thinking like a 
lawyer’ and this is an element of the intellectual domain of legal ethics. Therefore the ‘whole 
student’ model explicitly and implicitly recognises emotion as a factor in legal ethics. 
CILOs inform the formulation of subject objectives. In order for students to attain the CILO, 
subject learning objectives need to be formulated to increase in complexity so that students 
can learn incrementally, including the emotional factors contained in the CILO. The 
application of the ethics CILO in the subject learning objectives embedding the ethics 
attribute is explained in Part 4.3.3. Because the CILO encompasses the whole student 
approach, the content of subject learning objectives would ideally include the cognitive, 
affective and skill domains of legal ethics.
62
 However, as discussed in Part 4.3.3.2, whether 
the affective domain is included at the subject level depends on how the subject objectives 
are interpreted and applied.  
4.3.2.4 Subjects embedding the ethics attribute 
Under the 2013 curriculum review the ethics attribute sub-committee, of which I was a 
member, embedded the attribute more pervasively by increasing the number of subjects 
spread across the core curriculum.  
 
Table 4 - 2014 LLB/JD Progression – Ethics Attribute & CILO 
Semester Core Subject 
One (year 1) Ethics, Law and Justice 
Two (year 1) Torts 
Three (year 2) Civil Practice 
Four (year 2) Evidence and Criminal Procedure 
Five (year 3) Corporate Law 
PLT (year 3 or 
4) 
Legal Skills 
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Ethics, Law and Justice was an obvious place to embed the ethics attribute, and the sub-
committee decided to retain Torts and Corporate Law, because these substantive subjects 
already embed the attribute. The procedural subjects of Civil Practice and Criminal Procedure 
and Evidence were added to make the program more pervasive. Consideration had to be 
given to distributing the six graduate attributes equitably between core subjects and this is a 
reason why one semester, in year 3 or 4, does not have ethics coverage. This limitation was 
unavoidable however; ethics coverage has been improved from the previous curriculum.
63
 
Articulating incremental learning is achieved through subject learning objectives and this is 
discussed in the following Part. 
4.3.3 Embedding the ethics attribute in subject learning objectives 
The aim of this part is to explain how learning objectives for the core subjects that embed the 
ethics attribute were formulated by the ethics attribute sub-committee at UTS Law. This 
process involved the application of the constructionist learning theory of the educational 
psychologist John Biggs.
64
 This theory focuses on the learner and refers to the idea that 
learners construct knowledge for themselves. Teaching therefore, is about providing the 
environment that supports learners in constructing knowledge. For the purpose of this thesis it 
is not necessary to describe the entire process and the theory that was applied by the sub-
committee in formulating the learning objectives. This Part instead focuses on how emotion 
is included within the content of the learning objectives and how they promote the 
incremental learning of the emotional aspects of legal-ethical judgment and. Table 5 below 
contains the subject learning objectives embedding the ethics attribute via the CILO in core 
law subjects.  
Table 5 – Subject learning objectives - Ethics Attribute & CILO 2014  
Subject Learning Objectives - On successful completion of the subject students should be able to: 
Ethics, Law & 
Justice 
Develop an ethical framework for the practice of law together with the ability to recognise 
ethical questions. 
Recognise the relationship between personal and professional attitudes and values and 
approaches to ethical decision-making. 
Consider the impact of personal values, emotions and morals in ethical decision-making. 
Torts Recognise the perspectives of various stakeholders and to satisfactorily reconcile these 
differing perspectives. 
Civil Practice Evaluate the components and processes of ethical decision-making in a context of 
alternative modes of problem-solving. 
Evidence Evaluate and reflect on the roles of lawyers in the administration of justice. 
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Corporate Law LLB – Reflect on the professional responsibilities of lawyers and demonstrate the capacity 
to exercise ethical judgment. 
JD – Reflect on the professional responsibilities of lawyers and demonstrate and advanced 
and integrated capacity to exercise ethical judgment. 
4.3.3.1 Subject learning objectives and incremental development 
Subject learning objectives are a statement of learning outcomes
65
 that ideally include the 
standard at which knowledge and skills are to be demonstrated. Biggs makes a distinction 
between quantitative learning objectives that are intended to increase knowledge and 
qualitative objectives that are intended to deepen understanding.
66
 By focusing on the 
qualitative, deep learning approaches are encouraged, and the challenge is to highlight 
qualitative aims in subject learning objectives and support this through teaching and 
assessment methods.
67
 Qualitative objectives state relational outcomes (the orchestration 
between facts and theory, action and purpose) or extended abstract outcomes 
(conceptualisation beyond what is taught).
68
 Qualitative objectives are the intended learning 
outcomes, but within teaching and learning strategies and assessment some quantitative aims 
may be appropriate. This is because quantitative learning happens first and progresses to 
qualitative learning.
69
 Quantitative objectives state uni-structural outcomes (simple, 
minimalistic, refering to one learning aspect) or multi-structural outcomes (descriptive).
70
   
Levels of understanding are communicated in subject learning objectives by verbs that 
indicate what students need to do in order to demonstrate the level of understanding.
71
 For 
example, multi-structural verbs include ‘enumerate, describe, list, and combine’ and extended 
abstract verbs include ‘theorise, generalise, hypothesise, and reflect.’72 The subject learning 
objectives in Table 5 contain verbs that denote the increase in complexity from subject to 
subject and therefore the ascension of levels of understanding. This was a deliberate attempt 
by the sub-committee to ensure incremental learning between the subjects and is illustrated in 
Table 6 below. 
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th
 ed, 
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Table 6 – Incremental subject learning objectives 
Subject Verbs used Levels of 
understanding 
Ethics and Professional 
Conduct and 
Ethics Law and Justice 
Develop 
Recognise 
Consider 
Relational 
Uni-structural  
Relational  
Torts Recognise 
Reconcile 
Uni-structural 
Relational 
Civil Practice Evaluate Relational 
Evidence Evaluate 
Reflect 
Relational 
Extended abstract 
Corporate Law Reflect  Extended abstract 
 
The overall purpose of embedding ethics pervasively is the incremental development of 
knowledge and understanding over the degree. The intended outcome of this process is that 
students attain the graduate attribute via the Course Intended Learning Outcome (CILO). The 
ultimate aim of the CILO and graduate attribute is that students acquire an extended-abstract 
level of understanding. These standards are reflected in the CILO which describes 
competency by using verbs such as ‘reflect’ and ‘engage’.  Therefore, in order to achieve 
these outcomes the pervasive and incremental approaches have been employed at the subject 
level in the learning objectives.  The incremental progress of learning in the subject learning 
objectives also applies to the role of emotion in legal-ethical judgment. For example, one of 
the objectives in the foundational subject Ethics, Law and Justice requires students to 
‘consider the impact of emotions’ in ethical decision-making. Later in Corporate Law the 
objective requires students to demonstrate the ‘capacity to exercise ethical judgment’. 
Therefore, students should advance from considering the role of emotion in legal-ethical 
judgement in the beginning of their degree, to being able to account for it in such judgment 
toward the end of their degree. This will depend on whether emotional content is adopted in 
each subject and this issue is discussed further below. 
4.3.3.2 The content of the subject learning objectives 
Biggs cautions educators to be aware of the ‘inevitable tension between coverage and depth 
of understanding.’73 The result of having too much content is over-teaching at the expense of 
giving students the time to perform understanding in different situations.
74
 Accordingly, 
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breadth of coverage results in surface learning and quantitative learning outcomes.
75
 
Conversely, depth of coverage results in deep learning and qualitative outcomes.
76
 Apart 
from Ethics and Professional Conduct (and Ethics, Law and Justice) where the entire subjects 
deals with ethics, it is important to remember that the ethics content, in other UTS subjects 
that embed the ethics attribute, is learned in conjunction with the substantive legal topics. 
This means that the core law subjects that embed the attribute will have to consider the 
amount of formalised ethics content in order to encourage depth of understanding. 
Additionally, the ethics topics within individual subjects need to align with the content in the 
subject learning objective. Similarly, the opportunities to introduce emotion in this content 
will have to be relevant to the substantive material and the learning objective and therefore 
not every emotional topic, as conceived in Chapters 2 and 3, should be covered in each 
subject.   
As Table 5 above shows, the third learning objective in Ethics and Professional Conduct and 
Ethics, Law and Justice explicitly refers to emotion. Because several learning objectives in 
these subjects refer to the ethics attribute, the ethics attribute sub-committee thought it 
important to explicitly refer to emotion. There are several topics within these subjects where 
emotion is actively discussed, and its inclusion in the learning objective, promotes emotion 
from the outset as a valid intellectual pursuit and consideration in ethical judgment. This 
subject is also where students will begin to make the connection between ‘thinking like a 
lawyer’, legal-ethical-judgment and emotion.  
The subject learning objectives for Torts, Civil Practice, Evidence and Criminal Procedure, 
and Corporate Law, make no reference to the role of emotion in legal ethics or in legal-
ethical judgment. The tension here was between clarity, in the sense that learning objectives 
should accurately convey what is to be learned and what standard it is to be learned at, and 
the idea that emotion and thinking are not separate so that specifying the role of emotion 
could make it seem distinct from ethical judgment. A decision was made by the ethics 
attribute sub-committee in favour of keeping the objectives broad enough to encapsulate 
many components, including emotion, without making explicit reference to them. This is also 
consistent with the way the CILO is stated, which explicitly includes emotion in the affective 
domain and implicitly in the cognitive domain. For example, the learning objective in 
Evidence and Criminal Procedure states that students should be able to ‘evaluate and reflect 
on the roles of lawyers in the administration of justice’. The focus on the roles of lawyers 
provides the opportunity to discuss the ethics of advocacy and how lawyers use emotion to 
influence juror decision-making. The aim of this topic is to encourage students to evaluate 
how lawyers can enact their role in the administration of justice, to reflect on what it means to 
‘think like a lawyer’ ethically, and to examine the evaluations and moral justifiability of 
emotions such as contempt and anger. Additionally, students are engaging both the cognitive 
and emotional aspects of narrative intelligence, through a consideration of how lawyers 
control and construct narratives and use emotion persuasively. 
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However, the lack of explicit reference to emotion in the subject learning objectives can 
create a situation where emotion continues to be marginalised. For example, in the subject 
Torts, I wrote the content for a teaching and learning strategy that included the role of 
emotion in legal-ethical judgment.
77
 This was given to the subject co-ordinator of Torts at the 
end of 2013. It was the intention of the subject co-ordinator to implement this content in 
2014. The new content and teaching and learning strategy built on the ethics content already 
covered. In this subject, substantive cases on the advocates’ immunity are used to explore the 
tortious area of professional negligence and to reveal the ethical issues involved in these 
circumstances. In 2013, students were asked to consider several questions relating to the 
readings, but only one covered the ethical aspects of professional negligence: ‘What are the 
boundaries of advocates’ immunity as clarified in D’Orta-Ekenaike?’ This case centres on the 
advice given to the client and how the client acted on it.
78
 The topic of legal ethics appears to 
have only been given token consideration and that a wider range of ethical factors, such as 
emotion, were not considered at all. However, this case provided the opportunity to introduce 
the consideration of the emotional aspects of legal-ethical judgment into this seminar through 
the use of further discussion questions. The discussion questions I suggested and gave to the 
subject co-ordinator would encourage students to identify and consider how the emotions of 
various actors impacted on their decision-making, including the role of sympathy and 
empathy in giving ethical legal advice.  
Those suggested questions were not included in the 2014 materials. The subject co-ordinator 
explained  
At a meeting (before the semester commenced) of torts teachers and [name omitted] (who 
was coordinating the Grad Attributes integration into core subjects) the issue of the way in 
which the materials reflected the Subject Learning Outcomes was discussed and it was 
thought that the questions for discussion of advocates immunity should specifically address 
the subject learning outcome of “Recognise the perspectives of various stakeholders and how 
the law of tort attempts to reconcile these.” Accordingly the following more general 
discussion question was substituted in place of the questions concerning emotions: 
Consider the perspectives of the parties to this case. Does the law of tort adequately reconcile 
these?
79
 
In relation to addressing the subject learning objective, the emotional content and questions I 
formulated were consistent with the learning objective. The questions encouraged students to 
recognise and articulate the perspectives of the primary stakeholders in the case and to 
satisfactorily reconcile these differing perspectives through a consideration of the different 
                                                          
77
 I do not teach in this subject. 
78
 The applicant was charged with rape and was advised that the charge was legally indefensible. He was also 
advised that if he pleaded guilty he would get a suspended sentence as opposed to a custodial sentence if he 
pleaded not guilty and was convicted. He pleaded guilty and was given a custodial sentence and on appeal the 
applicant was acquitted. D’Orta-Ekenaike v Victoria Legal Aid (2005) 223 CLR 1, 9-10. 
79
 Email communication received on 14 May 2014. Permission was given via email on 15 May 2014 to 
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emotional perspectives of those stakeholders. Interpersonal intelligence is an essential skill in 
lawyering and the strategy I proposed provided students with the opportunity to understand 
the ethical implications of not developing and practising that skill.  
This example indicates that, although the inclusion of emotion is educationally justifiable, 
more work has to be done in order to convince academics that it is so. If some of the subjects 
embedding legal ethics omit emotion from the subject learning objectives and content, then it 
is less likely to pervade the curriculum and students are less likely to be given the opportunity 
to develop their knowledge and skills incrementally. Thus, similar problems to the 
embedding of the graduate attribute in the 2007 curriculum review are being repeated in 
relation to embedding emotion in the legal ethics curriculum.  
Despite the lack of formalised emotional content in Torts, the subject co-ordinator stated 
In my own class discussion of the D’Orta-Ekenaike case, students expressed some disquiet, 
having considered the circumstances outlined by Kirby J and they recognised that Mr D’Orta 
must have felt very pressured to give the instructions sought by his legal advisors. I was 
particularly struck by the students’ empathy for Mr D’Orta. I pressed them for their thoughts 
on how the lawyers might have better dealt with the situation. They recognised that the 
lawyers should have been alert to their client’s difficult situation – both emotional and social 
– and that there might have been a very different outcome if they had been more empathetic. 
So the discussion was a positive one and I thought that it highlighted the issues well.
80
 
Whilst it is encouraging to hear that some students have the ability to identify and consider 
the role of emotion in ethical questions, this quote indicates that in the current circumstances 
it is largely the influence of individual academics ‘pressing’ students ‘for their thoughts’ 
about the emotional content. Without specific discussion questions relating to the role of 
emotion in legal-ethical judgment, it is likely that many academics will not include that 
content. The subject co-ordinator could see the benefits of opening up the ethical discussion 
to include emotion and when students were engaged with their own feelings of empathy, they 
were able to perceive and relate to the ethical problem differently. 
Apart from communicating the educational justifiability of including the emotional 
components of legal ethics, this example makes it apparent that the attitude of academics to 
this material also needs to be considered. In implementing the pervasive approach to legal 
ethics at UCLA the law faculty undertook significant faculty re-education in both ethics and 
education techniques. It was found that this had a ‘clear and positive effect upon the law 
school’s faculty.’81 This thesis seeks to address an aspect of academic re-education in ethics, 
by providing an extended discussion of emotional factors in ethics, and by giving examples 
of teaching and learning strategies that introduce knowledge about emotion into ethics 
material. However it is acknowledged, that without formalised faculty re-education that 
addresses attitudes to emotional content and the educational techniques that can be utilised, 
emotion will continue to be marginalised in legal ethics education. 
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 Menkel-Meadow and Sander, above n 14, 133. See also Christensen and Kift, above n 27, 233-235, where the 
authors advocate for staff development and support in implementing graduate attributes into law subjects. 
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4.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has introduced the case study by providing an overview of the contextual and 
institutional factors that influenced the development of the legal ethics curriculum at UTS 
Law. In discussing the context of how ethics curricula have been implemented in Australian 
law schools and the context in which UTS Law has developed its ethics curriculum, it was 
demonstrated that UTS uses a combination of a foundational ethics subject, the pervasive 
approach by embedding the ethics attribute into core law subjects and a vocational subject 
which covers the professional responsibility rule and trust accounting. This approach ensures 
that students have a focused and early exposure to legal ethics and that this exposure is 
continued throughout the degree. The pervasive and incremental approaches are beneficial in 
allowing students to develop their capacity for ethical problem-solving by exercising ethical 
judgment in different contexts, and by reflecting on their values and how this impacts on 
ethical judgment. By using Burton’s model of ‘thinking like a lawyer’ students are also 
learning about the role of emotion in legal-ethical judgment via the capacities of narrative 
intelligence and the personal intelligences. Utilising these capacities allows students to 
consider a broader range of factors in ethical judgment and this is consistent with the way the 
graduate attribute, TLO, CILO are stated.  
In discussing the historical context of embedding the ethics graduate attribute at UTS Law, it 
was noted that under the 2007 curriculum review, the model was not entirely pervasive and 
there was a lack of co-ordination in implementing and embedding the ethics attribute into 
subject learning objectives. The lack of coordination meant that incremental learning was not 
adequately considered. Additionally, graduate attributes tended to be matched with existing 
subject learning objectives as opposed to developing learning objectives that embedded the 
attribute. This meant that ethics topics tended to be construed narrowly and broader ethical 
factors like personal values, morality and emotion were not emphasised.  
The discussion of the 2013 curriculum review showed the relationship between graduate 
attributes, course intended learning outcomes, teaching and learning outcomes, and subject 
learning objectives. It was here that the relevant factors outside of UTS (AQF and TLOs) and 
within UTS were contextualised and applied in developing graduate attributes and CILOs at 
UTS Law. The main reason for co-ordinating the implementation of the graduate attributes 
pervasively and incrementally is so students can achieve the learning outcomes and 
demonstrate how they have achieved them across the degree.  Importantly, this Part revealed 
how the emotional aspects of legal-ethical judgment are consistent with the content and aims 
of the graduate attribute, CILO, TLO thus providing the educational justification for the 
inclusion of emotional knowledge in the legal ethics curriculum.  
The learning outcomes of the CILO are achieved through incremental learning because the 
content of the subject learning objectives applying the CILO are different and the levels of 
understanding become more complex. A concerted effort was made by the ethics attribute 
sub-committee to implement the ethics attribute pervasively and to formulate subject learning 
objectives that incrementally increased in complexity. The learning objectives were 
formulated by utilising the pedagogical framework of John Biggs. The new learning 
objectives are criterion referenced and aim to encourage qualitative understandings of legal 
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ethics. The content of the subject learning objectives is broad enough to encompass wider 
ethical issues, such as the role of emotion in ethical judgment. This is consistent with the way 
in which the ethics graduate attribute and CILO explicitly and implicitly include emotion into 
ethical capacities such as judgment. However, whether the affective domain is included in the 
content of teaching and learning strategies will depend on how the subject objectives are 
interpreted and applied at the subject level.  
Whilst the 2013 curriculum review has improved pervasive and incremental development of 
legal ethics, it remains to be seen whether ethics will be construed more widely to include 
factors such as emotion. This case study has revealed a major limitation in the introduction of 
knowledge about emotion in legal ethics education at UTS. This could be attributed to 
ineffective communication about the educational justifiability of including emotion and the 
attitude toward the inclusion of emotion by some academics. This highlights the need for 
formalised faculty re-education that addresses attitudes to emotional content and the 
educational techniques that can be utilised.  
Having provided the educational justifications for including knowledge about emotion in 
legal ethics education the following chapter builds on the process explained in this chapter.  It 
shows how knowledge about the role of emotion in legal-ethical judgment can be introduced 
via Burton’s model of ‘thinking like a lawyer’ in the content of teaching and learning 
strategies for two core law subjects: Ethics and Professional Conduct and Evidence and 
Criminal Procedure. However, it is important to note, that the focus will not be on developing 
general content for each subject that targets the ethics attribute but on developing content that 
will enable students to consider and analyse the role of emotion in legal-ethical judgment.  
 
   89 
5.0 CASE STUDY PART TWO: 
INTRODUCING EMOTIONAL 
KNOWLEDGE INTO TWO CORE LAW 
SUBJECTS AT UTS LAW 
5.1 Introduction  
This chapter supports the second overall aim of the thesis by demonstrating how the 
knowledge about emotion and legal-ethical judgment from Chapters 2 and 3 can be 
introduced into the content of teaching and learning strategies. The proposed strategies 
outlined in this chapter can be used in two (of five) core law subjects embedding the ethics 
attribute: Ethics and Professional Conduct, and Evidence and Criminal Procedure.
1
 Chapter 4 
stated the learning objectives for each core subject which embeds the ethics graduate 
attribute. It was argued that the content of those objectives, even if not explicit, were stated 
broadly enough to include consideration of the role of emotion in legal-ethical judgment. This 
chapter proposes content which is consistent with the learning objectives for Ethics and 
Professional Conduct, and Evidence and Criminal Procedure, and which advances the aim of 
providing students with the opportunity to consider and analyse the role of emotion in legal-
ethical judgment. 
The content I have developed in this chapter is designed to contribute to a better 
understanding about the different ways emotion is implicated in legal-ethical judgment and 
how legal educators can include knowledge about emotion from other disciplines. The 
purpose of providing a detailed explanation of the content of the teaching and learning 
strategies is to display how emotional analysis can be undertaken in class-room learning 
strategies and to promote deep learning approaches to learning. It is argued that by using 
concrete examples of how emotion is involved in legal-ethical judgment and how emotion 
can be integrated into teaching and learning strategies,  this thesis will provide  academics  
with a framework from which they can formulate their own teaching and learning strategies 
with a view to achieving learning outcomes for students such as: increased awareness and 
understanding of  their own emotional capabilities and the ability to critically reflect on and 
analyse the role of emotion in ethical judgment. Additionally, it is argued that students will 
gain a more comprehensive understanding of ‘thinking like a lawyer’ and that this should 
improve their ability to make legal-ethical judgments, if an understanding of the role of 
emotion in such judgment is included. 
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 The core subjects are Ethics, Law and Justice; Torts; Civil Practice; Evidence and Criminal Procedure; and 
Corporate Law. See Chapter 4, Table 4. 
Chapter Five: Case Study Part Two: Introducing Emotional Knowledge into Two Core Law Subjects at UTS 
Law 
90 
 
Chapter 2 demonstrated that emotions involve evaluative judgments and are implicated in 
moral and ethical judgment. The evaluative properties of emotion and the reasons people 
have emotional responses were considered under three broad and interrelated categories: 
perception, cognition and emotional dispositions. To recap, the properties of and the 
relationship between these categories are as follows. The perception of the object of emotion 
has evaluative content, produces emotional responses and is essential to the moral domain. 
Perception is having the moral sensibility to see the suffering of others. This moral capacity 
depends on the emotional capacity of empathy. According to philosophers who advance 
cognitive theories emotions are defined by beliefs, thoughts or judgments directed toward the 
object, all of which are evaluations. The way in which the object is evaluated can be 
influenced by perception and emotional dispositions. Emotional dispositions are habits of 
thought and action that can influence how the object is perceived and evaluated. Emotional 
dispositions affect judgment because people are habituated toward thinking and acting on 
emotion in certain ways. The evaluative content of moral emotions was demonstrated in the 
discussion of empathy, sympathy, anger and contempt. Moral emotions have perceptive, 
motivational and evaluative functions in moral judgment. These emotions are also connected 
to ethical judgment because it reconciles normative standards, moral judgment and action. 
The categories of perception, cognition, emotional dispositions, and moral emotion are 
applied to the content of teaching and learning strategies in this chapter and in doing so, this 
chapter proposes materials which will enable students to consider and analyse the role of 
emotion in legal-ethical judgment. 
The analytical framework of ‘thinking like a lawyer’ is relevant to legal-ethical judgment and 
decision-making because this is another form of problem-solving undertaken by lawyers. 
Chapter 3 demonstrated how emotion is involved in ‘thinking like a lawyer’ and suggested 
that Burton’s model of ‘multiple lawyering intelligences’ is an appropriate vehicle for the 
inclusion of emotion in teaching legal-ethical judgment. In Burton’s model, narrative 
intelligence and the personal intelligences were identified as the intellectual capacities where 
emotion is explicitly involved. The capacity of narrative intelligence involves the ability 
recognise and evaluate emotional preferences, perspectives, beliefs, values and dispositions 
because these factors influence judgment. Emotionally self-aware people analyse their 
emotional narratives to examine and evaluate their experiences and to account for the impact 
of their emotions on judgment. Intrapersonal intelligence denotes the capacity to understand 
ourselves and requires emotional self-awareness. Self-awareness involves becoming more 
aware of emotions, learning how to examine and account for them and learning how to react 
to them effectively. Interpersonal intelligence denotes the capacity to understand and identify 
with others. This requires a balance between empathic engagement and a sufficient level of 
objective detachment, otherwise boundary violations may occur. Therefore the role of 
emotion in these intellectual capacities is essential to the way in which lawyers relate to 
themselves, their clients and other legal actors, and to developing ethical-problem solving 
skills and judgment. Both narrative intelligence and the personal intelligences feature in the 
content of teaching and learning strategies discussed in this chapter.   
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The subject Ethics and Professional Conduct provides an example of how emotion already 
features in the ethics curriculum at UTS Law.  As stated in Chapter 4, Ethics and Professional 
Conduct has been disbanded and will not exist from 2015. However, much of the content 
regarding emotion in this subject, the teaching and learning strategies outlined below, and the 
ethics components are used in the new foundational subject Ethics, Law and Justice, and as 
such they remain relevant.
2
 The professional responsibility aspect of the subject is now 
situated in the Practical Legal Training subject Legal Skills.
3
 The subject Evidence and 
Criminal Procedure is used as a second example, of how emotion and judgment could be 
introduced into a subject that has not previously embedded the ethics attribute but does from 
the beginning of 2014.
4
  
Part 5.2 outlines the learning objective and the content of teaching and learning strategies for 
the subject Ethics and Professional Conduct, and hence the replacement subject Ethics, Law 
and Justice. The learning objective targeting emotional content, the topics where emotion is 
considered, and the teaching and learning strategies are the same in each subject. The 
discussion focuses on how knowledge about emotion and its role in legal-ethical judgment 
was introduced in this subject and how it could be improved.  There are three topics within 
Ethics and Professional Conduct where the emotional components of ethics are considered in 
detail, and as such content has been developed for each topic.
5
 The current delivery of each 
topic and how it links to emotion and the capacities of narrative intelligence and the personal 
intelligences is explained. This is followed by recommendations for expanding on and 
improving the content to clarify the links between emotion and legal-ethical judgment and to 
encourage deep learning approaches. Whilst the focus is on the content of teaching and 
learning strategies, assessment tasks will be mentioned when they relate to the content being 
discussed. However, due to limited space assessment tasks will not be covered in depth.  
My original contributions in the development of the content pertaining to emotion in each 
topic in Ethics and Professional Conduct are explained throughout the Part 5.2. The first topic 
is ‘theoretical perspectives of values, morals and ethics’. The seminar involves students 
participating in a perspective-taking activity by adopting the role of an actor in the criminal 
justice system. Perspective-taking is involved in ‘thinking like a lawyer’ via the capacities of 
interpersonal intelligence, empathy and narrative intelligence. Additionally, this activity 
                                                          
2
 In 2014, both subjects are running concurrently so that students, who enrolled prior to 2014 and who did not 
undertake the foundational subject will still do an ethics subject at the end of their degree. 
3
 See Chapter 4, 4.2.1. 
4
 See Chapter 4, Table 6. 
5
 The content of Ethics and Professional Conduct is as follows: Topic 1 Theoretical perspectives of values, 
morals and ethics; Topic 2 Legal Ethics; Topic 3 The Legal Profession; Topic 4 Professional and Personal 
Conduct; Topic 5 Duty to the Court - Criminal Law; Topic 6 Duty to the Client - Civil Law; Topic 7 Duty to the 
Client - The retainer; Topic 8 Duty to the Client - Duty to account and costs; Topic 9 Duty to Colleagues, third 
parties and the public; Topic 10 Regulation and discipline; Topic 11 Emerging Issues; Topic 12 Conclusions 
and exam briefing. The corresponding topics where the emotional aspects of legal ethics are considered in 
Ethics, Law and Justice are: Topic 1 Ethics, Theory and the Law; Topic 2 Legal Players – Lawyers; and Topic 5 
Ethics and Criminal Law. 
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introduces students to how narratives disclose and convey values and emotion and the 
relationship between morality, personal values and emotion. The second topic is ‘professional 
and personal conduct.’ In the seminar for this topic, disciplinary cases that involve emotion 
are analysed for the purpose of demonstrating how specific emotions, such as love and anger, 
can impact on ethical judgment. The suggested framework for this analysis applies cognitivist 
theories of emotion generally and the specific evaluations involved in moral emotion from 
Chapter 2. This activity is also designed to elicit the relationship between intrapersonal 
intelligence and emotional self-awareness.  The third topic is ‘duty to the court – criminal 
law’. In the seminar for this topic, a criminal appeal case where the prosecutor was criticised 
for lacking objectivity and detachment is analysed. The purpose of the analysis is to 
demonstrate the role of sympathy and compassion in legal-ethical judgment and how these 
emotions can guide ethical behaviour. This activity also considers the relationship between 
emotional self-awareness and appropriate detachment.  
Part 5.3 outlines the learning objective, and the content of a teaching and learning strategy for 
the subject Evidence and Criminal Procedure. Legal ethics is not the substantive focus of this 
subject and, as a result, the ethical and emotional content is not as comprehensive as it is in 
Ethics and Professional Conduct. It is for this reason that only one strategy in relation to the 
role of emotion in legal-ethical judgment has been proposed for this subject. This subject 
embeds the ethics graduate attribute via a specific learning objective which is being 
implemented for the first time in 2014. I devised the content of the teaching and learning 
strategy in this chapter for the purpose of formalising the ethics content to accord with the 
subject learning objective and to include knowledge about emotion. I created this ethics 
content by building on the existing substantive legal content and materials used in the 
seminar about the sexual assault communications privilege. This topic provides the 
opportunity to evaluate how emotion is used persuasively by lawyers when they create 
narratives intended to influence juror decision-making, and whether and in what 
circumstances this is ethical. In order to ascertain the ethical justifiability of using emotion 
persuasively, students participate in an evaluation of the moral justifiability of contempt. 
5.2 Subject: Ethics and Professional Conduct 2013  
In 2013, Ethics and Professional Conduct began its transition from a Practical Legal Training 
subject
6
 into a first year foundational core law subject; Ethics, Law and Justice. Substantial 
portions of Ethics and Professional Conduct were rewritten to comply with Priestly 11 
requirements and so that material could be transferred over to the new foundational subject, 
which began in 2014. The reason that knowledge about emotion has already been introduced 
within Ethics and Professional Conduct is because the subject learning objectives changed 
because of the 2013 curriculum review, and one of those new objectives explicitly refers to 
emotion. Given my interest in legal ethics and emotion theory, I was asked by the subject co-
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 The qualification on completing PLT is a Graduate Certificate in Legal Practice. The format of this subject is a 
one hour lecture and a two hour seminar each week for twelve weeks. 
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ordinator in 2013 to assist in developing content pertaining to the role of emotion in legal 
ethics. The content I provided included primary sources such as cases which disclose the role 
of emotion in legal-ethical judgment,
7
 newspaper articles,
8
 and a summary of Burton’s 
multiple lawyering intelligences model and how that related to the content provided. This 
content was used by the subject co-ordinator to devise teaching and learning activities, 
assessment and marking criteria,
9
 and some of the material was included in the teaching notes 
for tutors.  
 
Part 5.2.1 outlines how the subject learning objective relates to the role of emotion in legal-
ethical decision-making. Part 5.2.2 examines the teaching and learning strategies which target 
this aspect of the learning objective. There are three topics where the emotional components 
of legal ethics are considered in detail and each topic is considered separately below. The 
discussion of each topic begins by explaining the current delivery and how the content links 
to the emotion theory discussed in Chapter 2, and how the content links to the capacities of 
narrative and the personal intelligences in Burton’s model of ‘thinking like a lawyer from 
Chapter 3. This is followed by suggestions for expanding on and improving the content to 
clarify these links. 
5.2.1 Learning Objective 
 
All of the subject learning objectives in Ethics and Professional Conduct embed the ethics 
graduate attribute
10
 and one of the subject learning objectives directly relates to the role of 
emotion in legal-ethical decision-making. 
Upon successful completion of this subject students should be able to: 
 Consider the impact of personal values, emotions and morals in ethical decision-
making.
11
  
The level of understanding is relational as denoted in the verb ‘consider’ meaning that in 
order to achieve the learning outcome, students have to demonstrate their ability to 
orchestrate between facts and theory, action and purpose.
12
 Therefore learning strategies need 
to provide students with the opportunity to identify and consider the impact of emotion in 
                                                          
7
 See Part 5.2.2.2. 
8
 See Part 5.2.2.1. 
9
 There are three assessment tasks in Ethics and Professional conduct: class participation (20%), reflective 
journal (30%) and final exam (50%). There are three assessment tasks in Ethics, Law and Justice: reflective 
journal (30%), collaboration and discussion (20%) and final exam (50%). 
10
 See Chapter 4, Table 5. 
11
 Ethics and Professional Conduct 2013 Subject Outline. This objective is the same for Ethics, Law and Justice, 
2014 Subject Outline. 
12
 Chapter 4, Part 4.3.3.1. 
Chapter Five: Case Study Part Two: Introducing Emotional Knowledge into Two Core Law Subjects at UTS 
Law 
94 
 
ethical decision-making and to demonstrate their ability to integrate and explain the 
relationship between facts and theory, action and purpose.  
In this subject, students are actively encouraged to consider legal ethics broadly, including 
the role of emotion and personal values in ethical decision-making. In Chapter 4, it was 
argued that the learning objectives for this subject were consistent with the ‘whole student’ 
approach in the ethics graduate attribute and Course Intended Learning Outcome.
13
 The 
learning objective above engages the affective domain because it refers explicitly to values 
and emotion, and it engages the intellectual domain because emotions contain evaluative 
judgments and ‘thinking like lawyer’, which involves emotion, is an intellectual capacity 
which is utilised in ethical decision-making.  
5.2.2 Teaching and Learning Strategies  
Students have three hours of face-to-face contact in Ethics and Professional Conduct; divided 
between a 1 hour lecture and a 2 hour seminar. The materials I provided for the three topics 
below were intended for use in seminars; however, the subject co-ordinator also included 
some of the content in some of the lectures. Following is a brief description of those lectures, 
either to illustrate where the content about emotion was included, or for the purpose of 
contextualising the seminar material. There is a more in depth analysis of the content of 
seminars because the new foundational subject Ethics, Law and Justice is composed of a 
three hour seminar each week with no lectures, and the teaching and learning strategies 
outlined are currently being implemented in this subject.   
5.2.2.1 Topic: Theoretical perspectives of values, morals and ethics 
Current Delivery 
In the first lecture students are introduced to the concepts of values, emotions, morals, and 
ethics and the relationships between them. These topics are returned to in the seminar content 
below. 
 
Lecture slide 
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 The ‘whole student’ approach engages the cognitive, affective and skills domains of legal ethics; see Chapter 
4, Part 4.3.2.3. 
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The lecture slide above illustrates that law, morals, emotions and values are connected to 
ethics and that all influence ethical judgment. A significant portion of the lecture explains the 
value of reflective practice and how this relates to a reflective journal, which is an assessment 
for the subject. This assessment was devised by the subject co-ordinator and it engages both 
the cognitive and emotional elements of narrative intelligence, interpersonal and 
intrapersonal intelligence. Students are actively encouraged to reflect on: 
 Awareness of their own emotions, values, morals and ethics;  
 How the above are formed; 
 Identification of social values, morals and ethics; 
 Relationships between personal and societal values, moral and ethics; 
 Awareness of how as individuals we make decisions; and 
 How the law, legal ethics and the study of law impacts on decision-making.  
The reflective journal assessment requires students to demonstrate consideration of emotion 
and other factors in ethical decision-making. Further, this assessment enables students to 
recognise and account for their own emotions.  
The first seminar consists of:  
1. Introductions  
2. Two small-group exercises  
3. Reflective writing  
I wrote the content pertaining to ethics and emotion myself whilst the class-room activities 
were devised by the subject co-ordinator. Although the foundational subject Ethics, Law and 
Justice has a three hour seminar, the amount of content and activities may still need to be 
revised in order to encourage deep approaches to learning. 
This seminar is used as an opportunity to discuss the wider aspects of ethics and values, 
emotions, morality and ethics in legal practice. I proposed the following activity: students 
introduce themselves and share an example of a recent movie, news item, book, or a 
conversation where a value impacted on them. This introduction exercise is intended to show 
to students that knowledge and awareness of values is within their personal experience.  
The purpose of the two small-group exercises is to introduce students to the idea that 
emotions and values can influence moral standards, moral behaviour and ethics. Students 
were allocated into small-groups for both. The first activity involves perspective-taking and 
the second activity is a role play. Although the activities are different in form, the content and 
purpose is largely the same. As such, only the first exercise will be elaborated on here. The 
content of the activity below is consistent with the subject learning objective because students 
are required to consider the impact of emotions in ethical decision-making.  
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The first small-group exercise pertains to actors in the criminal justice system. Students read 
a newspaper article about the conviction for murder and manslaughter of Kathleen Folbigg.
14
 
Four of Folbigg’s babies died and she was accused of causing their deaths. The newspaper 
article questioned the reliability of the prosecution evidence against Kathleen Folbigg. The 
case was primarily based on circumstantial evidence and the prosecution supported their 
theory as to how the children died with the expert evidence of discredited science and 
scientists. I used this case study because it raises questions about the ethics involved in 
criminal prosecutions and elicits the relationship between moral standards, values and 
emotion. The subject co-ordinator devised the following learning strategy with my input. 
This summary was given to students in the seminar: 
 In 2003, Kathleen Folbigg was convicted of the murder of her three babies and the 
manslaughter of one.  
 Possibility that sudden infant death syndrome (SIDS) was the cause of death for two 
of the babies, one baby from epilepsy-related causes and one from a heart condition.  
 Questions have recently emerged as to the reliability of the prosecution evidence – the 
SIDS /murder debate (women overseas convicted of similar deaths have had 
convictions overturned, two cases in Australia have been dismissed).  
 The prosecution evidence had a common theme that is consistent with co-incidence 
and circumstantial evidence – ‘One sudden infant death is a tragedy, two is suspicious 
and three is murder unless there is proof to the contrary’ – coined by a British 
paediatrician, Sir Roy Meadow, and known as ‘Meadow’s Law’. In 1977, Meadows 
identified and named a syndrome, for parents who faked illness in their children to 
gain attention - Munchausen’s syndrome. 
 Although evidence of this syndrome was not directly tendered in the trial, it, along 
with other statistically-faulty evidence, influenced the presentation of the prosecution 
evidence.
15
 
In each small-group students were allocated a role of a person involved, either directly or 
indirectly, in the trial: 
Accused  Expert witnesses 
Prosecutor  Police 
Defence  Media 
                                                          
14
 Mark Whittaker, ‘Did She Do It? Why Kathleen Folbigg May Not Have Killed Her Four Babies’ Sydney 
Morning Herald, 2 February 2013 http://www.smh.com.au/national/did-she-do-it-why-kathleen-folbigg-may-
not-have-killed-her-four-babies-20130128-2dfnw.html 
15
 Ethics and Professional Conduct, Seminar Materials, Autumn semester 2013. The summary above was written 
by the subject coordinator. 
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This activity is not a role-play;
16
 rather the activity involves introducing students to 
perspective-taking. The group discussed the following questions from the perspective of the 
role allocated to them: 
 What are the emotions that may have determined the behaviour of your role in the 
investigation and trial? 
 What do you see as the moral standards involved in the trial? 
 What are the values that underlie these standards? 
By asking the above questions, the subject co-ordinator included the perceptive and 
perspectival functions of emotion. In identifying particular emotions that may have 
determined the behaviour of the actors in any of the roles above, students are perceiving what 
is significant in the circumstance from the emotional perspective of the person. However, 
these emotional functions were not used to guide the discussion. A suggestion is made below 
for improving this activity, which includes an analysis of the perceptive and perspectival 
functions of emotion and their connection to moral standards and values. 
In the final part of the class, tutors communicated expectations in relation to reflective 
writing for the purpose of assessment, including the content of reflections and the additional 
resources students could use such as newspaper articles, literature, film, art etc. (all of which 
are narratives). Writing a reflection involves the capacity of narrative intelligence and 
intrapersonal intelligence because students are constructing stories about their own 
experiences. The purpose of such reflections are to encourage students to undertake self-
examination of their learning and their own psychic life, including their emotions. For 
example, in the assessment instructions students are encouraged to begin sentences in their 
reflective journals with the words ‘I feel’. Importantly, such instruction confirms the 
relevance of considering emotions and prompts self-examination and emotional self-
awareness. Drawing on additional narrative materials requires students to interpret the 
narrative they have chosen and explain its significance. This technique focuses attention on 
the lives of other people and therefore engages the empathic aspect of interpersonal 
intelligence.
17
  
Suggested Improvements 
The teaching and learning strategies and the reflective journal assessment involve the 
capacities of narrative and the personal intelligences from Burton’s model. When the 
materials for this subject were written I suggested that tutors explicitly introduce students to 
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 A role play typically has four stages: The teacher preparing and explaining the activity; student preparation; 
the role-play; and debriefing. See Stephanie Nickerson, ‘Role-Play: An Often Misused Learning Strategy; 
(2007-2008) 19 (4) Essays on Teaching Excellence. http://cte.udel.edu/sites/cte/udel.edu/files/u7/TE19-04.htm 
(26/09/13). 
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the entirety of Burton’s Multiple Lawyering Intelligence Paradigm (MLIP) in ‘thinking like a 
lawyer’.18 However, this was omitted from the teaching materials and was not covered in the 
class. It should be included because both the discussion on reflective practice and Burton’s 
model relates to and builds on the introductory exercise, the perspective-taking activity, and 
the discussion of reflective practice in this seminar. The model is also utilised throughout this 
subject to educate students about the role of emotion in ethical judgment. It is therefore 
important that the model is explicitly referenced and understood by students. 
Burton’s model was outlined in Chapter 3 with the role of emotion in the capacities of 
narrative intelligence and personal intelligence as the focus.  Tutors should discuss with 
students what is involved in narrative reasoning and how it can be expressed in narrative 
writing. The cognitive content of narrative provides a way of organising, interpreting, 
evaluating, elaborating, remembering, learning and communicating information.
19
 The 
emotional content of narrative intelligence involves acknowledging how emotion signifies 
preferences, perspectives, beliefs, values and dispositions to think and act in certain ways.
20
 
Additionally tutors should also explain that the capacities for the personal intelligences, 
involve intrapersonal and interpersonal intelligence. The personal intelligences shape our 
understanding of ourselves (intrapersonal) and others (interpersonal). These intelligences 
involve being aware of our own and other people’s emotions, personality, motivations, 
beliefs and values. Both intrapersonal and interpersonal intelligence requires emotional self-
awareness.
21
 These intelligences are important for lawyering because emotional self-
awareness contributes to personal and professional problem-solving and understanding the 
desires and motivations of others, contributes to effectively communicating and working with 
them.  
The introductory exercise in the seminar utilises knowledge within the experience of the 
learner and non-legal narratives to encourage reflection that utilises both the cognitive and 
emotional aspects of narrative intelligence. Additionally, the small-group exercise involves 
both interpersonal and narrative intelligence. Given the nature of these exercises, students 
could be involved in creating their own understanding of the content of narrative intelligence 
and the personal intelligences. For example, students could be asked to consider and 
articulate how narrative and the personal intelligences are engaged in the perspective-taking 
exercise during the group discussion. This would give the emotional aspects of ‘thinking like 
a lawyer’ more validity and therefore begin to break down any psychic resistance to engaging 
with emotion. As such, my suggestion is that the discussion of reflective practice is moved to 
the beginning of the seminar, and an explanation of Burton’s model is given immediately 
after the introduction activity so that students can identify the relevance of the model 
throughout the seminar. 
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The small-group exercise is about perspective-taking and the discussion can be further guided 
so that the connections between perspective-taking and ‘thinking like a lawyer’, and the 
connection between emotions, moral standards and values is made more apparent. As 
discussed in Chapter 2 emotions can be perceptive. This means that emotions assist in 
evaluating what is significant in the environment, or about the object of the emotion, from the 
perspective of the person experiencing the emotion.
22
 In this activity perspective-taking is 
involved in ‘thinking like a lawyer’ via interpersonal intelligence and narrative intelligence. 
A component of interpersonal intelligence is the capacity to perceive and understand another 
person’s desires and motivations and in order to do this empathy is required.23 Empathy is an 
emotional process enabling a person to non-judgmentally comprehend the experiences of 
another, and can manifest in any emotion.
24
 In order to do this, stories are created to make 
sense of the events and circumstances from the perspective of the person involved in those 
events. Thus the cognitive and emotional content of narrative intelligence is engaged. 
Perspective-taking activities such as the one above reflect Julien Deonna’s conception of 
empathically feeling ‘in-tune’ with another person and being aware of how the other person 
psychologically relates to their circumstances.
25
 Feeling ‘in tune’ involves experiencing a 
token emotion of the same type as the other person. For example, students considering the 
Folbigg case from the perspective of the accused may identify emotions such as fear, grief, 
guilt, shame and anger. These emotions arise out of the circumstances which include the 
moral standards and values that underpin them. Students may then identify moral standards 
such as being judged for being a bad mother (guilt, fear, shame, anger) and values such as the 
protection of children and punishment for those who fail to do so (fear).  
Students may require some guidance in connecting the emotions to the moral standards and 
values and to how they can inform ethical judgment.
26
 This can be done by identifying the 
beliefs, values and judgments that underpin the various emotions and this also highlights the 
relationship between emotion and judgment. For example, if Nussbaum’s theory about the 
evaluative properties of emotion is applied to Folbigg’s hypothetical guilt and shame it 
reveals how emotion is connected to moral standards and values. According to Nussbaum, 
the defining elements of an emotion are evaluative judgments based on intentionality, belief 
and value as related to the object of the emotion.
27
 Ascertaining the intentional object of the 
emotion is similar to understanding the perspective of the person experiencing the emotion. 
In relation to feelings of guilt and shame, the intentional object is being judged for being a 
bad mother. The belief could be, even if she did not criminally cause the death of the 
children, that she has failed them by not looking after them adequately. Therefore the value 
                                                          
22
 See Chapter 2, 21. 
23
 See Chapter 3, 61. 
24
 See Chapter 2, 35. 
25
 Ibid. 
26
  See Chapter 2, Part 2.5. 
27
 See Chapter 2, 24-25. 
Chapter Five: Case Study Part Two: Introducing Emotional Knowledge into Two Core Law Subjects at UTS 
Law 
100 
 
judgment is not meeting the ideal of being a good mother, resulting in feelings of guilt and 
shame. This example demonstrates how emotion, judgment and moral standards are related. 
If a student was considering the case from the perspective of a prosecutor they may identify 
emotions such as sympathy (toward the victims), and contempt and anger (toward the 
accused). Students may identify similar moral standards and values as above, but the 
corresponding emotions will be different because of the perspective being taken. Further, the 
combination of a lack of direct evidence proving the guilt of Folbigg, the questionable 
reliability of other evidence and circumstantial nature of the case, should indicate to students 
how emotions, moral standards and values contribute to narratives of legal guilt. In other 
words, the emotions connected to the different perspectives inform how events and 
circumstances are interpreted and evaluated, even where similar moral standards and values 
apply. In this way, students are engaging in critically evaluating the role of emotion in moral 
and ethical judgment. 
5.2.2.2 Topic: Professional and Personal Conduct 
Current Delivery 
The lecture for this topic considered when conduct can be both professional and personal and 
the resulting professional responsibility issues that can arise. In the lecture, personal conduct 
was defined as behaviour as a citizen unrelated to clients and legal work. Professional 
conduct was defined as acting in the capacity of a lawyer (or other professional). My 
contribution to the content of this topic was to give the subject co-ordinator summaries of 
disciplinary cases that involved the impact of emotions such as love, fear and anger on legal-
ethical judgment. The subject co-ordinator devised the teaching and learning strategies and 
exam questions based on those case summaries. All of the cases mentioned in this chapter 
and used in the teaching and learning activities, demonstrate how emotion can have a 
negative impact on ethical judgment, but they also highlight the importance of emotional self-
awareness and the ability to account for emotion. The seminar described below provided the 
opportunity to consider specific emotions more closely in the context of narrative and 
intrapersonal intelligence and how emotion can impact on ethical decision-making. This 
activity enabled students to critically reflect on and analyse the role of emotion in legal-
ethical judgment. 
In relation to personal conduct and emotion the subject co-ordinator chose the case of Legal 
Practitioners Board v Morel
28
 as an example in the lecture, but not in the seminar, of how 
personal relations with clients led to a criminal lawyer being struck off for professional 
misconduct. This particular disciplinary case elicits a narrative of love, sympathy and 
empathy and discloses how ethical judgment can be influenced by emotion. It was used in 
Chapter 3 to illustrate the emotional content of narrative intelligence, how emotion contains 
evaluative judgments and can be analysed, and how the analysis of emotional and ethical 
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narratives involves intrapersonal intelligence, emotional self-awareness, reflection and 
appropriate detachment.
29
  
Morel was also used in an exam question where students were asked to discuss the case with 
reference to values, emotions and morals; and to explain how different standards and 
perspectives influence the ethical behaviour of lawyers and the decisions of courts and 
tribunals. This was consistent with the seminar materials where other cases involving love 
were discussed.  
The seminar consisted of: 
 Class discussion, and 
 Small-group discussion. 
The subject co-ordinator devised these learning strategies with my input. The class discussion 
in the first part of the seminar considered questions and scenarios about the conflict between 
self-interest and duty. The small-group discussion focused on personal conduct, in particular 
the disciplinary cases of Legal Practitioners Complaints Committee v Pepe
30
 and Garde-
Wilson v Legal Services Board.
31
 Like Morel, these cases involved love, dependency and 
boundary violations. However Morel, which was not used in the seminar, is a better example 
of how love and sympathy influenced the practitioner’s judgment and led to breaches of the 
disciplinary rules. The discussion of Pepe and Garde-Wilson built on the previous topic 
where narrative intelligence and the relationship between emotion, values, morals, ethics and 
interpersonal intelligence were considered. Students were given the summaries and 
commentary of these cases, written by me, and were asked to consider and discuss the 
following questions. 
1. What was the basis for the determinations? 
2. What values, emotions and moral codes were present in the Tribunal’s determination? 
3. Do you think the determinations were reasonable? 
4. Were there any alternatives to the Tribunal’s decisions?  
Suggested Improvements 
The seminar questions above were posed by the subject co-ordinator and their purpose 
appears to be for students to demonstrate an understanding of the factors the disciplinary 
tribunals considered relevant and irrelevant to their determinations including values, 
emotions and moral codes. However, question two does not adequately prompt consideration 
of how specific emotions, such as love, could be analysed within those legal narratives and 
how it impacts on ethical judgment. The question encourages surface learning about the 
emotional content, because it is framed in terms of simply identifying the emotions that were 
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present, whereas the learning objective requires consideration of the impact of emotion. The 
questions place more focus on the Tribunal’s determination rather than the broader ethical 
issues. In the foundational subject Ethics, Law and Justice there is less focus on professional 
responsibility, as such these questions can be changed to refocus the discussion toward 
broader ethical issues, including emotion, and how these affect ethical judgment.  
Additionally, the content that is currently used could be refined so that less material is 
considered but in more depth. It is suggested that only one case is focused on for the purpose 
of discussion in the seminar and that students read the actual case so they can identify the 
relevant issues.  For example, if Morel was used as the case under discussion in the seminar 
the following questions could be asked to prompt a deeper enquiry of how emotions affect 
ethical decision-making. The proposed questions are based on the analysis of Morel in 
Chapter 3, which highlighted the emotional content of narrative intelligence and emotional 
self-awareness. That analysis could be provided to tutors as part of their teaching materials. 
1. Morel knew that she could not enter both professional and personal relationships with 
clients. What do you think her motivations were for entering these relationships? 
2. Apart from empathy, love is implied in Morel. What does the legal narrative reveal 
about the meaning of empathy and love in this situation? 
3. The psychiatric review reported that Morel ‘tended to act in the role of “rescuer” in 
relation to the prisoners.’ How are sympathy and love related in this case? What does 
this indicate about having empathy or sympathy for clients?  
4. A balance needs to be struck between empathic engagement and emotional 
detachment. Do you agree or disagree with this statement? Why / why not?  
5. What is emotional self-awareness? What does the case of Morel indicate about 
emotional self-awareness? Is emotional self-awareness related to personal and 
professional judgment? 
6. What are the implications when practitioners do not account for their emotion in 
ethical judgment? 
The questions are intended to elicit the relationship between appropriate emotional 
detachment and self-awareness, how emotion can affect the lawyer/client relationship, how 
emotion can be analysed and how emotion that is unaccounted for can lead to boundary 
violations. By participating in the seminar discussion students will engage the capacity of 
narrative intelligence by considering the role of emotion in legal-ethical judgment.  
Suggested Alternative Seminar Content 
The exam questions in semester two 2013 contained disciplinary cases that involved the 
impact of anger on ethical decision-making.
32
 However, the emotion of anger was not 
discussed meaningfully in any of the seminars. If students are asked to articulate their 
consideration of values, emotions and morals in the exam question, then they should be given 
opportunities prior to the exam to consider the emotion that arises in the case in some detail. 
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Having identified this limitation, I have developed an in depth analysis of a case involving 
anger and suggested seminar questions. The case study is provided in its entirety and tutors 
could be given the following material to use in this seminar as an alternative to discussing 
Morel. The purpose of giving this level of detail is to provide tutors with an example of an 
analysis that promotes deep approaches to learning about the role of emotion in legal-ethical 
judgment. Law Society of NSW v Madden
33
 illustrates the emotional content of narrative 
intelligence, intrapersonal intelligence, the defining features of anger, emotional dispositions, 
emotional defence mechanisms, and how the beliefs underpinning anger can be analysed. 
Madden is a case where there was explicit evidence of anger affecting the practitioner’s 
ability to make professional judgments. There are other emotions involved in this case such 
as jealousy and fear and these emotions contributed to Madden’s anger. However, only anger 
is considered in detail here, because it was the impact of that emotion on the practitioner’s 
judgment that led to the disciplinary proceedings.  
Facts 
Madden a sole practitioner, was suspended from practice and fined for professional 
misconduct and misappropriation. Madden had acted in an apprehended violence order, 
which was outside of his area of expertise. His client was his cousin Hill, who was the 
President of an Association that had agreed to pay costs. Madden instructed a barrister, Hood, 
and the Association paid Madden the full costs including Hood’s fees. Madden deposited the 
money into his general office account and withheld Hood’s fees. Hood initiated a recovery 
claim in the Local Court. Madden issued a cross-claim alleging negligence on behalf of Hood 
in the conduct of the matter and made a complaint to the Bar Association about Hood which 
was dismissed. The Local Court subsequently ordered Madden to pay Hood and when he did 
not, the matter was referred to the Legal Services Commissioner and the Law Society.  
Madden eventually admitted to having an arrogant and defensive approach toward Hood 
which manifested in anger when Hood complained to the Law Society. Madden also admitted 
that he had withheld Hood’s fees as ‘a form of punishment.’34 His attitude and behaviour was 
explained by reference to his relationship with his cousin Hill, and the emotions of jealousy 
and humiliation that arose as a consequence of their history. These aspects of the case will be 
explained further in the analysis below. 
Analysis 
The analysis below reveals that Madden’s anger toward Hood was misdirected. This 
conclusion is reached by considering the lack of justification for Madden’s anger toward 
Hood, and the impact of Madden’s emotional dispositions and defence mechanisms on his 
ability to exercise professional judgment. 
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The defining features of anger and its justifiability 
As stated in Chapter 2, the philosopher Gabriele Taylor contends that there are three defining 
features of anger. Firstly, anger is not just directed toward the object who has committed an 
offence ‘it attracts our desire to hit back’ and so the object must be accountable; secondly, 
anger is connected to human agency and responsibility and can be the result of intentional, 
stupid, clumsy or inconsiderate actions; and thirdly, the loss of well-being to the person 
feeling anger was caused by the offence and is seen as undeserved and unfair.
35
 Additionally 
Nussbaum states, that to understand anger ‘one must mention the object to which it is 
directed, what it is about and for’.36 In doing so the object is characterised ‘as it is seen by the 
person experiencing the emotion, whether that view is correct or not: my anger depends upon 
the way I view you and what you have done, not on the way you really are or what you have 
really done.’37 Hood is the object of Madden’s anger. Madden’s anger toward Hood was 
apparently ‘about’ his belief that Hood had been negligent in the carriage of the AVO matter 
and that Hood referred Madden to the Law Society because of his conduct. As such, Madden 
felt justified in his retaliation by withholding the fees, issuing a cross-claim, and complaining 
to the Bar Association. Because Hood’s actions were perceived as undeserved, Madden’s 
actions were intended as retaliation against Hood and intended to make him accountable. 
Therefore, Taylor’s three defining features of anger exist according to Madden’s perception 
of Hood and the situation. However, this perception becomes problematic when consideration 
is given to what the anger is ‘for’ and its strategic qualities in this situation.38 Madden’s anger 
is strategic because he is avoiding responsibility for his own poor judgment in the AVO 
proceedings, the inability to deal with his anger toward himself and his feelings toward the 
true object of the emotion, his cousin Hill.  
Emotional dispositions and emotional beliefs 
Madden felt that an injustice had occurred according to the theory above. However, his 
resulting anger was apparently based on a false belief as to the cause of the emotion and 
object of the anger. Consequently, there was misdirected retaliation and poor professional 
judgment. Madden’s distorted perception of the injustice and object apparently arise out of 
Madden’s emotional dispositions and lack of emotional self-awareness. For several months 
prior to the misconduct hearing Madden had been seeing a psychiatrist, Professor Zuessman, 
whose evidence was relied on in the disciplinary proceedings to explain Madden’s behaviour. 
In evidence, Professor Zuessman said that Madden’s mother had directed her attention and 
affection toward his cousin Hill, and that Madden experienced jealousy and humiliation as a 
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result.
39
 Expressing anger was considered inappropriate in the family context and Madden 
‘began to inwardly chastise himself for not being good enough and he set about living a life 
where he would strive to achieve to make up for a sense of not being good enough’.40 As a 
result Madden had developed ‘some sense of righteousness in his approach to things and 
possibly an element of entitlement based on his good behaviour.’41 These facts explain how 
Madden’s emotional disposition toward reacting with anger began and evolved.  
It was Professor Zuessman’s view that when Hill persistently and emotionally appealed to 
Madden to help him that it   
activated a whole series of dynamics within Mr Madden. He essentially took on a heroic role 
to save Mr Hill… from that point onward he continued to make error after error in judgment. 
This is really because of the maelstrom of emotions that were going on within him, in 
particular anger towards Mr Hill...
42
 
This passage identifies Madden’s disposition toward anger in relation to himself and Hill and 
how that affected his professional judgment. Emotional dispositions were defined in Chapter 
2 as habits of thought and action based on past emotional experience that produce emotional 
responses.
43
 Emotional dispositions influence how the object of the emotion is perceived and 
the formation and retention of beliefs that underpin emotion. Therefore, emotional 
dispositions influence the judgments that are made about the object of the emotion and 
emotional responses. According to Professor Zuessman, when things went wrong in 
Madden’s representation of Hill, that elevated his anger and humiliation and Madden began 
to displace that anger onto everyone involved in the process. Madden could not admit his 
mistakes because of his sense of righteousness and could not retaliate against Hill, because 
that would expose his jealousy and humiliation. Driving the displacement was an 
unacknowledged ‘experience of anger with self for being inadequate in the process for not 
doing what it is that ought to be done either heroically or otherwise.’44 Therefore, because of 
Madden’s emotional dispositions, he had to direct his anger toward Hood to maintain his 
righteous attitude, to avoid further humiliation and to prove himself as ‘good enough’ in his 
perception of self and the perception of his family. 
Emotional defence mechanisms and emotional self-awareness 
In relation to explaining Madden’s conduct during the investigations and complaints, 
Professor Zuessman stated that the psychological processes he had been describing  
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were so powerful and so all-consuming that for every push that came towards him of 
confrontation it would either cause his entire defensive structure - psychological defensive 
structure to crumble or his response would be to revalidate his world views from previously.
45
  
This statement indicates that Madden’s anger toward Hood was a product of a defence 
mechanism used to project or rationalise his feelings of inadequacy onto Hood. The 
discussion of intrapersonal intelligence in Chapter 3 showed that this kind of defence 
mechanism is an inappropriate evaluative response.
46
 Madden’s anger toward Hood was 
unjustified because it was an inappropriate evaluative response arising out of an unexamined 
defence mechanism and emotional disposition. It was based on false beliefs and a misplaced 
perception about the object of and reason for the anger.  
Arguably, with better self-awareness and the capacity to exercise appropriate emotional 
detachment, Madden could have avoided the errors in judgment that he made. Indeed, 
Madden stated that he thought his therapy had been ‘positive and life enhancing’ and he 
described the experience ‘like scales falling from [my] eyes and I could see, not only in this 
matter but other things of a personal nature and other things within my life that I could 
understand my motivations and the - some of the irrational threats I felt.’47 For Madden his 
therapy with Professor Zuessman exorcised ‘the demons that this matter contained’ resulting 
in understanding his weaknesses where family were concerned and improved professional 
judgment.
48
 These statements indicate that Madden gained insight into his emotional 
disposition and defence mechanism and their impact on his judgment. However, in order for 
Madden to have improved his judgment, he would have to apply those insights which require 
emotional self-awareness and the education of emotional capabilities. Engaging in emotional 
education leads to the ability to control emotion, experience emotion appropriately and to 
form habits of thought that enable people to see what is and is not relevant to their judgments 
and why.
49
 
New seminar questions 
The analysis of Madden above demonstrates the kinds of evaluations that are involved in 
emotion and the role of emotion in legal-ethical judgment. The seminar questions I created 
below attempt to elicit the relationship between intrapersonal intelligence and emotional self-
awareness, how emotion can affect judgment, how emotion can be analysed, and how 
emotion that is unaccounted for can lead to ethical violations. Additionally, students 
participating in the seminar discussion are engaging in the emotional aspects of narrative 
intelligence by evaluating the role of emotion on Madden’s professional judgment. In order to 
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conduct a meaningful analysis of the impact of emotion, students need to read the relevant 
aspects of the case under discussion. It is suggested that a brief summary of the defining 
features of anger is also provided to assist in interpreting and answering the discussion 
questions.  
The seminar questions and discussion points that arise out of this material include: 
1. Anger is a significant emotion in Madden. What does the legal narrative reveal about 
the reasons for Madden’s anger toward the barrister Hood? 
2. Madden’s anger toward Hood was as a product of a defence mechanism that was used 
to project or rationalise his feelings of inadequacy onto Hood. Is this a reasonable 
assessment? Why / why not? 
3. Emotional dispositions are defined as habits of thought and action based on past 
emotional experience that produce emotional responses. What does the legal narrative 
reveal about Madden’s emotional disposition? How, if at all, did this impact on his 
professional judgment? 
4. Was Madden’s anger toward Hood justifiable? Why / why not? 
5. What is emotional self-awareness? What does the case of Madden indicate about 
emotional self-awareness? Is emotional self-awareness related to personal and 
professional judgment? 
6. What are the implications when practitioners do not account for their emotion in 
ethical judgment? 
The content of this topic is consistent with the learning objective because the aim is to 
provide students with the opportunity to consider the impact of emotion in ethical decision-
making. Analysing legal narratives, such as Morel and Madden, is one way to expose 
students to the analysis of emotion and how it can be implicated in legal-ethical judgment. 
The danger in using cases where the emotion has had a negative impact, may reinforce 
attitudes that discount emotion leading to its repression or denial when making judgments, 
which is why emotional self-awareness must also be emphasised. Appropriate emotional 
detachment does not mean acknowledging emotion then attempting to exclude it from 
judgment; it requires emotional self-awareness, that is, the ability to acknowledge, moderate 
and account for the negative and positive influences of emotion on judgment. 
5.2.2.3 Topic: Duty to the Court - Criminal Law 
Current Delivery 
The focus of the lecture was on criminal law and ethics and the additional ethical obligations 
and issues that can arise in criminal law practice. The seminar topic below builds on the 
content of previous seminars by considering specific emotions, the relationship between 
emotion, morality and personal values, and appropriate detachment. The content of this topic 
and seminar is consistent with the subject learning objective, because students consider the 
role of compassion and sympathy in ethical judgment and the impact those emotions have on 
ethical decision-making.  
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The seminar consisted of: 
 Class discussion, and 
 Small-group activity. 
The subject co-ordinator devised these learning strategies and I provided the materials. 
Students read a speech given by the prosecutor, Margaret Cunneen, to law students in 2005
50
 
which was reported in the press.
51
 In that speech Cunneen recounted details of legal 
proceedings in which she was involved, notably the infamous Bankstown gang rape trials. 
Students also read MG v R
52
 which contains sections of the speech and comments Cunneen 
made in the press.  MG was a co-accused, in a separate trial, and an application was made at 
the inception of the trial to have Cunneen excluded as the prosecutor; however the trial judge 
refused. An appeal was made to the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal (NSWCCA) 
to have Cunneen excluded. The appeal was upheld and Cunneen was criticised for publicly 
supporting the complainant, lacking detachment from the case, and undermining the ability of 
the accused to have a fair trial.   
Students considered the following questions in small-groups. 
(a) Is there a place for compassion in ethical decision-making and in the law?   
(b) Is there a difference between sympathy and compassion? How did the judiciary 
appear to deal with Cunneen’s motivation to express her feelings for the victims?  
Suggested Improvements 
I suggest restructuring the above questions to guide students into a discussion of the role of 
compassion and sympathy in ethical judgment as these emotions arise in the materials. The 
questions I have developed below directly relate to the criticisms of the NSWCCA pertaining 
to the prosecutor lacking detachment and undermining the ability of the accused to have a fair 
trial. The significant emotional themes that arise are the motivational force of emotion and 
emotion as a guide to ethical choice and these themes are related to each other within the 
context of the analysis below. This activity engages narrative intelligence because students 
are analysing the emotional themes within the legal narrative and it engages interpersonal 
intelligence as students examine the emotional motivations behind the speech.  
Proposed small-group questions: 
1. Cunneen seems to express compassion for the victims of crimes and to evoke 
sympathy for those victims. What do you think her motivations were for expressing 
these feelings? What does this say about the evaluations underpinning her sympathy? 
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2. What was the problem with Cunneen expressing these emotions according to the 
NSWCCA? 
3. Is there a place for compassion and sympathy in legal-ethical decision-making? 
Analysis 
Emotional motivations – compassion and sympathy 
The first proposed question requires an examination of the motivations behind Cunneen’s 
comments in relation to the administration of justice and the victims of crime. This discussion 
should raise the relationship between emotion, morality and personal values. Cunneen 
expresses concern over what she perceives as an imbalance in the criminal justice system: 
For some victims the anguish continues in a justice system which can give the impression that 
it is increasingly focussed on the rights of the accused person to the complete exclusion of the 
right of the victims, many of whom… have found themselves bound up in the criminal justice 
system through absolutely no fault of their own.
53
 
This statement provides insight into Cunneen’s values around justice and fairness and how 
these values are connected to sympathy and compassion. In publicly supporting the victims of 
crime, Cunneen is apparently seeking to redress the perceived unfairness in the exclusion of 
victim’s rights and this is the act of compassion. In noting the anguish of victims and their 
lack of fault for their circumstances, Cunneen is expressing her sympathy. As discussed in 
Chapter 2, sympathy is not only characterised by a belief that another person is suffering, it is 
also characterised by a belief that the suffering can be alleviated.
54
  
In her speech to students at Newcastle University, Cunneen challenged the audience to bring 
their ‘humanity’ and their ‘conscience’ in the practice of criminal law.55 By appealing to the 
audience in this way, Cunneen is enlisting the conscience of future lawyers to alleviate the 
suffering of victims when they encounter the criminal justice system. This statement also 
provides an insight into the relationship between morality and ethics in legal practice 
according to Cunneen. Asking the audience to bring their humanity and conscience to the 
practice of law, is a reminder that professional ethics are related to morality and that personal 
morality and values should inform professionalism. However, as will be discussed shortly, 
there needs to be a balance between competing values in the legal system, something that 
Cunneen apparently did not achieve according to the NSWCCA.  
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Emotion as a guide to ethical choice 
The second and third questions are intended to encourage students to address the role of 
compassion and sympathy as guides to ethical judgment and action.
56
 The court indicates that 
they understand why sympathy is felt toward the complainant in this case.
57
 However, the 
court regards Cunneen’s compassion and sympathy as an inappropriate guide to ethical 
judgment and action because her conduct lacked impartiality and objectivity. The court’s 
account focuses on the justice values of fairness and detachment as guides to ethical 
judgment and action: 
The statements… demonstrate a lack of detachment from the case she was required to 
prosecute. There is no difficulty in Ms Cunneen privately holding the view that the applicant 
is guilty. However, her public expression of that view displayed partiality and potentially 
compromised her capacity to fairly prosecute on behalf of the Crown.
58
 
In relation to Cunneen’s experience of compassion there are two potential problems. As the 
NSWCCA identify, Cunneen did not find a balance between her feelings of sympathy and the 
detachment required of an ethical prosecutor. Cunneen brought her moral conscience to bear 
on her role as a lawyer, but did not effectively balance this with the other values that bear on 
that role.
59
 
The second problem alludes to the possibility of a less altruistic motivation although it is not 
suggested that the following was Cunneen’s actual or deliberate motivation. It is arguable that 
Cunneen’s actions place more emphasis on her ‘experience of compassion and its subsequent 
relation to material practice.’60 Although Cunneen brings the plight of victims to the 
forefront, a major premise of her speech relates to the observations she has made in her 
lengthy career as a prosecutor:   
Perhaps it is time for us to consider whether public confidence in the courts is now being 
eroded by the perception that the pendulum has swung rather too far in the direction of the 
protection of the rights of an accused person.61 
Whilst Cunneen’s expression of sympathy is apparently benevolent, it also seems to be 
placed strategically in a broader argument about the perceived proliferation of the rights 
afforded to accused people. It is arguable that Cunneen’s opinions relating to victim rights 
and fairness to them, is an attempt to reorientate the rhetoric of the criminal justice system in 
a way which would ultimately benefit the prosecution. Any diminishing of the rights of an 
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accused means that the pendulum swings in favour of the prosecution. Additionally, the 
suffering of victims may not be alleviated as they will still be a part of the criminal justice 
system through no fault of their own. Further, diminishing the rights of an accused does not 
necessarily mean that victim rights will improve. On the contrary, it is more likely to increase 
the combative nature of the defence tactics and questioning of victims.  
The discussion pertaining to the third seminar question requires consideration of whether 
there is a place for compassion in law. Compassion is important because it can provide a 
motivation to seek justice and rectify perceived imbalances but caution is required in case the 
exercise of compassion creates other forms of injustice or imbalance, as in the example 
above. Nussbaum states that ‘compassion is controversial’ with defenders who consider this 
emotion as ‘the bedrock of ethical life’ and opponents ‘who denounce it as ‘irrational’ and a 
bad guide to action.’62 However, there can be a middle ground between these views; it does 
not have to be one or the other. There are times when compassion and sympathy are 
appropriate guides to ethical action and can be balanced with other ethical considerations. 
Students should be encouraged to discuss whether they think a balance could have been 
achieved in the example above in light of the answers to the previous questions.  
5.2.3 Conclusion 
The subject Ethics and Professional Conduct provided several opportunities for the emotional 
components of legal ethics to be considered, including the relationship between: personal 
values, morals and emotion; intrapersonal intelligence and emotional self-awareness; 
interpersonal intelligence and empathy, sympathy and compassion; narrative intelligence and 
evaluating emotion; and the impact of emotion in ethical judgment and decision-making. The 
content of the teaching and learning strategies was intended to encourage students to acquire 
functioning knowledge by orchestrating between facts and theory, action and purpose. The 
purpose of all three activities was to demonstrate how emotion can and does impact on legal-
ethical judgment and decision-making. The use of legal narratives elicited how emotions 
within those narratives could be analysed. Thus students were presented with facts and theory 
and activities which required them to integrate and explain the relationship between emotion 
and ethical decision-making.  
There are two aspects of my original contribution to the content of teaching and learning 
strategies within this subject. The first is researching and providing examples and materials 
where emotion is relevant. The second is proposing suggestions for improvement and 
developing the extended analysis of the materials integrating emotion theory and the 
framework of ‘thinking like a lawyer’ which includes the emotional aspects of narrative 
intelligence and the personal intelligences. As such, this chapter has demonstrated how the 
knowledge from Chapters 2 and 3 expands conceptions of ‘thinking like a lawyer’ that 
include emotion, and how this knowledge can be introduced at a subject level.  This is an 
aspect of the overall original contribution this thesis makes to legal ethics education. 
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The extended analysis of emotional knowledge in this chapter is intended to provide 
academics with a detailed understanding of the ways emotion can impact on ethical decision-
making. This enables academics to create learning environments which engage students in 
deep learning approaches about emotion. The above analysis shows the importance of 
explicitly stating the capacities involved in ‘thinking like a lawyer’ where emotion is 
relevant. This is important because it communicates the significance of emotion in legal 
judgment to both students and academics and demonstrates the legitimacy of considering the 
role of emotion in legal ethics.  All of the suggested learning strategies above consider the 
relationship between values, morals and emotions. In participating in them students engage 
the capacity of narrative intelligence. As stated in Chapter 3, the psychologists Rettinger and 
Hastie contend that when making morally salient decisions, narrative processing is 
undertaken to identify, comprehend and integrate information.
63
 These activities also engage 
the capacities in the personal intelligences and, significantly, understand the need for 
emotional self-awareness. Explicitly stating the content of these intellectual capacities and the 
cognitive processes that underpin legal thinking exhibits the mechanics of these processes to 
students. Allowing students to engage those capacities through perspective taking and 
analysis of narratives that involve emotion, should give students a more comprehensive 
understanding of how to ‘think like a lawyer’ and make ethical judgments. 
Additionally, the inclusion of emotional knowledge prompts consideration of other ethical 
factors and encourages students to think about their own approach to ethical decision-making. 
I asked the subject co-ordinator about her observations of the reception of emotional content 
by students, whether she thought emotional content enhanced their learning experience, and 
what she thought of the content as a teacher. The subject co-ordinator made the following 
observations: 
Students are comfortable with discussing emotions, values and morals when they read and 
discuss cases where they can identify emotions (love, regret, fear), values (honesty, integrity) 
and morals (obedience to the law, being a 'good' person) and when they read and 
discuss resources relating to ethical decision-making. Through building on emotions, 
values and morals, students draw out the connection with legal ethics and the rules that 
regulate lawyer conduct, for example, the duties of prosecutors based on impartiality, the 
focus of family law on the child's best interests. The material and resources on the emotional 
context in ethics adds a layer of richness to the subject as students are very willing to discuss 
the impact of values and morals on lawyers and the administration of justice and their 
feedback has a consistent theme of the value of discussions and reflection on their personal 
responses to their future role as a lawyer.64   
According to the subject co-ordinator, the educational goals set in this subject, specifically 
the relationship between emotion, values and morals and the ways in which they can impact 
on ethical decision-making, appears to have been achieved. Most encouraging are the 
comments about the reception of emotional content by students. Students were ‘comfortable 
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with discussing emotions’ particularly when they were discussing legal narratives containing 
emotional themes. Additionally, the discussion of emotion added ‘a layer of richness’ 
indicating that the discussion of emotion prompted consideration of other ethical factors, 
encouraged students to consider their own values, and provided a perspective on ethical 
issues which enabled students to reflect on their own decision-making processes. These 
observations are consistent with comments made by some students in their student feedback 
surveys from the first and second semester in 2013.
65
 In response to the statement ‘My 
learning experiences in this subject were interesting and thought provoking’ students stated: 
There is a different approach to this subject, compared with others I've completed, that was 
more reflective on how I personally would react to the ethical and conduct issues in each 
topic. I thought this was a valuable way of teaching.  
It made me think outside the square...it was different to any law subject I've done before. 
I really liked the reflection based assessment; it made me engage with subject and think about 
issues personally. I liked the variety of discussion questions in class, I think these made the 
material really accessible and showed different people's points of view. 
I liked the interactive nature of class discussion, prepared tutorial discussion questions and 
consistent reference to case studies. 
The dilemmas were thought provoking and engaging. 
Overall, the subject is interesting as it delves into our own ethical standards - something 
which we don't get to do in our other subjects. We need a subject like ethics to allow us to 
reflect how we as future lawyers can become better lawyers.  
These comments indicate that the subject as a whole, which includes emotional content, 
allowed students to explore their own subjective experiences, values, ethical standards, 
decision-making processes, and to engage their reflective and analytical skills. In terms of the 
content and the class activities, students appear to appreciate being given the opportunity to 
discuss real situations which were considered from different perspectives. The teaching and 
learning strategies pertaining to emotion have these qualities and are aimed at enabling 
students to consider their own values and decision-making processes. In doing so, the content 
of these teaching and learning strategies may help achieve the aim of better equipping 
students for the reality of making ethical judgments in practice. 
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5.3 Subject: Evidence and Criminal Procedure 
This core subject covers the practice and procedures governing the law of evidence and 
certain pre-trial criminal procedures. It is taught in a 1.5 hour lecture and 1.5 hour tutorial per 
week over 13 weeks. The subject embeds the ethics graduate attribute from 2014. I teach in 
this subject and developed the content of a teaching and learning strategy for the purpose of 
formalising the ethics content to accord with the subject learning objective below and to 
include emotional knowledge. This teaching and learning strategy will be implemented in 
second semester 2014. I developed new ethics and emotion content by building on the 
existing substantive legal content and materials used in a particular seminar. The seminar 
about sexual assault communications privilege provides the opportunity to evaluate how 
emotion is used persuasively by lawyers, and whether and in what circumstances this is 
ethical. In order to ascertain the ethical justifiability of using emotion persuasively, students 
undertake an evaluation of the moral justifiability of contempt. Contempt was chosen because 
it arises in the content and the analysis of this emotion enables students to evaluate the ethical 
justifiability of using emotion persuasively. Additionally, students engage in narrative 
intelligence because they evaluate how lawyers control and construct narratives and the 
ethical issues involved in this process, and students identify and analyse emotional 
preferences, perspectives, beliefs and values.   
Unlike Ethics and Professional Conduct where emotion has already been introduced into the 
subject, this subject is used as an example of how emotion could be introduced into a subject 
embedding the ethics attribute.
66
 Part 5.3.1 explains that the subject has the capacity to 
introduce knowledge about emotion because of the learning objective and the content the 
subject covers. Part 5.3.2 presents the content of the teaching and learning strategy I 
developed in order to accord with the subject learning objective. The content of this learning 
strategy uses emotional knowledge and narrative intelligence as a vehicle from which to 
educate students about ethical advocacy. 
5.3.1 Learning Objective 
The subject learning objective in Evidence and Criminal Procedure embedding the ethics 
graduate attribute is:
67
  
Upon successful completion of this subject students should be able to: 
 Evaluate and reflect on the roles of lawyers in the administration of justice.68 
This learning objective is not explicit about the role of emotion in legal ethics. However as 
stated in Chapter 4, the objective is consistent with the ‘whole student’ approach in the ethics 
graduate attribute, Threshold Learning Outcome and the Course Intended Learning 
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Outcome.
69
 This learning objective engages the affective domain because evaluating the roles 
of lawyers requires consideration of the values attached to those roles. It engages the 
intellectual domain because of the analysis of the evaluative judgments contained in emotion 
and it engages the intellectual capacity ‘thinking like lawyer’ ethically.  
There are three subjects that embed the ethics graduate attribute prior to this subject: Ethics, 
Law and Justice, Torts, and Civil Procedure.
70
 In those subjects the intended learning 
outcomes for students are relational levels of understanding. In Evidence and Criminal 
Procedure the learning objective requires both a relational level of understanding, denoted in 
the verb ‘evaluate’, and an extended abstract level of understanding, denoted in the verb 
‘reflect’.71 Therefore learning strategies need to provide students with the opportunity to 
evaluate the roles of lawyers’ in the administration of justice and to demonstrate their ability 
to integrate and explain the relationship between facts and theory, action and purpose. 
Learning strategies also need to provide students with the opportunity to reflect on the roles 
of lawyers’ in the administration of justice and to demonstrate their ability to communicate 
and apply perspective changes. Demonstrating reflection and perspective changes can happen 
through learning activities in class but the reflection component could also be demonstrated 
in an assessment task.
72
 The incorporation of emotional content, as applied to ethical issues in 
the teaching and learning strategy below, requires students to evaluate and reflect on how 
emotion impacts on lawyers performing their role in the administration of justice. However, 
as discussed in Chapter 4, the expectation that students will be able to demonstrate this level 
of understanding will depend on whether emotional knowledge has been incrementally 
introduced into the subjects preceding Evidence and Criminal Procedure. 
5.3.2 Teaching and Learning Strategy 
This subject allocates a seminar to the professional confidential relationships privilege and 
the sexual assault communications privilege. In relation to these privileges the subject matter 
involves the history leading up to the enactment of these privileges and the law itself. There 
is ample scope within this material to discuss legal-ethical content and the related emotional 
content. One aspect of the emotional and ethical content is discussed below, but this material 
also raises other ethical issues such as the moral character of lawyers and role-detachment.
73
 
The learning strategy I propose below has three purposes: to understand the evaluative 
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properties of emotion, to understand how emotion is used persuasively and strategically by 
lawyers, and to consider whether the use of emotion is morally justifiable and ethically 
defensible. In doing so, students are critically analysing and reflecting on the role of emotion 
in legal-ethical judgment through an aspect of how lawyers may enact their role in the 
administration of justice. 
5.3.2.1 Content 
The aim of this teaching and learning strategy is to have students consider ethical behaviour 
more broadly and whether the narratives strategically created by lawyers are morally 
defensible. One way of doing this is to evaluate the moral justifiability of the emotions 
evoked by lawyers in order to influence juror judgment.  
One of the prescribed readings for the seminar is an article by Mary Rose Liverani,
74
 
explaining the circumstances and the reasons why law reform was needed in relation to the 
subpoenaing of sexual assault counsellors’ notes. This reading will continue to be used 
because it raises interesting ethical issues pertaining to defence tactics in sexual assault cases. 
Lawyers in New South Wales were subpoenaing the notes in order to gain information that 
could be used to undermine the credibility of sexual assault complainants. Liverani discusses 
how some lawyers subverted the rape shield laws prior to the sexual assault communications 
privilege. Rape shield laws disallow lawyers from adducing evidence of the sexual reputation 
of the complainant to discredit them.
75
 In order to subvert these laws, some lawyers started to 
subpoena counselling notes for the purpose of indirectly introducing evidence of the 
complainant’s moral character.76 The purpose of this strategy was to discredit the credibility 
of the complainant and to affect juror judgment.
77
  
Counselling notes may contain information including ‘past sexual history, the existence of 
illegitimate children, drug, alcohol and psychiatric history’ and self-blame.78 Lawyers could 
use this information to support stereotypes, to distort the factual nature of the sexual assault 
and to impeach the moral character of the complainant.
79
 In doing so they created a 
narrative
80
 that used the persuasive influence of emotion to direct the attention of jurors away 
from the moral obloquy of the defendant, and toward impeaching the moral character of the 
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complainant. If jurors think that the complainant has a dubious moral character they may 
sympathise with the defendant and disdain the complainant. Emotions commonly attached to 
disdain are contempt and anger. Contempt is examined below because it arises in the content 
and because it promotes consideration of the ethical justifiability of using emotion 
persuasively. 
As stated in Chapter 2, contempt is related to anger and moral disgust.
81
 Contempt involves a 
judgment about a moral or character defect in another person. Feeling contempt involves 
perceiving and regarding the object as a person who ranks low in worth, because they fall 
short ‘of some legitimate interpersonal ideal’ and the affective quality is feeling pained in the 
presence of the object thus making the object a source of aversion.
82
 This can result in the 
object of contempt being treated with less respect and consideration or with derision or 
disregard.
83
 According to Mason, the conditions necessary for contempt’s proper evaluative 
presentation and moral justifiability are: 
1. It is directed at a person or persons (objects) as a response to violations of a legitimate 
interpersonal ideal. The object does not have to commit a personal offense against the 
person; the offense can be based on a belief about a class of people. 
2. The violation stems from a morally evaluable character trait.  
3. The object can appropriately be held responsible for the expression of the character 
trait. 
4. There is a legitimate expectation or demand that the object can approximate the 
interpersonal ideal. 
5. The attitude toward the object emanates from an agent who does not possess a similar 
fault otherwise they are also contemptible. 
6. The agent is responsive to evidence that the object has repented or changed for the 
better thus being open to forgiveness or some other change in attitude. To be blind to 
that evidence would be a morally objectionable attitude. 
All of the above conditions and justifications contain evaluations. The purpose of this activity 
is to engage students in an analysis of contempt to increase understanding of the evaluative 
nature of the emotion and whether, and in what circumstances, it is morally and ethically 
justifiable. As such, this activity promotes an understanding of how emotion is involved in 
the broader judgments people make. Mason’s six conditions will be applied to the following 
hypothetical. 
The defendant (D) contends that the sexual intercourse with the complainant (C) was 
consensual. A juror (J) thinks that D could have made an honest mistake about a belief in 
consent because C engaged D in conversation, was dressed provocatively, allowed D to buy 
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drinks, had been flirting with D, and accepted a lift home with D. Additionally, C did not 
scream or struggle during the alleged sexual assault. D’s lawyer has deliberately introduced 
this evidence with the aim of influencing the juror’s perception of C. As a result J feels 
contempt toward C.  
The seminar questions below are designed to elicit how lawyers use emotion to influence 
juror judgment and whether, and in what circumstances, this is ethical. This activity engages 
students in narrative intelligence through an analysis of how lawyers construct narratives 
including the persuasive role of emotion. Additionally, students consider whether certain 
emotions are morally justifiable. The first three questions address the article by Liverani and 
the last addresses the hypothetical case study. 
1. What was the purpose of subpoenaing sexual assault counsellor notes? 
2. How was the information in the notes used? 
3. How might this information affect the way the jury perceives the complainant? 
4. Apply the six evaluations in Mason’s theory of contempt to the hypothetical to 
determine whether the juror’s attitude toward the complainant is proper and morally 
justifiable. Based on your analysis, do you think what D’s lawyer did by introducing 
the evidence was ethical? Why / why not? Is that situation different from using 
information in counselling notes? Why / why not? 
Questions 1-3 require students to identify and contextualise the problem of using the 
information in counselling notes to induce emotions such as contempt in the jury. The 
analysis below demonstrates how an answer to question 4 could be addressed by applying 
Michelle Mason’s theory of contempt from Chapter 2 to the hypothetical facts.84 The 
following analysis will be given to tutors in this subject to enable them to guide the 
discussion and analysis involved in question 4. 
5.3.2.2 Analysis - Contempt 
Point 1: Violations of legitimate interpersonal ideals 
In relation to Mason’s first point above, it is necessary to examine the possible beliefs that 
underpin the interpersonal ideal and the perception of C. The beliefs that could arise are that 
C invited the advance, and if C did not want to have sexual intercourse C would have 
objected by screaming or struggling. The evaluations involved in these beliefs lead J to 
conclude that C is either lying or D has a reasonable belief in consent. Contempt toward C is 
attached to these evaluations. Further evaluation of the beliefs underpinning the emotion 
could reveal that the beliefs are based on stereotypes or biases and that this would invalidate 
the contempt. This, however, requires the honest appraisal of one’s beliefs. Without this kind 
of appraisal, J considers that C has violated an ideal. The interpersonal ideal could be the 
thought that C is lying, or that C should not have invited the advance or that it was reasonable 
in the circumstances for D to believe there was consent. The interpersonal ideal could be 
based on misconceptions about sexual assault complainants, and perhaps normative standards 
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and perceptions related to the gender and the sexuality of the complainant. This calls into 
question the legitimacy of the ideal and the moral systems and norms that it is based on. 
Points 2, 3 and 4: Morally evaluable character traits and responsibility 
 
In relation to Mason’s second and third points, J considers the violation has stemmed from a 
morally evaluable character trait. This is the beliefs that C invited the advance, and if C did 
not want to have sexual intercourse C would have objected. This element again depends on 
the personal morality and perspective of J, and the acceptance or rejection of information 
which contradicts the beliefs above. If C is lying, then C would appropriately be held 
responsible for the expression of the character trait of lying. However, whether the other 
beliefs raise morally questionable traits and whether C should be held responsible is 
debatable. The above beliefs could be based on stereotypes and attitudes that blame the 
complainant. Similarly in relation to point four, J may consider that there is a legitimate 
expectation or demand that C can approximate the interpersonal ideal. That is, people should 
not flirt, accept drinks, dress provocatively, accept lifts home, and should communicate non-
consent clearly, otherwise they are blurring boundaries. In those circumstances it is 
reasonable that D believed there was consent and C has offended the interpersonal ideal. But 
again this ideal is problematic, for the reasons above, and because it adopts a moral standard 
that is not reflected in the law. For example, in New South Wales, when determining whether 
consent was ‘freely and voluntarily’ given, submission or a lack of resistance does not 
constitute consent.
85
 Moral standards do not have to be reflected in the law, and people apply 
different norms and standards of behaviour depending on their moral and cultural 
perspectives. This is why some lawyers try to invoke negative emotions like contempt, by 
reinforcing stereotypes in order to bias juror decision-making.   
Points 5 and 6: The moral justifiability of contempt 
 
Whether the emotion is morally justifiable depends on Mason’s fifth and six points. J could 
argue that the contemptible attitude toward the complainant is justifiable because J does not 
possess a similar fault. However, this depends on whether the evaluations J has made, based 
on their beliefs, are correct. If J’s evaluations are questionable or incorrect, because their 
beliefs are biased or based on stereotypes, their attitude could be considered contemptible 
particularly if they are unwilling to change those beliefs. J also needs to be responsive to 
evidence that the object of the emotion, in this example the complainant, has repented or 
changed for the better, thus being open to forgiveness or some other change in attitude. To be 
blind to evidence of change would be a morally objectionable attitude. In the hypothetical 
this will again depend on whether J gets the evaluation right, and if wrong, is willing to 
accept that C does not need to repent or change. If J's evaluations are wrong it means that the 
contempt is not morally justifiable. 
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After considering the evaluative properties and moral justifiability of contempt, question 4 
asks students whether introducing evidence like this is ethical. In a technical sense, lawyers 
who use emotion and create narratives such as the one above are not breaking professional 
responsibility rules. However, compliance with professional responsibility rules does not 
necessarily make the strategy ethical as the above analysis suggests. 
5.3.3 Conclusion 
The content of the teaching and learning strategy I have proposed above is consistent with the 
subject learning objective because it focuses on the roles of lawyers in the administration of 
justice. By using a concrete example of how a lawyer can enact their role in the 
administration of justice, this activity requires students to critique the fulfilment of that role 
in the context of ethical behaviour. Additionally, students will engage narrative intelligence 
through a consideration of how lawyers control and construct narratives. The content of this 
activity exposes students to the reality of advocacy and the tactics, including the use of 
emotion to influence juror decision-making, employed by lawyers. The purpose is to 
encourage students to evaluate the impacts of employing these tactics and the potential harm 
it can cause, and also to encourage reflection on appropriate ethical boundaries. The level of 
understanding in the learning objective is relational, requiring students to demonstrate the 
orchestration between facts and theory, action and purpose when they engage in analysing the 
ethical issues involved in creating narratives and using emotion persuasively. By considering 
the moral justifiability of certain emotions, students are exposed to extended abstract 
reasoning, as it provides them with an alternate perspective on the tactical use of emotion and 
its relationship to ethical boundaries. 
I developed the idea for this teaching and learning strategy from two student responses on an 
internet discussion board for this subject. In this subject students are actively encouraged to 
engage in discussion based on books
86
 about the criminal trial process in Australia and 
documentaries, such as ‘The Staircase’ and ‘The Staircase 2: The Last Chance’. ‘The 
Staircase’ documents the trial of Michael Petersen who was charged and convicted for the 
murder of his wife in the United States. ‘The Staircase 2’ documents his appeal and his 
subsequent release from prison pending a new trial. Student A commented on ‘The Staircase’ 
and student B on ‘The Staircase 2’. The students recognised that emotion plays a role in the 
criminal justice system. Student A explicitly discussed emotion and its influence on juries but 
found it ‘interesting/alarming’ that emotion and human psychology has so much to do with 
jury decisions. Student B acknowledged that ‘lawyers play on the emotions of juries’ and it is 
‘hard for juries to isolate their emotion.’ It is assumed that student B meant that jurors should 
not let emotion affect their decision-making. But ‘lawyers play on emotion’ precisely because 
it is difficult for people to be unaffected by emotion for better or worse. This is why it is 
important to educate students about the responsibility of doing so and how it can be done 
ethically. If students continue to think that law, legal actors and legal judgment are free from 
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emotion, they are not learning about the reality of human decision-making or ethical 
persuasion.  
5.4 Conclusion 
This chapter argues that by using concrete examples of how emotion is involved in legal-
ethical judgment and how emotion can be integrated into teaching and learning strategies,  
this thesis provides academics with a framework from which they can formulate their own 
teaching and learning strategies with a view to achieving learning outcomes for students such 
as: increased awareness and understanding of  their own emotional capabilities and the ability 
to critically reflect on and analyse the role of emotion in ethical judgment. It is further argued 
that students will gain a more comprehensive understanding of ‘thinking like a lawyer’ and 
their ability to make ethical judgments will improve by including emotion. The literature 
reviewed in Chapters 2 and 3 demonstrated that people, including lawyers, can be educated to 
recognise the impact of their emotions on judgment and to better account for their emotional 
responses. This chapter has shown how teaching and learning strategies can facilitate 
education about the role of emotion in legal-ethical judgment by applying the emotional 
knowledge from Chapter 2 to examples where emotion impacted on the judgment of various 
legal actors. The present chapter has also shown how Burton’s model of ‘thinking like a 
lawyer’ can be applied in educating students about making ethical judgments that recognise 
the role of emotion. Thus, the teaching and learning strategies proposed in this chapter aim to 
provide students with the opportunity to identify how emotion is involved in legal-ethical 
judgment, to practise emotional analysis and to improve their ability to ‘think like lawyers’ 
ethically.  
The subject Ethics and Professional Conduct provided an example of how emotion already 
features in the legal ethics curriculum at UTS Law. One of the learning objectives and three 
topics within Ethics and Professional Conduct directly addresses the emotional content of 
legal ethics. Additionally, the reflective journal assessment encourages students to identify 
their own emotions for the purpose of gaining a better understanding of their own emotional 
capabilities. The content of all three teaching and learning strategies are aligned to the 
learning objective because in each of the strategies students have to consider the impact of 
emotions on ethical decision-making. The perspective-taking activity in the seminar for the 
topic ‘theoretical perspectives of values, morals and ethics’ demonstrates how emotions are 
connected to moral standards and values. This is important in the context of legal ethics 
education as a whole because it promotes the understanding that ethics is not based on legal 
rules alone and that personal moral orientations, including emotion and values, influence 
ethical judgments. In participating in the perspective-taking activity students engage both 
narrative intelligence and interpersonal intelligence by exercising their capacity for empathy 
and identifying and evaluating the emotions of the various actors involved in the scenario. 
The activity encourages students to consider the evaluative judgments contained in emotion 
and how they can reflect moral standards and values. However, the examination of the way in 
which this activity was initially implemented in the class-room, emphasised the need to 
explicitly introduce students to the idea that ‘thinking like a lawyer’ involves both narrative 
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and personal intelligences and how emotion is implicated in these capacities. If this is not 
done students may fail to see the relevance and significance of the role of emotion in 
exercising legal-ethical judgment. 
The small-group discussions for the topics ‘professional and personal conduct’ and ‘duty to 
the court – criminal law’ again engage students in narrative intelligence and intrapersonal 
intelligence. The content of these topics involved analysis of specific emotions such as love, 
anger and sympathy; the relationship between morals, values and emotion; emotion as a 
guide to ethical judgment; and consideration of emotional self-awareness, emotional 
dispositions, the educability of emotion and appropriate emotional detachment. Again, the 
content of these topics demonstrate that the knowledge about emotion in Chapter 2 is relevant 
to legal ethics and can be applied by using the narrative and personal intelligence aspects of 
‘thinking like a lawyer’. By analysing specific emotions such as anger and sympathy, these 
activities also encourage students to consider the evaluative judgments contained in emotions. 
Additionally, the inclusion of emotional knowledge prompts consideration of other ethical 
factors such as duty and impartiality, and encourages students to think about their own 
approach to ethical decision-making and the importance of emotional self-awareness. 
The content pertaining to emotion was written for Ethics and Professional Conduct in its 
transition from a Practical Legal Training subject into a foundational core law subject Ethics, 
Law and Justice. In the foundational subject, students begin to explore the relationship 
between personal attitudes, values and emotion, the educability of emotion and the role of 
emotion in morality and ethical decision-making. This is important because introducing 
emotion in stage one assists in breaking down any resistance to what students may initially 
perceive as a pursuit tangential to law. However, I argue that by exposing students at an early 
stage to the role of emotion in ‘thinking like a lawyer’ the status of emotion in legal thinking 
and legal ethics will gain legitimacy. The challenge for educators is to provide opportunities 
for students to acquire an understanding of the relationship between personal values, emotion 
and ethics, and further that emotions are related to justice, rationality, judgment and 
professional relationships. The emotional content of the learning strategies discussed in this 
chapter demonstrates that these opportunities can be provided and how they can be 
introduced. Further, as the student feedback in Ethics and Professional Conduct indicates, 
students appreciate opportunities to expand their understanding of ethics and to develop their 
own capacity for ethical judgment. This includes allowing students to explore and understand 
what they bring, in terms of life experience and subjectivity, to making ethical judgments and 
the practice of law.  
The subject Evidence and Criminal Procedure provided an example of how emotion could be 
introduced into the legal ethics curriculum at UTS Law. The content of the teaching and 
learning strategy in this subject was created in order to formalise the ethics content and to 
include knowledge about emotion and its role in legal-ethical judgment. The teaching and 
learning strategy has three intended learning outcomes: to understand the evaluative 
properties of emotion, to understand how emotion is used persuasively and strategically by 
lawyers, and to consider whether the emotion is morally justifiable and ethically defensible. 
In order to achieve these outcomes contempt was used in the strategy with the aim of 
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involving students in a structured and thorough analysis of the evaluative properties of this 
emotion and its moral justifiability. This analysis provides the basis for considering whether 
and when the persuasive use of emotion by lawyers is ethical. 
The activity is consistent with the aim of this thesis to use the emotional content in ‘thinking 
like a lawyer’ to educate students about ethical judgment. The activity does this by engaging 
students in the cognitive and emotional content of narrative intelligence through a 
consideration of how lawyers construct and control narratives and how the narrative conveys 
and expresses emotion. This process is designed to allow students to practise ‘thinking like a 
lawyer’ ethically because they are subjecting the emotional narrative to analysis in order to 
ascertain its moral justifiability. The content for this teaching and learning strategy was 
developed by building on existing seminar materials. The article on the sexual assault 
communications privilege used in this subject is not explicit about emotion; however, this 
example demonstrates that academics can use existing materials and with further analysis, 
reveal emotional content. Again, the benefit of drawing out the emotional content is that other 
ethical factors are considered, in this example those would include how lawyers enact their 
role and the boundaries of ethical advocacy. 
The examples of disciplinary cases used in this chapter provide support for the argument that 
emotion does influence legal-ethical judgment and decision-making. Although the examples 
mostly show the negative impacts of emotion they also emphasise the need for emotional 
self-awareness. As such, it is important to educate students about how to account for emotion 
as opposed to ignoring it or excluding it from judgment. The teaching and learning strategies 
proposed in this chapter are not especially innovative in terms of class discussions; however, 
the emotional content of those strategies are designed to enable students to think about legal 
ethics more broadly and to consider their own ethical perspectives. Additionally, the teaching 
and learning strategies proposed in this chapter, are intended further the aim of providing 
students with a more comprehensive and realistic understanding of what it means to ‘think 
like a lawyer’ and to allow students to develop their capacity for making legal-ethical 
judgments. 
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6.0 CONCLUSION 
This thesis examined the role of emotion in legal-ethical judgment and developed practical 
examples of how to teach students about ethical judgment in ways that consider the role of 
emotion in such judgment. Academics, as legal actors, are implicated in this process because 
they devise and deliver the means of educating students in the law, including its forms of 
reasoning and the methods by which legal judgments are to be reached. ‘Thinking like a 
lawyer’ is one of the key models of rational thinking and can be used to incorporate material 
on the role of emotion in legal-ethical judgment, decision-making and legal ethics education. 
Including knowledge about emotion in learning to ‘think like a lawyer’ will improve 
students’ judgment because they will be better equipped to understand the role of emotion in 
legal-ethical judgment and decision-making. 
The overall aims of this thesis were to demonstrate why it is important to include knowledge 
about emotion in legal-ethical judgment and decision-making and how knowledge about 
emotion could be introduced into legal ethics education. As stated in Chapter 1, these aims 
were reflected in the ‘investigation, illumination and integration’ dimensions of law and 
emotion scholarship.
1
 The ‘investigation’ dimension was realised by exploring the cognitive 
attributes of emotion and emotion’s role in legal-ethical judgment, drawing on cognitivist 
philosophy, cognitive psychology and cognitive neuroscience in Chapter 2 and legal 
scholarship on ‘thinking like a lawyer’ in Chapter 3. The ‘illumination’ dimension was 
realised in Chapter 4 by demonstrating how the inclusion of emotional knowledge in legal 
ethics education is consistent with the pervasive and incremental approaches to learning legal 
ethics and institutional and faculty statements of the ethics graduate attribute, and in Chapter 
5 by developing practical examples of how to teach students about ethical judgment in ways 
that consider the role of emotion in such judgment. In relation to the ‘integration’ dimension 
the normative goal of this thesis was to modify legal ethics education by expanding the 
concept of ‘thinking like a lawyer’ and to provide concrete strategies that show how 
knowledge about emotion can be introduced into legal ethics education.
2
 It is in this way that 
this thesis contributes to the field of law and emotions scholarship and legal ethics education. 
In order to achieve the overall aims the thesis was divided into two parts each comprising two 
chapters.  
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 Kathryn Abrams and Hila Keren ‘Who’s Afraid of Law and Emotions?’ (2010) 94 Minnesota Law Review 
1997, 2033-2034. 
2
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6.1 Part One – why it is important to include knowledge about emotion in 
legal ethics education 
Emotion and Judgment 
Chapter 2 focused on scholarship from cognitivist philosophy, cognitive neuroscience and 
cognitive psychology. That scholarship establishes the relationship between emotion, 
cognition, judgment and ethical reasoning. Emotions involve thought and they contain 
evaluative judgments in the form of beliefs and values. Given the status of emotion in these 
disciplines, it is no longer appropriate for the discipline of law to ignore emotion, to do so 
would be to remain ignorant to the reality of human decision-making. In excluding material 
on emotion, legal education fails its students by not taking into account an influential factor 
in ethical and legal judgment and decision-making. The extent to which emotion is involved 
in such judgment depends on the situation and the person experiencing the emotion. Whether 
emotion plays a major or minor role, it is important for people, including lawyers, to be 
aware of the influences of emotion in judgment. This is why legal education should enable 
students to understand and analyse the evaluations contained in emotion. This understanding 
leads to increased self-awareness and the ability to account for the positive and negative 
impact of emotion on judgment. Because the aforementioned disciplines recognise the role of 
emotion in cognition, judgment, ethics and decision-making they are compatible with the 
cognitive frameworks employed in law and therefore are useful in expanding the 
understanding of how emotion is involved in ‘thinking like a lawyer’. 
The ability to account for the positive and negative influences of emotion requires 
comprehension of the evaluative judgments that emotions contain. In order to understand the 
general defining features of emotion, three interrelated categories were considered: 
perception, cognition, and emotional dispositions. Emotional perceptions provide evaluative 
knowledge by revealing what is significant about the object of the emotion according to the 
perspective of the person. A persons’ perspective is influenced by emotional dispositions 
which affect the evaluation of the object of the emotion.
3
 The approaches of three 
philosophers who offer cognitivist theories of emotion were considered in order to discern the 
defining features of cognition and the evaluative properties of emotion.
4
 In general these 
philosophers argue that emotions are evaluations based on belief, value, thought and 
judgment as directed toward the object of the emotion. The framework to analyse emotional 
experiences comes from understanding the evaluative properties of emotion. Emotional 
dispositions are habits of thought and action based on past emotional experience that produce 
emotional responses.
5
 Emotional dispositions influence the way in which the object is 
perceived and valued and the formation and retention of beliefs that underpin emotion. In this 
way, emotional dispositions influence the judgments that are made about the object of the 
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4
 Martha Nussbaum, Jerome Neu and Robert Solomon; see Chapter 2, Part 2.3. 
5
 See Chapter 2, Part 2.4. 
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emotion. In chapter 2 the analysis of perception, cognition and emotional dispositions leads 
to the conclusion that the ability to understand and analyse the evaluations involved in 
emotion results in better emotional self-awareness. This is the ability to analyse emotion, 
experience emotion appropriately and to form habits of thought that enable people to see 
what is and is not relevant to their judgments.  
Moral emotions were then considered in order to elaborate on the additional defining features 
of these emotions, the evaluations involved and their connection to ethical judgment. Moral 
emotions involve perceptive, motivational and evaluative functions in judgment.
6
 The moral 
emotions of empathy, sympathy, anger and contempt were examined to demonstrate the 
structure of these emotions and their moral justifiability. Moral emotions involve moral 
evaluations which can be constituted by beliefs about right and wrong, and evaluations about 
the experiences, actions or character traits of the object of the emotion. It is important to 
examine the evaluative judgments contained in these emotions because when the evaluations 
are wrong or unjustifiable the emotion can impact on ethical judgment negatively. For 
example, the disciplinary cases used in this thesis demonstrate the perceptive and 
motivational functions of emotions, such as sympathy, love and anger, as well as the negative 
impact on judgment when these emotions are not scrutinised.  Instead of ignoring or 
excluding the emotion from judgment, it was argued that if the practitioners in these cases 
had better emotional self-awareness and had accounted for the impact of their emotions they 
would have exercised sounder ethical judgment.  
Thinking like a Lawyer: Professionalism, Ethics and Emotion 
‘Thinking like a lawyer’ can be broadly understood to mean the ability to undertake legal 
problem-solving.
7
 The analytical framework of ‘thinking like a lawyer’ is relevant to legal-
ethical judgment and decision-making because this is another form of problem-solving 
undertaken by lawyers. However traditionally, ‘thinking like a lawyer’ is indicative of the 
rationalist practices of law because of the focus on logical reasoning. This practice effectively 
attempts to exclude humanistic concerns such as emotion in legal problem-solving. Chapter 3 
argued that including the emotional aspects of ‘thinking like a lawyer’ would make legal 
ethics education more comprehensive and better equip law students for the reality of making 
ethical judgments in practice. Angela Olivia Burton’s model of ‘thinking like a lawyer’ was 
adopted in Chapter 3 because it explicitly identifies the intellectual capacities where emotion 
is involved: narrative intelligence and the personal intelligences.
8
 The inclusion of emotion in 
Burton’s model is significant because it demonstrates that students can learn traditional 
analytical legal skills, such as inductive and deductive reasoning, together with the analytical 
skills involved in the emotional aspects of ethical judgment. This thesis contributes to a better 
understanding of the role of emotion in legal judgment because it expanded on the function of 
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emotion in narrative intelligence and the personal intelligences contained in Burton’s model 
by applying the knowledge about emotion from Chapter 2.  
The scholarship considered in Chapter 3 emphasised that humanistic concerns, such as 
emotion, are consistent with the ability to ‘think like a lawyer’ and moreover, they are a 
necessary element of this skill. Lawyers use narrative intelligence to contextualise problems 
beyond legal rules, to gain an understanding of the perspective of their clients and others, and 
to construct stories that convey facts persuasively. Narratives also express emotional content 
and in doing so can reveal the structure of emotions and their impact on judgment, makes 
stories easier to remember and more persuasive, and allows empathic identification and 
perspective taking. The personal intelligences are important for lawyering because emotional 
self-awareness contributes to personal and professional problem-solving. Understanding the 
desires and motivations of others contributes to effectively communicating and working with 
them. As such, a legal ethics curriculum that includes the emotional content of narrative 
intelligence and the personal intelligences in ‘thinking like a lawyer’ is more 
comprehensively preparing students for the human context of legal practice. 
The capacity of narrative intelligence involves the ability recognise and evaluate emotional 
preferences, perspectives, beliefs, values and dispositions because these factors influence 
judgment. Accordingly a component of narrative intelligence is the way people examine, 
evaluate and make sense of emotional experiences. Although several academics advocate the 
importance of emotion in narrative intelligence they do not go into detail about it.
9
 This thesis 
expanded on the emotive content of narrative intelligence in Chapter 3 by providing a 
detailed application of narrative analysis and cognitivist theories of emotion to the 
disciplinary case of Morel.
10
 That analysis revealed how Morel’s experience of love impacted 
on her professional judgment. Solomon’s narrative theory of love was applied to show how a 
lack of emotional self-awareness led to boundary violations and unethical behaviour. 
Nussbaum’s theory on the evaluative properties of emotion was applied to better understand 
how Morel’s need to be a rescuer and her prioritisation of this need exposes habits and 
dispositions to think and act on love in certain ways which led to the ‘wrong story’ of love 
being told. Morel was used as an example of how a lack of emotional self-awareness 
impaired the practitioner’s personal and professional judgment.  
In Chapter 5 a similar form of narrative analysis was applied in the case of Madden
11
 which 
revealed the impact of anger on the practitioner’s professional judgment. Gabriele Taylor’s 
conception of anger from Chapter 2 was applied to ascertain the defining features of 
Madden’s anger and its moral justifiability.12 The analysis demonstrated that Madden’s 
emotional dispositions, beliefs and defence mechanisms
13
 contributed to the misguided 
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judgments he made about the object of the emotion. It was suggested that if Madden had 
better emotional self-awareness he may have avoided making poor ethical judgments. The 
disciplinary cases illustrated how narratives can reveal the structure of an emotion, how 
emotions contain evaluative judgments that can be analysed, and the need for emotional self-
awareness in legal practice. The teaching and learning strategies involving Madden and 
Morel exemplify how engaging the capacity of narrative intelligence can assist in the analysis 
of emotion. All of the teaching and learning strategies in Chapter 5 utilise narratives because 
importantly, the evaluation of ethical and emotional narratives also engages the personal 
intelligences. 
The personal intelligences shape our understanding of ourselves (intrapersonal) and others 
(interpersonal). These intelligences involve being aware of our own and other people’s 
emotion, personality, motivations, beliefs and values. Intrapersonal intelligence requires 
emotional self-awareness. It was argued that self-awareness means developing better 
awareness of emotions, experiencing them, learning how to examine and account for them, 
and learning how to react to them effectively. This thesis expanded on the emotive content of 
intrapersonal intelligence by giving a detailed description of how a lack of emotional self-
awareness can manifest in self-representation, intellectualisation, inappropriate emotional 
responses and inappropriate emotional detachment.
14
 In turn, these issues can lead to poor 
judgment, unethical conduct and dissociation from personal values and morality. 
Interpersonal intelligence denotes the ability to understand another person’s desires and 
motivations and to use that knowledge to effectively deal with other people and this requires 
a capacity for empathy. The analysis of empathy from Chapter 2 was applied to expand the 
understanding of what it means to have a genuine capacity for empathy in legal practice. 
However it was acknowledged that a balance between empathic engagement and detachment 
is necessary in order to prevent boundary violations such as counter-transference.
15
 It was 
argued that the ability to recognise emotional responses, habits and dispositions, and the 
ability to analyse how emotion can affect the lawyer/client relationship is required in order 
for boundary violations to be avoided, or dealt with if they arise.
16
 Thus emotional self-
awareness assists in striking the balance between empathic engagement and detached 
objectivity.
17
  
The disciplinary cases used as examples in this thesis provide support for the argument that 
emotion does influence legal-ethical judgment. These cases illustrate how emotion is 
involved in judgment, ethics and legal practice and this is why it is important to include 
emotion in legal ethics education. The cases demonstrate the negative impacts of unexamined 
emotion and the analysis of them emphasises the need for emotional self-awareness, so that 
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the positive and negative effects of emotion are accounted for in exercising ethical judgment 
and legal practice. Legal ethics education should therefore provide students with the 
opportunity to develop the capacities of emotional self-awareness, empathy and appropriate 
emotional boundaries.  
In order to provide students with such opportunities, teaching and learning strategies would 
ideally be designed so that students could gain an understanding of their own emotional 
capabilities, practice making judgments that include emotion, and critically reflect on and 
analyse the role of emotion in legal-ethical ethical judgment. Including knowledge about 
emotion can also prompt consideration of other ethical factors, such as duty and impartiality, 
how a lawyer enacts their role and the boundaries of ethical advocacy, and encourages 
students to think about their own approach to ethical decision-making. The observations of 
the subject co-ordinators of Ethics and Professional Conduct
18
 and Torts
19
 lend support for 
the claim that when the emotional aspects of legal ethics are included, students consider their 
own values and apply empathy in order to understand the perspectives of others. Therefore, 
the inclusion of knowledge about emotion into the teaching of legal ethics, orients problems 
away from rigid legal perspectives, and in so doing encourages students to account for a 
broader range of factors in ‘thinking like a lawyer’ and legal ethics. 
6.2 Part Two: How knowledge about emotion could be introduced into legal 
ethics education 
Emotion in the Legal Ethics Curriculum 
Chapter 4 used a case study to describe the historical context and processes for developing 
the legal ethics curriculum at UTS Law. In chapter 5 the case study explained the 
introduction of the knowledge about emotion from previous chapters in the content of 
teaching and learning strategies for two core law subjects. Chapter 4 considered how the 
emotional aspects of judgment in legal ethics education were consistent with the pedagogical 
approaches and policies on learning outcomes at an institutional and faculty level. The 
particular case analysed was the substance and form of the program of legal ethics education 
at UTS Law. UTS Law uses a combination of the pervasive and incremental approaches by 
embedding the ethics attribute into five core law subjects together with the foundational 
subject Ethics, Law and Justice and the vocational subject Legal Skills where professional 
responsibility is considered. This approach ensures that students have a focused and early 
exposure to legal ethics and that this exposure is continued throughout the degree.  
The pervasive and incremental approaches are beneficial because they allow students to 
develop their capacity for ethical judgment in different contexts and from different 
perspectives, enhance their analytical skills, gain awareness of structural and regulatory 
issues, and encourage reflection on the multitude of factors influencing ethical judgment 
                                                          
18
 See Chapter 5, Part 5.2.2. 
19
 See Chapter 4, Part 4.3.3.2. 
Chapter Six: Conclusion 
130 
 
including personal values, and morals. It was argued that emotional knowledge in legal ethics 
education is best implemented via the pervasive and incremental approaches.
20
 These 
approaches allow students to acquire an understanding of how emotion is involved in ethical 
judgment and to develop emotional self-awareness incrementally and with increasing levels 
of complexity. The intended outcome is that students are better equipped to make ethical 
judgments in practice. 
However, the case study showed that achieving that outcome depends on the way in which 
the pervasive and incremental approaches are deployed in the curriculum. The analysis of the 
2007 curriculum review identified two significant issues. The first issue was that the ethics 
curriculum was not completely pervasive because an entire year did not have ethics coverage 
in core subjects. The second issue was the lack of co-ordination in deploying ethics content 
and skills components throughout the degree. These were problematic because students were 
not continually exposed to legal ethics material, and their ability to learn incrementally and to 
practice making ethical judgments across a broad range of subject areas with increasing 
levels of complexity was limited. As discussed below, there are similar issues with the 
introducing knowledge about emotion in the current legal ethics curriculum. 
Chapter 4 also argued that the incorporation of material on the role of emotion in legal- 
ethical decision-making and legal ethics education is educationally justified at the 
institutional level and subject levels. The analysis of the 2013 curriculum review 
demonstrated how the ethics graduate attribute, Threshold Learning Outcome (TLO), Course 
Intended Learning Outcome (CILO) and subject learning objectives developed at UTS Law 
provide the means to introduce the knowledge about emotion from the previous chapters.
21
 
These factors are framed in such a way as to be able to include narrative intelligence and the 
personal intelligences and emotion is an element in each of these intelligences. Additionally, 
the ethics attribute, CILO and subject learning objectives encompass the judgment and whole 
student approaches which recognise the affective domain in legal ethics.  
However, with the exception of the subjects Ethics and Professional Conduct, and Ethics, 
Law and Justice where the learning objective is explicit about the relationship of emotion to 
ethics, there have been difficulties in implementing the emotional components of legal ethics 
pervasively and incrementally in other subjects. For example, in the subject Torts the content 
pertaining to emotion in the legal ethics learning strategy was omitted from the materials 
even though that content, as outlined in chapter 4, was designed to engage students in 
exercising both narrative and interpersonal intelligence and was consistent with the learning 
objective.
22
 The inclusion of the content pertaining to emotion in the legal ethics curriculum 
has not been approached in a co-ordinated, pervasive or incremental way.  
Thus, similar problems as those experienced with the embedding of the graduate attribute in 
the 2007 curriculum review are being repeated in relation to introducing the emotional 
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aspects of legal ethics in the curriculum. This means that students will not be continually 
exposed to considering the role of emotion in legal-ethical judgment and this will impact on 
their ability to develop emotional insight incrementally. This highlights the need for 
formalised faculty re-education that addresses attitudes to including the role of emotion in 
legal-ethical judgment and which develops teaching and learning strategies that are relevant 
to the ethics content in specific subjects. Without this it is likely that emotion will continue to 
be marginalised in legal ethics education.  
Emotion in Core Law Subjects 
Chapter 5 concluded the case study by demonstrating how knowledge about emotion can be 
implemented via Burton’s model of ‘thinking like a lawyer’. The original contribution in this 
chapter was developing the content of teaching and learning strategies for two core law 
subjects, Ethics and Professional Conduct and Evidence and Criminal Procedure. The content 
of those strategies were developed with the aim of providing students with the opportunity to 
consider and analyse the role of emotion in legal-ethical judgment. The application of the 
knowledge from chapters 2 and 3 to the teaching and learning strategies for these subjects 
demonstrated the different ways in which emotion is involved in legal ethics, how the 
narrative intelligence and personal intelligence components of Burton’s model can be used as 
a vehicle from which to educate students about the role of emotion in ethical judgment, and 
how educators can introduce knowledge from other disciplines that deal with emotion and 
judgment.  
It was argued that by using concrete examples of how emotion is involved in legal-ethical 
judgment and how emotion can be integrated into teaching and learning strategies, this thesis 
provides  academics with a framework from which they can formulate their own teaching and 
learning strategies with a view to achieving learning outcomes for students such as: increased 
awareness and understanding of their own emotional capabilities and the ability to critically 
reflect on and analyse the role of emotion in ethical judgment. The main support for this 
argument came from the scholarship of cognitive philosophy, cognitive neuroscience and 
cognitive psychology examined in Chapter 2. By applying the knowledge about emotion 
from these disciplines to the content of the teaching and learning strategies, the role of 
emotion in ‘thinking like a lawyer’ is illuminated and integrated into practical educational 
content. For example, students participating in perspective taking activities would gain a 
better understanding of their own emotional capabilities, specifically their capacity for 
sympathy and empathy, and practice making judgments that involve emotion.
23
 Students can 
engage in critical reflection and analysis of the role of emotion in ethical judgment when they 
discuss the role of sympathy and compassion in ethical judgment,
24
 and the persuasive use of 
emotions such as contempt.
25
 It was further argued that students would gain a more 
comprehensive understanding of ‘thinking like a lawyer’ and improve their ability to make 
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ethical judgments by introducing the role of emotion in legal-ethical judgement. The main 
support for this argument came from the scholarship of legal educators, examined in Chapter 
3, who advocate the important role emotion has in legal thinking and legal education. The 
application of this scholarship demonstrated how emotional analysis could be incorporated 
into ethical analysis via the narrative and personal intelligence components of ‘thinking like a 
lawyer’.  
The design of the teaching and learning strategies demonstrated that emotion does not belong 
to a realm outside of law and legal thinking. Emotion is involved in ‘thinking like a lawyer’ 
and it is only a transgressor in the intellectual realm when it is not properly accounted for in 
judgment. The teaching and learning strategies advanced in this thesis confirm that the 
objective aspects of legal ethics can be learned in conjunction with subjective aspects such as 
emotion. Importantly, this thesis recognises that students have subjectivities that will 
influence the way they learn law and perform as ethical practitioners. Instead of ignoring or 
repressing the subjectivity and emotional experiences of students, it is important that students 
bring them into the classroom and identify their relevance in legal practice. By articulating 
the emotional aspects of ‘thinking like a lawyer’ legal educators not only acknowledge the 
humanity involved in legal practice, we also allow our students to develop as people, who 
will practice law with a better awareness of their own emotional capabilities and a more 
comprehensive understanding of the factors that can impact on ethical judgment. 
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APPENDIX ONE 
Table 1 Graduate Attributes prior to 2013 curriculum review 
INTELLECTUAL PROFESSIONAL PERSONAL 
1. Critical thinking  5. Disciplinary knowledge 8. Self & cooperative work 
management 
2. Analysis and evaluation  6. Lifelong learning 9. Cultural awareness & global 
outlook  
3. Spoken & written 
communication  
7. Ethics  10. Social justice  
4. Legal research & technology 
literacy  
  
Table 2 Graduate Attributes 2013 curriculum review for the Bachelor of Laws (LLB) 
NEW ATTRIBUTES (LLB) PREVIOUS 
ATTRIBUTES 
1. Legal knowledge - A coherent understanding of fundamental areas of legal 
knowledge including the Australian legal system, social justice, cultural and 
international contexts and the principles and values of ethical practice. 
5, 7, 9, 10 
2. Ethics & professional responsibility - A capacity to value and promote honesty, 
integrity, accountability, public service and ethical standards including an 
understanding of approaches to ethical decision making, the rules of professional 
responsibility and, an ability to reflect upon and respond to ethical challenges in 
practice. 
7 
3. Critical analysis & evaluation - A capacity to think critically, strategically and 
creatively including an ability to identify and articulate legal issues, apply 
reasoning and research, engage in critical analysis and make reasoned choices. 
1, 2 
4. Research skills - Well-developed cognitive and practical skills necessary to 
identify, research, evaluate and synthesise relevant factual, legal and policy 
issues. 
4 
5. Communication & collaboration - Effective and appropriate communication 
skills including highly effective use of the English language, an ability to inform, 
analyse, report and persuade using an appropriate medium and message and an 
ability to respond appropriately. 
3, 8 
6. Self-management - The ability to implement appropriate self-management and 
lifelong learning strategies including initiating self-directed work and learning, 
judgment and responsibility, self-assessment of skills, personal wellbeing and 
appropriate use of feedback and, a capacity to adapt to and embrace change. 
8, 6 
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Table 3 Graduate Attributes 2013 curriculum review for Post Graduates including the 
Juris Doctor (JD) 
NEW ATTRIBUTES (PG) PREVIOUS 
ATTRIBUTES 
1. Legal knowledge - An advanced and integrated understanding of a complex body 
of legal knowledge including the Australian legal system, social justice, cultural 
and international contexts, the principles and values of ethical practice, and 
contemporary developments in law and its professional practice. 
5, 7, 9, 10 
2. Ethics & professional responsibility - An advanced and integrated capacity to 
value and promote honesty, integrity, accountability, public service and ethical 
standards including an understanding of approaches to ethical decision making, the 
rules of professional responsibility, an ability to reflect upon and respond to ethical 
challenges in practice, and a developing ability to engage in the profession of law 
and to exercise professional judgment. 
7 
3. Critical analysis & evaluation - A capacity to think critically, strategically and 
creatively including an ability to identify and articulate complex legal issues, apply 
reasoning and research to generate appropriate theoretical and practical responses, 
and, demonstrate sophisticated cognitive and creative skills in approaching complex 
legal issues and generating appropriate responses. 
1, 2 
4. Research skills - Well-developed cognitive and practical skills necessary to 
identify, research, evaluate and synthesise relevant factual, legal and policy issues 
and demonstrate intellectual and practical skills necessary to justify and interpret 
theoretical propositions, legal methodologies, conclusions and professional 
decisions. 
4 
5. Communication & collaboration - Effective and appropriate professional 
communication skills including highly effective use of the English language, an 
ability to inform, analyse, report and persuade using an appropriate medium and 
message and an ability to respond appropriately. 
3, 8 
6. Self-management - A high level of autonomy, accountability and 
professionalism, the ability to implement appropriate self-management and lifelong 
learning strategies including initiating self-directed work and learning, judgment 
and responsibility, self-assessment of skills, personal wellbeing and appropriate use 
of feedback and, a capacity to adapt to and embrace change. 
8, 6 
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Table 4 Level 7 and 9 Course Intended Learning Outcomes 
 
 CILO Level 7 (LLB) CILO Level 9 (JD) 
Legal Knowledge A coherent understanding of 
fundamental areas of legal knowledge 
including: 
The Australian legal system, 
international and comparative contexts, 
theoretical and technical knowledge; 
The broader contexts within which legal 
issues arise and the law operates 
including cultural awareness, social 
justice and policy; and 
The principles and values of justice and 
ethical practices in lawyers’ roles. 
An advanced and integrated understanding 
of a complex body of legal knowledge 
including: 
The Australian legal system, international 
and comparative contexts, theoretical and 
technical knowledge; 
The broader contexts within which legal 
issues arise and the law operates including 
cultural awareness, social justice and 
policy; 
The principles and values of justice and 
ethical practices in lawyers’ roles; and 
Contemporary developments in law and its 
professional practice. 
Ethics & Professional 
Responsibility 
A capacity to value and promote honesty, 
integrity, accountability, public service 
and ethical standards including: 
An understanding of approaches to 
ethical decision making and professional 
responsibility; and 
An ability to recognise, reflect upon and 
respond to ethical issues likely to arise in 
professional contexts in ways that 
evidence professional judgment, promote 
justice and serve the community. 
 
An advanced and integrated capacity to 
value and promote honesty, integrity, 
accountability, public service and ethical 
standards including: 
An understanding of approaches to ethical 
decision making and professional 
responsibility;  
An ability to recognise, reflect upon and 
respond to ethical issues likely to arise in 
professional contexts in ways that 
evidence professional judgment, promote 
justice and serve the community; and 
A developing ability to engage in the 
profession of law and to exercise 
professional judgment. 
Critical Analysis & 
Evaluation 
A capacity to think critically, 
strategically and creatively, including the 
ability to: 
Identify and articulate legal issues in 
context;  
Apply reasoning and research to generate 
appropriate responses; 
Engage in critical analysis and make a 
reasoned choice amongst alternatives; 
and 
Think creatively in approaching legal 
issues and generating appropriate 
responses. 
A capacity to think critically, strategically 
and creatively, including the ability to: 
Identify and articulate complex legal 
issues in context;  
Apply reasoning and research to generate 
appropriate theoretical and practical 
responses; 
Engage in critical analysis and make a 
reasoned choice amongst alternatives; and 
Sophisticated cognitive and creative skills 
in approaching legal issues and generating 
appropriate responses. 
Research Skills Well-developed cognitive and practical 
skills necessary to identify, research, 
evaluate and synthesise relevant factual, 
legal and policy issues. 
Well-developed cognitive and practical 
skills necessary to identify, research, 
evaluate and synthesise relevant factual, 
legal and policy issues and demonstrate 
intellectual and practical skills necessary 
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to justify and interpret theoretical 
propositions, legal methodologies, 
conclusions and professional decisions. 
Communication & 
Collaboration 
Effective and appropriate communication 
skills including: 
Highly effective use of the English 
language to convey legal ideas and views 
to different audiences and environments; 
An ability to communicate to inform, 
analyse, report and persuade. 
An ability to strategically select an 
appropriate medium and message; 
An ability to assess how messages are 
received and alter communication 
strategies accordingly;  
An ability to be responsive and adaptive 
to the perspectives of collaborators, 
clients, counter parties and others; and 
An ability to generate a sustained and 
logical argument. 
Effective and appropriate professional 
communication skills including: 
Highly effective use of the English 
language to convey legal ideas and views 
to different audiences and environments; 
An ability to communicate to inform, 
analyse, report and persuade. 
An ability to strategically select an 
appropriate medium and message; 
An ability to assess how messages are 
received and alter communication 
strategies accordingly;  
An ability to be responsive and adaptive to 
the perspectives of collaborators, clients, 
counter parties and others; and 
An ability to generate a sustained and 
logical argument. 
Self-management The ability to implement appropriate 
self-management and lifelong learning 
strategies including: 
An ability to undertake and initiate self-
directed work and learning; 
Well-developed judgment and 
responsibility as a legal professional in a 
broader social context; 
The ability to support personal and 
professional development by: 
Reflecting on and assessing their own 
capabilities, wellbeing and performance; 
Making use of feedback as appropriate; 
Identifying and accessing appropriate 
resources and assistance; and 
Making use of resources and support in 
developing resilience. 
A capacity to adapt to and embrace 
change and a commitment to ongoing 
learning. 
A high level of autonomy accountability 
and professionalism, and, the ability to 
implement appropriate self-management 
and lifelong learning strategies including: 
An ability to undertake and initiate self-
directed work and learning; 
Well-developed judgment and 
responsibility as a legal professional in a 
broader social context; 
The ability to support personal and 
professional development by: 
Reflecting on and assessing their own 
capabilities, wellbeing and performance; 
Making use of feedback as appropriate; 
Identifying and accessing appropriate 
resources and assistance; and 
Making use of resources and support in 
developing resilience. 
A capacity to adapt to and embrace change 
and a commitment to ongoing learning. 
  
   137 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
A. Books and Book Chapters 
Abramson, Kate, ‘A Sentimentalist’s Defense of Contempt, Shame and Disdain’ in Peter 
Goldie (ed), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion (Oxford University Press, 
2010) 
Aristotle, Rhetoric, Book II Part 1, translated by W Rhys Roberts (The Internet Classics 
Archive) http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/rhetoric.2.ii.html (28/01/2014) 
Arnold, Magda, Emotion and Personality (Columbia University Press, 1960) 
Bandes, Susan (ed), The Passions of Law (New York University Press, 1999) 
Barton, Karen, and Fiona Westwood, ‘Developing Professional Character – Trust, Values 
and Learning’ in Paul Maharg and Caroline Maughan (eds), Affect and Legal Education: 
Emotion in Learning and Teaching the Law (Ashgate, 2011) 
Bell, Macalister, Hard Feelings: The Moral Psychology of Contempt (Oxford University 
Press, 2013) 
Berlant, Lauren (ed), Compassion: The Culture and Politics of an Emotion (Routledge, 
2004) 
Berlant, Lauren, ‘Introduction: Compassion (and Withholding)’ in Lauren Berlant (ed), 
Compassion: The Culture and Politics of an Emotion (Routledge, 2004) 
Biggs, John, Teaching for Quality Learning at University (Open University Press, 1999) 
Biggs, John, Teaching for Quality Learning at University (Open University Press, 2
nd
 ed, 
2003) 
Biggs, John and Catherine Tang, Teaching for Quality Learning at University (Open 
University Press, 4
th
 ed, 2011) 
Calhoun, Cheshire, ‘Subjectivity and Emotion’ in Robert C Solomon (ed), Thinking 
About Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions (Oxford University Press, 2003) 
Calvo, Paco, and John Simons (eds), The Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of 
Psychology (Routledge, 2009) 
Dalgleish, Tim, and Mick Powers (eds), Handbook of Cognition and Emotion (Wiley, 
1999) 
Dal Pont, GE, Lawyers’ Professional Responsibility (Lawbook Co, 3rd ed, 2006) 
Damasio, Antonio, Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason and the Human Brain (Harper 
Collins, 1994) 
Damasio, Antonio, The Feeling of What Happens: Body Emotion and the Making of 
Consciousness (Vintage, 2000) 
Damasio, Antonio, Looking for Spinoza: Joy, Sorrow, and the Feeling Brain (Vintage, 
2004) 
 138 
 
Damasio, Antonio, ‘William James and the Modern Neurobiology of Emotion’ in Dylan 
Evans and Pierre Cruse (eds), Emotion, Evolution, and Rationality (Oxford University 
Press, 2004) 
Davidson, Richard J, Klaus R Schere and H Hill Goldsmith, Handbook of Affective 
Sciences (Oxford University Press, 2002) 
Deigh, John, ‘Primitive Emotions’ in Robert C Solomon (ed), Thinking About Feeling: 
Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions (Oxford University Press, 2003) 
Del Mar, Maksymilian, ‘Legal Understanding and the Affective Imagination’ in Paul 
Maharg and Caroline Maughan (eds), Affect and Legal Education: Emotion in Learning 
and Teaching the Law (Ashgate, 2011) 
Duncan, Nigel, ‘Addressing Emotions in Preparing Ethical Lawyers’ in Paul Maharg and 
Caroline Maughan (eds), Affect and Legal Education: Emotion in Learning and Teaching 
the Law (Ashgate, 2011) 
Eades, Diana, Sociolinguistics and the Legal Process (Multilingual Matters, 2010) 
Eckman, Paul, ‘Basic Emotions’ in T. Dalgliesh and M. Powers (eds), Handbook of 
Cognition and Emotion (John Wiley & Sons, 1999) 
Evans, Dylan, Emotion: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford University Press, 2001) 
Evans, Dylan, and Pierre Cruse (eds), Emotion, Evolution, and Rationality (Oxford 
University Press, 2004) 
Melissa L Finucane, Melissa L, Ellen Peters and Paul Slovic, ‘Judgment and Decision 
Making: The Dance of Affect and Reason’ in Sandra L Schneider and James Shanteau 
(eds), Emerging Perspectives on Judgment and Decision Research (Cambridge 
University Press, 2003) 
Freeman, MDA, Lloyd’s Introduction to Jurisprudence (Sweet and Maxwell Ltd, 7th ed, 
2001) 
Frijda, Nico, The Emotions (Cambridge University Press, 1986) 
Goldie, Peter, The Emotions: A Philosophical Exploration (Oxford University Press, 
2000) 
Goldie, Peter (ed), Understanding Emotions: Mind and Morals (Ashgate, 2002) 
Goldie, Peter, ‘Emotion, Feeling and Knowledge of the World’ in Robert C Solomon 
(ed), Thinking About Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions (Oxford 
University Press, 2003) 
Goldie, Peter (ed), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion (Oxford University 
Press, 2010) 
Greenspan, Patricia, Practical Guilt: Moral Dilemmas, Emotions, and Social Norms 
(Oxford University Press, 1995) 
Griffiths, Paul E, ‘Is Emotion a Natural Kind?’ in Robert C Solomon (ed), Thinking 
About Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotion (Oxford University Press, 2004) 
Gross, Daniel M, The Secret History of Emotion: From Aristotle’s Rhetoric to Modern 
Brain Science (The University of Chicago Press, 2006)  
 139 
 
Haidt, Jonathan, ‘The Moral Emotions’ in Richard J Davidson, Klaus R Schere and H 
Hill Goldsmith, Handbook of Affective Sciences (Oxford University Press, 2002) 
Hughes, Gerard J, Routledge Philosophy Guide to Aristotle on Ethics (Routledge, 2001) 
Kemdal, Anna Blom, and Henry Montgomery, ‘Perspectives and Emotions in Personal 
Decision Making’ in Rob Reynard (ed), Decision Making: Cognitive Models and 
Explanations (Routledge, 1997) 
Koehler, Derek J, and Nigel Harvey (eds), Blackwell Handbook of Judgment and 
Decision Making (Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2004) 
Lamb, Ainslie, and John Littrich, Lawyers in Australia (The Federation Press, 2007) 
Lane, Richard D, and Lynne Nadel (eds), Cognitive Neuroscience of Emotion (Oxford 
University Press, 2000) 
Le Brun, Marlene and Richard Johnstone, The Quiet Revolution: Improving Student 
Learning in Law, (The Law Book Company, 1994) 
Lerner, Alan M, ‘From Socrates to Damasio, from Langdell to Kandel: The Role of 
Emotion in Modern Legal Education’ in Paul Maharg and Caroline Maughan (eds), Affect 
and Legal Education: Emotion in Learning and Teaching the Law (Ashgate, 2011) 
Lewis, Michael, and Jeanette Haviland-Jones (eds), The Handbook of Emotions (Guilford 
Press, 1999) 
Lloyd, Dennis, The Idea of Law (Penguin, 1964)  
Luban, David, Lawyers and Justice: An Ethical Study (Princeton University Press, 1988) 
Maharg, Paul, and Caroline Maughan (eds), Affect and Legal Education: Emotion in 
Learning and Teaching the Law (Ashgate, 2011) 
Maharg, Paul, ‘Space, Absence, Silence: The Intimate Dimensions of Legal Learning’ in 
Paul Maharg and Caroline Maughan (eds), Affect and Legal Education: Emotion in 
Learning and Teaching the Law (Ashgate, 2011) 
Maughan, Caroline, ‘Why Study Emotion?’ in Paul Maharg and Caroline Maughan (eds), 
Affect and Legal Education: Emotion in Learning and Teaching the Law (Ashgate, 2011) 
Kevin Mulligan, ‘Moral Emotions’ in David Sander and Klaus Scherer (eds), The Oxford 
Companion to Emotions and Affective Sciences (Oxford University Press, 2009) 
Murphy, Kevin R (ed), A Critique of Emotional Intelligence: What Are the Problems and 
How Can They Be Fixed? (Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2006) 
Nado, Jennifer, Daniel Kelly and Stephen Stich, ‘Moral Judgment’ in Paco Calvo and 
John Simons (eds), The Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Psychology 
(Routledge, 2009) 
Neu, Jerome, A Tear is an Intellectual Thing: The Meanings of Emotion (Oxford 
University Press, 2000) 
Neu, Jerome, ‘Emotion and Freedom’ in Robert C Solomon (ed), Thinking About 
Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions (Oxford University Press, 2003) 
Nicholson, Donald, and Julian Webb, Professional Legal Ethics: Critical Interrogations 
(Oxford University Press, 1999) 
 140 
 
Nussbaum, Martha C, The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenstic Ethics 
(Princeton University Press, 1994) 
Nussbaum, Martha C, Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions (Cambridge 
University Press, 2001) 
Nussbaum, Martha C, ‘Emotions as Judgments of Value and Importance’ in Robert C 
Solomon (ed), Thinking About Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions 
(Oxford University Press, 2003) 
Nussbaum, Martha C, Hiding From Humanity: Disgust, Shame and the Law (Princeton 
University Press, 2004) 
Oakley, Justin, and Dean Cocking, Virtue Ethics and Professional Roles (Cambridge 
University Press, 2001) 
Parker, Christine, and Adrian Evans, Inside Lawyers Ethics (Cambridge University Press, 
2007) 
Payne, Roy L, and Gary L Cooper (eds), Emotions at Work: Theory, Research and 
Applications in Management (John Wiley & Sons Ltd, 2001) 
Pillsbury, SH, ‘Harlan, Holmes, and the Passion of Justice’ in Susan Bandes (ed), The 
Passions of Law (New York University Press, 1999) 
Prinz, Jesse, ‘Which Emotions Are Basic?’ in Dylan Evans and Pierre Cruses (eds), 
Emotion, Evolution and Rationality (Oxford University Press, 2004) 
Ramsden, Paul, Learning to Teach in Higher Education (Routledge Falmer, 2
nd
 ed, 2003) 
Rettinger, David A, and Reid Hastie, ‘Comprehension and Decision Making’ in Sandra L 
Schneider and James Shanteau (eds), Emerging Perspectives on Judgment and Decision 
Research (Cambridge University Press, 2003) 
Reynard, Rob (ed), Decision Making: Cognitive Models and Explanations (Routledge, 
1997) 
Rhode, Deborah L, Professional Responsibility: Ethics by the Pervasive Method (Aspen 
Publishers, 2
nd
ed, 1998) 
Robinson, Jenefer, ‘Emotion: Biological Fact or Social Construction?’ in Robert C 
Solomon (ed), Thinking About Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions 
(Oxford University Press, 2003) 
Ross, Ysaiah, Ethics in Law: Lawyers’ Responsibility and Accountability in Australia 
(Lexis Nexis Butterworths, 2005) 
Rorty, Amelie Oksenberg (ed), Explaining Emotions (University of California Press, 
1980) 
Sander, David, and Klaus Scherer (eds), The Oxford Companion to Emotions and 
Affective Sciences (Oxford University Press, 2009) 
Scherer, Klaus R, Angela Schorr and Tom Johnstone (eds), Appraisal Processes in 
Emotion: Theory, Methods, Research (Oxford University Press, 2001) 
Scherer, Klaus R, and H Hill Goldsmith, Handbook of Affective Sciences (Oxford 
University Press, 2002) 
 141 
 
Schneider, Sandra L, and James Shanteau (eds), Emerging Perspectives on Judgment and 
Decision Research (Cambridge University Press, 2003) 
Silverman, David (ed), Qualitative Research: Issues of Theory, Method and Practice 
(Sage Publications, 3
rd 
ed, 2011) 
Shklar, J ‘Law and Ideology’ (1964) in MDA Freeman, Lloyd’s Introduction to 
Jurisprudence (Sweet and Maxwell Ltd, 7
th
 ed, 2001) 
Solomon, Robert C, The Passions (Doubleday, 1976) 
Solomon, Robert C, ‘Emotions and Choice’ in Amelie Rorty (ed), Explaining Emotions 
(University of California Press, 1980) 
Solomon, Robert C, Not Passion’s Slave: Emotions and Choice (Oxford University Press, 
2003) 
Solomon, Robert C (ed), Thinking About Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on 
Emotions (Oxford University Press, 2003) 
Solomon, Robert C, ‘Emotions, Thoughts, and Feelings: Emotions as Engagements in the 
World’ in Robert C Solomon (ed), Thinking About Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers 
on Emotions (Oxford University Press, 2003) 
Solomon, Robert C, About Love: Reinventing Romance for Our Times (Hackett 
Publishing Company, 2006) 
Spinoza, Benedict De, Ethics, edited and translated by Edwin Curley, (Penguin Books, 
1996) 
Sripada, Chandra Sekhar, and Stephen Stich ‘Evolution, Culture and the Irrationality of 
the Emotions’ in Dylan Evans and Pierre Cruses (eds), Emotion, Evolution and 
Rationality (Oxford University Press, 2004) 
Stanley, Robb O, and Graham D Burrows, ‘Varieties and Functions of Human Emotion’ 
in Roy L Payne and Gary L Cooper, Emotions at Work: Theory, Research and 
Applications in Management (John Wiley & Sons Ltd, 2003) 
Stroud, Sarah, and Christine Tappolet (eds), Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality 
(Clarendon Press, 2003) 
Terada, Rei, Feeling in Theory: Emotion after the “Death of the Subject” (Harvard 
University Press, 2001) 
Thiele, Leslie Paul, The Heart of Judgment: Practical Wisdom, Neuroscience, and 
Narrative (Cambridge University Press, 2006) 
Vetlesen, Arne Johan, Perception, Empathy, and Judgment: An Inquiry into the 
Preconditions of Moral Performance (The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994) 
Webb, Julian, ‘The Body in Emotion: Thinking Through Embodiment in Legal 
Education’ Paul Maharg and Caroline Maughan (eds), Affect and Legal Education: 
Emotion in Learning and Teaching the Law (Ashgate, 2011) 
Wolski, Bobette, Skills, Ethics and Values for Legal Practice (Lawbook Co, 2
nd
 ed, 2009) 
Woodward, Kathleen, Statistical Panic: Cultural Politics and the Poetics of the Emotions 
(Duke University Press, 2009) 
 142 
 
B. Journal Articles 
Abrams, Kathryn and Hila Keren, ‘Who’s Afraid of Law and Emotions?’ (2010) 94 
Minnesota Law Review 1997 
Alfini, James and Joseph Van Vooren, ‘Is There a Solution to The Problem of Lawyer 
Stress? The Law School Perspective’ (1995-1996) 10 Journal of Law and Health 61 
Allan, Joanna, ‘Learning outcomes in higher education’ (1996) 21 (1) Studies in Higher 
Education 93 
Anderson, Christopher J, ‘The Psychology of Doing Nothing: Forms of Decision 
Avoidance Result From Reason and Emotion’ (2003) 129 (1) Psychological Bulletin 139 
Anleu, Sharyn R, and Kathy Mack, ‘Magistrates Everyday Work and Emotional Labour’ 
(2005) 32 (4) Journal of Law and Society 590 
Arkush, David J, ‘Situating Emotion: A Critical Realist View of Emotion and 
Nonconscious Cognitive Processes for the Law’ (2008) 5 Brigham Young University Law 
Review 1275 
Bagaric, Mirko, and Penny Dimopoulos, ‘Legal Ethics is (Just) Normal Ethics: Towards a 
Coherent System of Legal Ethics’ (2003) 3 (2) Queensland University of Technology Law 
Journal 367 
Bandes, Susan, ‘Repression and Denial in Criminal Lawyering’ (2006) 9 (2) Buffalo Law 
Review 339 
Baxter, Pamela and Susan Jack, ‘Qualitative Case Study Methodology: Study Design and 
Implementation for Novice Researchers’ (2008) 13 (4) The Qualitative Report 544 
Bechara, Antoine, Hanna Damasio and Antonio Damasio, ‘Emotion, Decision Making 
and the Orbital Cortex’ (2000) 10 (3) Cerebral Cortex 295 
Bechara, Antoine, ‘The Role of Emotion in Decision-Making: Evidence From 
Neurological Patients with Orbitofrontal Damage’ (2004) 55 Brain and Cognition 30 
Beck, Connie, Bruce Sales and G Andrew H Benjamin, ‘Lawyer Distress: Alcohol-
Related Problems and Other Psychological Concerns Among A Sample Of Practicing 
Lawyers’ (1995-1996) 10 Journal of Law and Health 1 
Beck, Phyllis, and David Burns, ‘Anxiety and Depression in Law Students: Cognitive 
Intervention’ (1979-1980) 30 Journal of Legal Education 270 
Benjamin, G Andrew H, Alfred Kaszniak, Bruces Sales and Stephen Shanfield, ‘The Role 
of Legal Education in Producing Psychological Distress Among Law Students and 
Lawyers’ (1986) 11 (2) American Bar Foundation Research Journal 225 
Benjamin, G Andrew H, Elaine J Darling and Bruce Sales, ‘The Prevalence of 
Depression, Alcohol Abuse, and Cocaine Abuse Among United States Lawyers’ (1990) 
13 International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 233 
Bennet, Hayley, and GA Broe, ‘Judicial neurobiology, Markarian synthesis and emotion: 
How can the human brain make sentencing decisions?’ (2007) 31 Criminal Law Journal 
75 
Blake, Meredith, and Andrew Ashworth, ‘Some Ethical Issues in Prosecuting and 
Defending Criminal Cases’ [1998] Criminal Law Review 16 
 143 
 
Blasi, Augusto, ‘Emotions and Moral Motivation’ (1999) 29 Journal for the Theory of 
Social Behaviour 1 
Blumenthal, Jeremy A, ‘Does Mood Influence Moral Judgment? An Empirical Test With 
Legal and Policy Implications’ (2005) 29 Law and Psychology Review 1 
Blumenthal, Jeremy A, ‘Law and the Emotions: The Problems of Affective Forecasting’ 
(2005) 80 Indiana Law Journal 155 
Boon, Andrew, ‘Ethics in Legal Education and Training: Four Reports, Three 
Jurisdictions and a Prospectus’ (2002) 5 (1 & 2) Legal Ethics 34 
Bornstein, Brian H, Lahna M Rung and Monica K Miller, ‘The Effects of Defendant 
Remorse on Mock Juror Decisions in a Malpractice Case’ (2002) 20 Behavioural 
Sciences and the Law 393 
Brooks, Brian, ‘Ethics and Legal Education’ (1998) 28 Victoria University Wellington 
Law Review 157 
Burns, Kelly, and Antoine Bechara, ‘Decision Making and Free Will: A Neuroscience 
Perspective’ (2007) 25 Behavioral Sciences and the Law 263 
Burton, Angela Olivia, ‘Cultivating Ethical, Socially Responsible Lawyer Judgment: 
Introducing the Multiple Lawyering Intelligences Paradigm into the Clinical Setting’ 
(2004-2005) 11 Clinical Law Review 15 
Cain, Paul J, ‘A First Step Toward Introducing Emotional Intelligence into the Law 
School Curriculum: The “Emotional Intelligence and the Clinic Student” Class’ (2003-
2004) 14 Legal Education Review 1 
Cassidy, R Michael, ‘Character and Context: What Virtue Theory Can Teach Us about a 
Prosecutor’s Ethical Duty to “Seek Justice”’ (2006) 82 (2) Notre Dame Law Review 101 
Cates, Diana Fritz, ‘Conceiving Emotions: Martha Nussbaum’s Upheavals of Thought’ 
(2003) 31 (2) The Journal of Religious Ethics 325 
Chismar, Douglas, ‘Empathy and Sympathy: The Important Difference’ (1988) 22 The 
Journal of Value Inquiry 257 
Christensen, Sharon and Sally Kift, ‘Graduate Attributes and Legal Skills: Integration of 
Disintegration?’ (2000) 11 Legal Education Review 207 
Clarke, Ben, ‘An ethics survey of Australian criminal law practitioners’ (2003) 27 
Criminal Law Journal 142 
Cocks, Russell, ‘Ethics a Lifelong Journey’ (July 2004) 78 (7) Law Institute Journal 61 
Connolly, Terry, and Marcel Zeelenberg, ‘Regret in Decision Making’ (2002) 11 (6) 
Current Directions in Psychological Science 212 
Corbin, Lillian, ‘Professionalism Redefined: More Than Ethics’ (2001) 26 (3) Alternative 
Law Journal 139 
Coper, Michael, ‘Legal Knowledge, The Responsibility of Lawyers, and the Task of Law 
Schools’ (2007-2008) 39 University of Toledo Law Review 251 
Cossins, Annie, and Ruth Pilkinton, ‘Balancing the Scales: The case for the 
Inadmissibility of Counselling Records in Sexual Assault Trials’ (1996) 19 University of 
New South Wales Law Journal 222 
 144 
 
Cownie, Fiona, ‘Alternative Values in Legal Education’ (2003) 6 (2) Legal Ethics 159 
Cramton, Roger C, and Susan P Koniac, ‘Rule, Story, and Commitment in the Teaching 
of Legal Ethics’ (1996-1997) 38 William & Mary Law Review 145 
Daicoff, Susan, ‘(Oxymoron?) Ethical Decision Making By Attorneys: An Empirical 
Study’ (1996) 48 Florida Law Review 197 
Daicoff, Susan, ‘Lawyer, Know Thyself: A Review of Empirical Research on Attorney 
Attributes Bearing on Professionalism’ (1996-1997) 46 (5) American University Law 
Review 1337 
Daicoff, Susan, ‘Law as a Healing Profession: The Comprehensive Law Movement’ 
(2006) 6 Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal 1 
D’Arms, Justin, ‘Empathy and Evaluative Inquiry’ (1998-2000) 74 Chicago Kent Law 
Review 1467 
D’Arms, Justin, and Daniel Jacobson, ‘The Moralistic Fallacy: On the ‘Appropriateness’ 
of Emotions’ (2000) 61 (1) Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 
Deigh, John, ‘Cognitivism in the Theory of Emotions’ (July 1994) Ethics 824 
Deigh, John, ‘On Nussbaum’s Defense of the Stoic Theory of Emotions’ (2000) 19 
Quinnipiac Law Review 293 
Denckla, Derek A, ‘Forgiveness as a Problem-Solving Tool in the Courts: A Brief 
Response to the Panel on Forgiveness in Criminal Law’ (1999-2000) 27 Fordham Urban 
Law Journal 1613 
Deonna, Julien A, ‘Emotion, Perception and Perspective’ (2006) 60 (1) Dialectica 29 
Deonna, Julien A, and Fabrice Teroni, ‘Taking affective explanations to heart’ (2009) 48 
(3) Social Science Information 358 
De Sousa, Ronald, ‘Moral Emotions’ (2001) 4 Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 109 
Doring, Sabine A, ‘Seeing What to Do: Affective Perception and Rationalist Motivation’ 
(2007) 61 (3) Dialectica 363 
Edwards, Kari, and Tamara S Bryan, ‘Judgmental Biases Produced By Instructions to 
Disregard: The (Paradoxical) Case of Emotional Information’ (1997) 23 (8) Personality 
and Social Psychology Bulletin 849 
Eisenberg, Nancy, ‘Emotion, Regulation, and Moral Development’ (2000) 51 Annual 
Review of Psychology 665 
Elkins, James R, ‘The Pedagogy of Ethics’ (1985) 10 The Journal of the Legal Profession 
37 
Entwistle, Noel, ‘Learning Outcomes and ways of thinking across contrasting disciplines 
and settings in higher education’ (2005) 16 (1) The Curriculum Journal 67 
Etienne, Margareth, ‘The Ethics of Cause Lawyering: An Empirical Examination of 
Criminal Defense Lawyers as Cause Lawyers’ Illinois Public Law and Legal Theory 
Research Papers Series, Research Paper No. 05-06, March 21 2005, available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=690721 
Etzioni, Amitai, ‘Normative-Affective Factors: Toward a New Decision-Making Model’ 
(1988) 9 Journal of Economic Psychology 125 
 145 
 
Evans, Adrian, ‘Lawyer’s Perceptions of Their Values: An Empirical Assessment of 
Monash University Graduates in Law, 1980-1998’ (2001) 12 Legal Education Review 
209 
Feldman, Heidi Li, ‘Codes and Virtues: Can Good Lawyers be Good Ethical 
Deliberators?’ (1995-1996) 69 Southern California Law Review 885 
Fletcher, Laurel E, and Harvey M Weinstein, ‘When Students Lose Perspective: Clinical 
Supervision and the Management of Empathy’ (2002-2003) 9 Clinical Law Review 135 
Frenkel, Douglas N, ‘On Trying to Teach Judgment’ (2001) 12 Legal Education Review 
19 
Gantt, Larry O Natt, ‘Deconstructing Thinking Like a Lawyer: Analysing the Cognitive 
Components of the Analytical Mind’ (2006-2007) 29 Campbell Law Review 413 
Gerdy, Kristin B, ‘Clients, Empathy, and Compassion: Introducing First Year Students to 
the Heart of Lawyering’ (2008-2009) 87 Nebraska Law Review 1 
Giddings, Jeff, ‘Teaching the ethics of criminal law and practice’ (2001) 35 (2) The Law 
Teacher 161 
Glesner, B A, ‘Fear and Loathing in Law Schools’ (1990-1991) 23 Connecticut Law 
Review 627 
Goldie, Peter, ‘Emotions, feelings and intentionality’ (2002) 1 Phenomenology and the 
Cognitive Sciences 235 
Goldie, Peter, ‘Emotion’ (2007) Philosophy Compass 928 
Goodrich, Peter, ‘Law in the Courts of Love: Andreas Capellanus and the Judgments of 
Love’ (1996) 48 Stanford Law Review 633 
Graham Lorie M, and Stephen M McJohn, ‘Cognition, Law, Stories’ (2009) 10 (1) 
Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology 255 
Granfield Robert, and Thomas Koenig, ‘”It’s Hard to be a Human Being and a Lawyer”: 
Young Attorneys and the Confrontation With Ethical Ambiguity in Legal Practice’ 
(2002-2003) 105 West Virginia Law Review 495 
Gray, James, ‘Thawing Out the Law School: Why we need legal education theory’ (2012) 
37 (3) Alternative Law Journal 171 
Green Bruce A, ‘The Role of Personal Values in Professional Decision Making’ (1998) 
11 Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics 19 
Greenspan, Patricia S, ‘Emotional Strategies and Rationality’ (2000) 110 Ethics 469 
Grose, Carolyn, ‘Lawyers and Clients Telling Stories about Ethics (and Everything Else)’ 
(2009) 20 Hastings Women’s Law Journal 163 
Gruen, Rand J, and Gerald Mendelsohn, ‘Emotional Responses to Affective Displays in 
Others: The Distinction Between Empathy and Sympathy’ (1986) 51(3) Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology 609 
Harris, Angela P, and Marjorie M Schultz, ‘A(nother) Critique of Pure Reason: Toward 
Civic Virtue in Legal Education’ (1993) 45 Stanford Law Review 1773 
Harris, Lloyd C, ‘The Emotional Labour of Barristers: An Exploration of Emotional 
Labour by Status Professionals’ (2002) 39 (4) Journal of Management Studies 553 
 146 
 
Hartwell, Steven, ‘Promoting Moral Development Through Experiential Teaching’ 
(1995) 1 Clinical Law Review 505 
Hartwell, Steven, ‘Moral Growth or Moral Angst? A Clinical Approach’ (2004-2005) 11 
Clinical Law Review 115 
Heins, Marilyn, Shirley Nickols Fahey and Lisa Lieden, ‘Perceived Stress in Medical, 
Law, and Graduate Students’ (1984) 59 Journal of Medical Education 169 
Henriss-Anderssen, Diana, ‘Teaching Legal Ethics to First Year Law Students’ (2002) 13 
Legal Education Review 45 
Hess, Gerald F, ‘Heads and Hearts: The Teaching and Learning Environment in Law 
School (2002) 52 Journal of Legal Education 75 
Hussey, Trevor and Patrick Smith, ‘Learning outcomes: a conceptual analysis’ (2008) 13 
(1) Teaching in Higher Education 107 
Hutcherson, Cendri A, and James J Gross, ‘The Moral Emotions: A Social-Functionalist 
Account of Anger, Disgust and Contempt’ (2011) 100 (4) Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology 719 
Juergens, Ann, ‘Practicing What We Teach: The Importance of Emotion and Community 
Connection in Law Work and Law Teaching’ (2004-2005) 11 Clinical Law Review 413 
Kafetsios, Konstantinos, ‘Aristotelian Affinities with Contemporary Emotion Research’ 
(2005) 15 (5) Theory and Psychology 639 
Kahan, Dan M, and Martha C Nussbaum, ‘Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal 
Law’ (1996) 96 (2) Columbia Law Review 269 
Kamvounias, Patty and Darrall Thompson, ‘Assessing Graduate Attributes in the 
Business Law Curriculum’ (2008) 1 (1) Journal of the Australian Law Teachers 
Association 181 
Keen, Suzanne, ‘A Theory of Narrative Empathy’ (2006) 14 (3) Narrative 207 
Kift, Sally, ‘21st Century Climate for Change: Curriculum Design for Quality Learning 
Engagement in Law’ (2008) 18 Legal Education Review 1 
Koniac, Susan P, and Geoffrey C Hazard Jr, ‘Paying Attention to the Signs’ (1995) 58 (3 
& 4) Law and Contemporary Problems 117 
Kovach, Kimberlee K, ‘Lawyer Ethics must Keep Pace With Practice: Plurality in 
Lawyering Roles Demands Diverse and Innovative Ethical Standards’ (2003) 39 Idaho 
Law Review 399 
Krieger, Lawrence S, ‘The Inseparability of Professionalism and Personal Satisfaction: 
Perspectives on Values, Integrity and Happiness’ (2004-2005) 11 Clinical Law Review 
425 
Lacewing, Michael, ‘Emotional Self-Awareness and Ethical Deliberation’ (2005) 18 (1) 
Ratio 65 
Landwehr, Lawrence J, ‘Lawyers as Social Progressives or Reactionaries: The Law and 
Order Cognitive Orientation of Lawyers’ (1982) 7 Law and Psychology Review 39 
Langevoort, Donald C, ‘Behavioural Theories of Judgment and Decision Making in Legal 
Scholarship: A Literature Review’ (1998) 51 Vanderbilt Law Review 1499 
 147 
 
Lazarus, Richard, ‘Cognition and Motivation in Emotion’ (1991) 46 American 
Psychologist 362 
Lerner, Alan, ‘Using our Brains: What Cognitive Science and Social Psychology Teach 
us About Teaching Law Students to Make Ethical, Professionally Responsible, Choices’ 
(2004) 23 Quinnipiac Law Review 643 
Lerner, Jennifer, and Larissa Tiedens, ‘Portrait of the Angry Decision Maker: How 
Appraisal Tendencies Shape Anger’s Influence on Cognition’ (2006) 19 Journal of 
Behavioural Decision Making 115 
Lerman, David M, ‘Forgiveness in the Criminal Justice System: If It Belongs, Then Why 
Is It So Hard To Find?’ (1999-2000) 27 Fordham Urban Law Journal 1663 
Liverani, Mary Rose, ‘Confidential Communications: Support for new subpoena law and 
bouquets for the Attorney General from sexual assault lobby’ (1998) 36 (3) Law Society 
Journal 42 
Luban, David, ‘Reason and Passion in Legal Ethics’ (1999) 51 Stanford Law Review 873 
Maroney, Terry A, ‘Law and Emotion: A Proposed Taxonomy of an Emerging Field’ 
(2006) Law and Human Behaviour 119 
Mason, Michelle, ‘Contempt as a Moral Attitude’ (2003) 113 (2) Ethics 234 
McEachrane, Michael, ‘Emotion, Meaning, and Appraisal Theory’ (2009) 19 (1) Theory 
& Psychology 33 
McPhail, Ken, ‘The Other Objective of Ethics Education: Re-humanising the Accounting 
Profession – A Study of Ethics Education in Law, Medicine, Engineering and 
Accounting’ (2001) 34 Journal of Business Ethics 279 
Mellers, Barbara A, Alan Schwartz, Katty Ho and Ilana Ritov, ‘Decision Affect Theory: 
Emotional Reactions to the Outcomes of Risky Options’ (1997) 8 (6) Psychological 
Science 423 
Menkel-Meadow, Carrie, and Richard H Sander, ‘The “Infusion” Method at UCLA: 
Teaching Ethics Pervasively’ (1995) 58 Law and Contemporary Problems 129 
Montgomery, John E, ‘Incorporating Emotional Intelligence Concepts into Legal 
Education: Strengthening the Professionalism of Law Students’ (2007-2008) 39 
University of Toledo Law Review 323 
Moore, Bert S, ‘The Origins and development of Empathy’ (1990) 14 (2) Motivation and 
Emotion 75 
Mortensen Reid, ‘Lawyers’ Character, Moral Insight and Ethical Blindness’ (2002) 22 
The Queensland Lawyer 166 
Nickerson Stephanie, ‘Role-Play: An Often Misused Learning Strategy (2007-2008) 19 
(4) Essays on Teaching Excellence 1 http://cte.udel.edu/sites/cte/udel.edu/files/u7/TE19-
04.htm (26/09/13) 
Note, ‘Making Docile Lawyers: An Essay on the Pacification of Law Students’ (1997-
1998) 111 Harvard Law Review 2027 
Nussbaum, Martha C, ‘Narrative Emotions: Beckett’s Genealogy of Love’ (1988) 98 (2) 
Ethics 225 
 148 
 
Nussbaum, Martha C, ‘The Use and Abuse of Philosophy in Legal Education’ (1993) 45 
Stanford Law Review 1627 
O’Brien, David, ‘Rescuing the Emotions from Neo-Stoic Theory: A Reply to Martha 
Nussbaum’ (April 2012) Dialogue 197 
O’Brien, Molly Townes, Stephen Tang and Kath Hall, ‘Changing Our Thinking: 
Empirical Research on Law Student Wellbeing, Thinking Styles and the Law Curriculum’ 
(2011) 21 (2) Legal Education Review 149 
Ogletree, Charles J, ‘Beyond Justifications: Seeking Motivations to Sustain Public 
Defenders’ (1992-1993) 106 Harvard Law Review 1239 
O’Shea, Paul, ‘The Complete Law School: Avoiding the Production of ‘Half-lawyers’’ 
(2004) 29 (6) Alternative Law Journal 272 
Parker, Christine, ‘What Do They Learn When They Learn Legal Ethics?’ (2001) 12 
Legal Education Review 175 
Parker, Christine, ‘A Critical Morality For Lawyers: Four Approaches to Lawyers’ 
Ethics’ (2004) 30 (1) Monash University Law Review 49 
Pearce, Russell G, ‘Teaching Ethics Seriously: Legal Ethics as the Most Important 
Subject in Law School’ (1998) 29 (4) Loyola University Chicago Law Journal 719 
Pfister, Hans-Rudiger, and Gisela Bohm, ‘The multiplicity of emotions: A framework of 
emotional functions in decision making’ (2008) 3 (1) Judgment and Decision Making 5 
Phelps, Teresa Godwin, ‘Narratives of Disobedience: Breaking/Changing the Law’ 
(1990) 40 Journal of Legal Education 133 
Pizarro, David, ‘Nothing More Than Feelings? The Role of Emotion in Moral Judgment’ 
(2000) 30 (4) Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 355 
Posner, Eric A, ‘Law and Emotion’ (2000-2001) 89 (6) Georgetown Law Journal 1977 
Prinz, Jesse J, ‘Is Emotion a Form of Perception?’ (2006) 36 Supplement [vol. 32] 
Canadian Journal of Philosophy 137 
Puig, Gonzalo Villalta, ‘Legal Ethics in Australian Law Schools’ (2008) The Law 
Teacher 29 
Rand, Joseph W, ‘Understanding Why Good Lawyers Go Bad: Using Case Studies in 
Teaching Cognitive Bias in Legal Decision-Making’ (2002-2003) 9 Clinical Law Review 
731 
Raporort, Nancy B, ‘Is “Thinking Like a Lawyer” Really What We want to Teach?’ 
(2002) 91 Journal of the Association of Legal Writing Directors 91 
Rhode, Deborah L, ‘Ethics by the Pervasive Method, (1992) 42 Journal of Legal 
Education 31 
Rhode, Deborah L, ‘Into the Valley Of Ethics: Professional Responsibility and 
Educational Reform’ (1995) 58 Law & Contemporary Problems 139 
Rhode, Deborah L, ‘If Integrity is the Answer, What is the Question?’ (2003-2004) 72 
Fordham Law Review 333 
Robertson, Michael, ‘Challenges in the Design of Legal Ethics Learning Systems: An 
Educational Perspective’ (2005) 8 Legal Ethics 222 
 149 
 
Robinson, Dawn T, Lynn Smith-Lovin and Olga Tsoudis, ‘Heinous Crime or Unfortunate 
Accident? The Effectes of Remorse on Responses to Mock Criminal Confessions’ (1994) 
73 (1) Social Forces 175 
Rorty, Amelie Oksenberg, ‘Explaining Emotions’ (1978) 75 (3) The Journal of 
Philosophy 139 
Rosenberg, Joshua D, ‘Interpersonal Dynamics: The Importance of Human Relationships 
in the Practice of Law’ (2003-2004) 58 University of Miami Law Review 1225 
Ross, Mary Massaron, ‘A Basis for Legal Reasoning: Logic on Appeal’ (2006) 3 Journal 
of the Association of Legal Writing Directors 179 
Ryan, Erin, ‘The Discourse Beneath: Emotional Epistemology in Legal Deliberation and 
Negotiation’ (2005) 10 Harvard Negotiation Law Review 231 
Scherr, Alexander, ‘Lawyers and Decisions: A Model of Practical Judgment’ (2002) 47 
Villanova Law Review 161 
Schiltz, Patrick J, ‘On Being a Happy, Healthy, and Ethical Member of an Unhappy, 
Unhealthy, and Unethical Profession’ (1999) 52 Vanderbilt Law Review 871 
Seligman, Martin, Paul R Verkuil and Terry H Kang, ‘Why Lawyers Are Unhappy’ 
(2005) 10 Deakin Law Review 49 
Semmler, Caroline, and Neil Brewer, ‘Research Report: Effects of Mood and Emotion on 
Juror Processing and Judgments’ (2002) 20 Behavioural Sciences and the Law 423 
Shapiro, Daniel L, ‘A Negotiator’s Guide to Emotion: Four ‘Laws’ to Effective Practice’ 
(2001) 7 (2) Dispute Resolution Magazine 3 
Sheldon, Kennon M, and Lawrence S Krieger, ‘Does Legal Education Have Undermining 
Effects on Law Students? Evaluating Changes in Motivation, Values, and Well-Being’ 
(2004) 22 Behavioral Sciences and the Law 261 
Silver, Marjorie A, ‘Emotional Intelligence and Legal Education’ (1999) 5 (4) 
Psychology, Public Policy and Law 1173 
Silver, Marjorie A, ‘Love, Hate and Other Emotional Interference in the Lawyer/Client 
Relationship’ (1999-2000) 6 Clinical Law Review 259 
Silver, Marjorie A, Sanford Portnoy and Jean K Peters, ‘Stress, Burnout, Vicarious 
Trauma, and Other Emotional Realities in the Lawyer / Client Relationship’ [2002-2004] 
Touro Law Review 847 
Silver, Marjorie A, ‘The Professional Responsibility of Lawyers: Emotional Competence, 
Multiculturalism and Ethics’ (2006) 13 (4) Journal of Law and Medicine 431 
Simon, William H, ‘Reply: Further Reflections on Libertarian Criminal Defense’ (1992-
1993) 91 Michigan Law Review 1767 
Smith, Abbe, ‘Defending Defending: The Case for Unmitigated Zeal On Behalf Of 
People Who Do Terrible Things’ (2000) 28 Hofstra Law Review 925 
Smith, Abbe, ‘Too Much Heart and Not Enough Heat: The Short Life and Fractured Ego 
of Empathic, Heroic Public Defender’ (2003-2004) 37 Davis Law Review 1203 
Smith, Abbe, ‘Defending the Unpopular Down-Under’ (2006) Melbourne University Law 
Review 495 
 150 
 
Smith, Abbe, and William Montross, ‘The Calling of Criminal Defense’ (1998-1999) 50 
Mercer Law Review 443 
Solomon, Robert C, ‘The Logic of Emotion’ (1977) 11 (1) Nous 41 
Stoecker, Randy, ‘Evaluating and Rethinking the Case Study’ (1991) 39 (1) The 
Sociological Review 88 
Sturdy, Andrew, ‘Knowing the Unknowable? A Discussion of Methodological and 
Theoretical Issues in Emotion Research and Organizational Studies’ (2003) 10 (1) 
Organization 81 
Sullivan, Barry, and Ellen S Podgor, ‘Respect, Responsibility and the Virtue of 
Introspection: An Essay on Professionalism in the Law School Environment’ (2001) 15 
(1) Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics and Public Policy 117 
Szaniawski, Klemens, ‘Philosophy of Decision Making’ (1980) 45 Acta Psychologica 
327 
Tangney, June Price, Jeff Stuewig and Debra J Mashek, ‘Moral Emotions and Moral 
Behaviour’ (2007) 58 Annual Review of Psychology 345 
Tapp, June Louin, and Felice Levine, ‘Legal Socialization: Strategies for an Ethical 
Legality’ (1974) 27 Stanford Law Review 1 
Taylor, Gabriele, ‘Justifying the Emotions’ (1975) 84 (1) Mind 390 
Tsoudis, Olga, and Lynn Smith-Lovin, ‘How Bad Was It? The Effects of Victim and 
Perpetrator Emotion on Responses to Criminal Court Vignettes’ (1998) 77 (2) Social 
Forces 695 
Turner, Dennis, ‘Infusing Ethical, Moral and Religious Values Into a Law School 
Curriculum: A Modest Proposal’ (1999) 24 (2) University of Dayton Law Review 283 
Valentine, Sean R, and Terri L Rittenburg, ‘The Ethical Decision Making of Men and 
Women Executives in International Business Situations’ (2007) 71 Journal of Business 
Ethics 125 
Volpp, Leti, ‘Lawyering at the Margins: On Reason and Emotion’ (2002-2003) 11 
Journal of Gender, Social Policy and the Law 129 
Vrkleski, Lila, and John Franklin, ‘Vicarious Trauma: The Impact on Solicitors exposure 
to Traumatic Material’ (2008) 14 Traumatology 106. 
Waldman, Ellen, ‘Mindfulness, Emotions, and Ethics: The Right Stuff?’ (2010) 10 (2) 
Nevada Law Journal 513 
Webb, Julian, ‘Being a Lawyer / Being a Human Being’ (2002) 5 Legal Ethics 130 
Wetlaufer, Gerald B, ‘Rhetoric and Its Denial in Legal Discourse’ (1990) 76 Virginia 
Law Review 1545 
Willging, Thomas E, and Thomas G Dunn, ‘The Moral Development of the Law Student: 
Theory and Data on Legal Education’ (1981) 31 Journal of Legal Education 306 
Wispe, Lauren, ‘The Distinction Between Sympathy and Empathy: To Call Forth a 
Concept, A Word is Needed’ (1986) 50 (2) Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 
314 
 151 
 
Zeelenberg, Marcel, Rob MA Nelissen, Seger M Breugelmans and Rik Pieters, ‘On 
emotion specificity in decision making: Why feeling is for doing’ (2008) 3 (1) Judgment 
and Decision Making 18 
C. Cases and Legislation 
Garde-Wilson v Legal Services Board [2008] VSCA 43 
Law Society of NSW v Madden [2008] NSWADT 210 
Legal Practitioners Board v Morel [2004] SASC 168; (2004) 88 SASR 541 
Legal Practitioners Complaints Committee v Pepe [2009] WASC 39 
Legal Practitioners Conduct Board v Jones [2010] SASCFC 51 
MG v R [2007] NSWCCA 57 
R v Skaf [2005] NSWCCA 297 
Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) 
Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) 
D. Other 
Australian Council of Law Deans, ‘A Catalogue of the Teaching of Legal Ethics, 
Professional Responsibility, etc. in Australian Law Courses’, November 2008, 3. 
http://www.cald.asn.au/docs/4.1Ethics.pdf (16/05/2012) 
ANU Law School Reform Committee, ‘Breaking the Frozen Sea: The case for reforming 
legal education at the Australian National University’ (Law School Reform ANU Law 
Students Society, 2010) 
Beaton Consulting, ‘New Survey finds professionals have more depressive symptoms 
than general population’ (MediaRelease,13May 2007) 
http://www.beyondblue.org.au/index.aspx?link_id=105.898&oid=921 (12/11/09) 
‘Margaret Cunneen’s Lecture: Living Within the Law’ Sydney Morning Herald, 
September 24, 2005 http://www.smh.com.au/news/national/margaret-cunneens-
lecture/2005/09/23/112698 (23/03/11) 
Eades, Diana, ‘Telling and retelling your story in court: Questions, assumptions, and 
intercultural implications’ (Paper presented at Cultures and the Law, Australasian 
Institute of Judicial Administration, 25
th
 Annual Conference, Melbourne, Sunday 14 
October 2007) 
Evers, Maxine, Leanne Houston and Paul Redmond, ‘Good Practice Guide (Bachelor of 
Laws): Ethics and Professional Responsibility (Threshold Learning Outcome 2)’ 2011. 
Support for the original work was provided by the Australian Learning and Teaching 
Council Ltd, an initiative of the Australian Government Department of Education, 
Employment and Workplace Relations 
Harling, Kenneth, ‘An Overview of Case Study’ 
http://www.farmfoundation.org/news/articlefiles/284-1_harling.pdf 
 152 
 
Michael Robertson, ‘Renewing a Focus on ethics in Legal Education’ (2004) 
http://anulaw.anu.edu.au/sites/all/files/users/u4081600/Conference_docs/mikerobertson.p
df (17/05/13) 
Solomon, Robert C, ‘The Passions: Philosophy and the Intelligence of Emotions’ Lecture 
Series Part One, The Teaching Company Limited Partnership, 2006, 14. Available from 
http://www.teachersyndicate.com/documents/oct_2010/TTC%20Guidebooks/Passions%2
0-%20Philosophy%20and%20the%20Intelligence%20of%20Emotions.pdf (21/02/2011) 
UTS Institute for Interactive Media and Learning, 
http://www.iml.uts.edu.au/curriculum/definitions.html 
Mark Whittaker, ‘Did She Do It? Why Kathleen Folbigg May Not Have Killed Her Four 
Babies’ Sydney Morning Herald, 2 February 2013 http://www.smh.com.au/national/did-
she-do-it-why-kathleen-folbigg-may-not-have-killed-her-four-babies-20130128-
2dfnw.html 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
